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Abstract 
Social power, or the ability to control resources and influence others’ 
outcomes, has been found to facilitate successful attainment of single goals by 
increasing attentional focus and the ability to inhibit irrelevant information. 
However, the relationship between power and multiple-goal pursuit has not yet been 
investigated. The current thesis first examined whether power influences strategies 
during multiple-goal pursuit. It was hypothesized that powerful individuals are more 
inclined to single-task (attend to tasks in a sequential manner) and powerless 
individuals tend to multitask (attend to tasks simultaneously or switch rapidly 
between them) when faced with multiple demands. Six studies were conducted and 
showed (in general) a effect of power on multitasking and prioritization tendencies. 
Specifically, reported tendency for multitasking and number of switches planned 
between various tasks decreased as a function of power (Chapter 2). This negative 
relationship between power and multitasking tendency was replicated by measuring 
how many times participants actually switched between multiple goals during goal 
striving (Chapter 3). Moreover, power was also found to increase prioritization 
tendency. Second, the thesis investigated the relationship between power and 
multitasking ability (Chapter 4). It was predicted that powerless participants will 
show lower multitasking ability than control and powerful participants. Three 
experiments found that powerless (compared to control and powerful) participants 
displayed lower performance in dual-tasking and task-switching paradigms, and 
reported lower abilities in the management of multiple-goals. However, the effect of 
power on multitasking ability may depend on the multitasking context. These results 
were found using experimentally manipulated power, individual differences in 
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power, and real-world power roles. Potential mediating factors of power such as 
mood, confidence, anxiety, rumination, and motivation were also measured. Overall, 
the thesis established an ironic effect of power as powerless individuals had a higher 
multitasking tendency but underperformed during demanding multitasking 
situations.  
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1.1 Preface 
Hierarchical differentiations have been prevalent throughout history in both 
human and animal populations. Despite the worldwide endorsement and promotion 
of equality in recent years, almost all cultures, organizations, and groups still have 
salient power differentials with asymmetrical distributions of resources among 
individuals. Given the ubiquitous nature of social power, there has been an 
increasing interest in how the amount of power one possesses (or lacks) can 
influence cognition and action.  
One well documented effect is that power facilitates, whereas powerlessness 
hinders, self-regulation and the attainment of goals (DeWall, Baumeister, Mead, & 
Vohs, 2011; Guinote, 2007c; Overbeck & Park, 2006; Scheepers, de Wit, Ellemers, 
& Sassenberg, 2012). This effect has been attributed to the fact that powerholders, 
who are at the top of the hierarchy, can benefit from increased freedom, security, 
and rewards, and have more control over their own as well as the other’s outcomes 
(Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). As a consequence, 
powerholders are able to devote their undivided attention to their primary goals and 
needs and regulate their behaviors accordingly (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 
2003; Guinote, 2007a). On the other hand, powerlessness increases dependency, 
restraints, and potential threats (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007), and these challenging 
environments incur multiple concerns for the individual. They therefore need to pay 
attention to various sources of information, such as their superiors’ actions (Fiske, 
1993) and the unpredictable environment (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), in order to predict the future and to regain control. 
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This can increase distractibility and divert attention from pursuing the focal goal 
because all, instead of only those relevant for the focal goal, information are 
potentially important. As a result, low-power individuals exhibit goal pursuit deficits 
compared to high-power individuals (DeWall et al., 2011; Guinote, 2007c; Slabu & 
Guinote, 2010; Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008).  
However, thus far previous studies have not examined whether power affects 
the pursuit of multiple goals and multitasking (also known as polychronicity), where 
individuals pursue two or more goals simultaneously (i.e., dual-tasking) or in rapid 
succession by continuously switching between them (i.e., task-switching). This is 
unfortunate because in everyday lives we usually face a variety of demands that 
compete for our attention. For example, modern technology and flexible work ethic 
constantly offer opportunities to do more than one task at a time. Whether driving 
and talking on cell phones, or being notified of emails while working, we are 
frequently exposed to multiple inputs and opportunities (Lindbeck & Snower, 2000). 
Similarly, studies in goal pursuit and performance literatures have not looked at 
whether social factors, in particular the position that individuals occupy in the social 
hierarchy, can affect multitasking behavior and performance. Instead, past research 
has mostly focused on how goal progress (Schmidt, Dolis, & Tolli, 2009), positive 
affect (Carver, 2003), sensation seeking tendency (Sanbonmatsu, Strayer, Medeiros-
Ward, & Watson, 2013), motivational state (Pierro, Giacomantonio, Pica, 
Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2012), culture (Allen, 1992), and anxiety (Derakshan & 
Eysenck, 2009) can affect multitasking tendency and performance. The current 
thesis will address this gap in the literature by investigating the effect that power has 
on how individuals pursue multiple goals and on their ability to multitask.  
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Drawing on the idea that power increases (whereas powerlessness decreases) 
attentional focus and prioritization of goal-consistent information, and on evidence 
that the ability to focus attention and the amount of distractions experienced affects 
multiple-goal pursuit (Ansari, Derakshan, & Richards, 2008; Appelbaum, 
Marchionni, & Fernandez, 2008; Lehle, Steinhauser, & Hübner, 2009; Ophir, Nass, 
& Wagner, 2009), it was predicted that power can influence how individuals pursue 
multiple goals. Powerless individuals’ need for control encourages them to attend to 
multiple sources of information, and this willingness to perceive different 
information as equally important will encourage interruptions and multitasking 
behavior (i.e., higher polychroncitiy). Conversely, powerholder’s tendency to 
prioritize and focus attention on goal-relevant information will foster a single-
tasking pursuit of multiple goals (i.e., higher monochronicity), which involves 
switching to another goal only after one goal has been progressed to a sufficient 
degree (Bluedorn, Kalliath, Strube, & Martin, 1999). 
The second question addressed in the thesis is whether power affects 
performance during multitasking. Multitasking is attentionally more demanding and 
challenging than focusing on only one task (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Kruglanski 
et al., 2002; Pashler, 1993; Pashler & Johnston, 1998; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 
2001; Stephen Monsell, 2003). Therefore being vigilant to irrelevant information 
and off-task concerns in powerless individuals can be distractive and absorb 
attentional resources necessary for efficient multitasking. This will then decrease 
performance during challenging multitasking situations, which are highly dependent 
on the amount of cognitive resources available and allocated to the tasks. Since 
powerless individuals seek more information and have less capacity to control 
  
16 
 
attention during multitasking situations, then low power may ironically lead to 
increased multitasking behavior, but less ability to multitask.  
Before introducing the empirical chapters, the current thesis will first review 
the literature on power as well as on multiple goals and multitasking. The first part 
of the introductory chapter will define social power, summarize various 
operationalization of power, and review the influence of power on attention and goal 
pursuit. Together, evidences provided in this section suggest a gap in the power 
literature regarding multiple-goal pursuit. This will then be followed with a second 
section which will present the literature on multiple goals. The second section was 
divided into two main domains. The first area revolved around behaviors and 
strategies that people use during multiple-goal pursuit, where researchers 
investigated how individuals approached multiple goals. The second strand looked 
at multitasking ability. Work in this field has examined whether individuals are 
generally better at single-tasking as compared to multitasking, and what can affect 
multitasking ability. Lastly, the final section of the introduction will describe the 
present research questions and explain how power can impact both the behavior and 
the performance aspects during the pursuit of multiple goals. The introduction will 
end with an overview of the next empirical chapters.  
The introduction will be followed by three empirical chapters that will 
explore the effect of power on how individuals approach multiple goals, whether or 
not individuals prioritize the various goals that they have, and performance during 
multitasking situations. To test the hypothesis that power affects the kind of 
strategies employed during multiple-goal pursuit, a variety of methodologies were 
used including self-reports, planning, and measuring actual behaviors. For example, 
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participants were asked to report directly their tendency to engage to multiple tasks 
simultaneously and to plan out the number of switches they will make from one 
activity to another (Chapter 2). Participants’ strategies during goal striving were also 
assessed by measuring how many times they actually switched from one task to the 
other during simulated multitasking situations (Chapter 3). As power decreased, the 
number of planned and actual switches increased, which indicates a higher 
propensity to multitask. Finally, the relationship between multitasking ability and 
power was addressed using dual-tasking and task-switching paradigms, as well as 
using self-reports (Chapter 4).  
1.2 Social Power 
1.2.1 The Experimental Study of Power 
Social power is arguably one of the most important concepts in social 
sciences (Russell, 1938), as it is present in virtually all relationships that we have. 
Whether it is between individuals (e.g., parent and child), within groups (e.g., in 
organizational settings), or between social groups (e.g., ethnicities, genders, and 
socio-economic classes), power has a profound impact on how individuals think, 
feel, and act. Defining power has not always been easy, as it is a complex and 
multifaceted concept. However, explicit definitions are essential in order to be able 
to empirically study social power. Traditionally, power has been defined as the 
ability to influence others at will, where the powerful person can cause the 
powerless person to behave in a certain way through social compliance (Dahl, 1957; 
Huston, 1983; Freeman & Pruitt, 1976).  
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It has later been proposed that defining power in terms of influencing others 
is problematic because it only explains the effect or consequence of power, but not 
what power actually is (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). Rather than describing power 
through its consequences, many researchers started to define power as an 
individual’s relative ability to possess and control valuable resources and outcomes 
(Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Keltner et al., 2003). 
That is, hierarchical differences in power can significantly modify the state of an 
individual through asymmetrical control over valuable resources, which allows the 
powerholder to withhold rewards or administer punishments towards those with less 
power (Dépret & Fiske, 1999; Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; French & Raven, 1959; 
Yukl & Falbe, 1991). These can be material resources (e.g., food and shelter) or 
social and psychological resources (e.g., knowledge and affection). The control of 
these resources can exist at an individual level (e.g., subordinates vs. managers) or at 
an intergroup level (e.g., gender). This definition of power also suggests that people 
who have control over others’ outcomes have power, regardless of whether or not 
they attempt to use their power to influence other individuals. Thus the most 
common definition of power, and the one adapted by the current thesis, is the ability 
to influence others by having control over resources or outcomes.  
The current definition of power does not focus solely on a single outcome or 
resource, but proposes that power is present in almost all contexts, and can exist in 
the absence of formal roles (e.g., within informal groups; Weber, 1947). It also 
distinguishes power from other related constructs such as status and dominance. 
Although power has been commonly associated with social status (Knippenberg, 
1991), but status is related to attributes that produce differences in respect and 
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prominence, and not necessarily the ability to allocate resources. Therefore it is 
possible to have power without status (e.g., a corrupt politician), or status without 
relative power (e.g., a religious leader; Blader & Chen, 2012). In addition, power is 
different than dominance, as dominance is the act of acquiring or wanting power as 
the end-goal. Hence it is possible to possess power without dominant behaviors 
(e.g., obtaining powerful positions through cooperation). Thus both status and 
dominance can be determinants, but not synonyms, of power.  
We have evolved to be very sensitive to power and dominance cues because 
noticing power differences in social situations are so prevalent and important for 
survival. For example, we can in just a few milliseconds recognize whether a face is 
dominant or submissive (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Moreover, even in informal 
one-to-one interactions, individuals often implicitly assume complementary power 
postures and behaviors where one person acts in a more powerful manner than 
another, who in turn assumes a more submissive role (Markey, Funder, & Ozer, 
2003; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). In fact, research has showed that the reason why 
social hierarchies exist is because individuals have an indirect preference for them as 
hierarchical relationships are easier to cognitively process, understand, and 
remember (Zitek & Tiedens, 2012). Given the importance and prevalence of power 
in our society, researchers have actively tried to explain the concept of social power 
in order to investigate its impact on our feelings, thoughts, perceptions, and actions 
(Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007b; Guinote, 
Judd, & Brauer, 2002). 
The experience of having or lacking power can be derived from social 
relationships and interactions, as well as from the psychological property of the 
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individual. For example, sense of power can be measured as an individual trait 
variable, where some people generally feel more in control across different social 
contexts and relationships compared to others. These individual differences can 
result from chronic personal experiences based on social roles, group memberships, 
or dominant personalities. In fact, measures of general sense of power correlate with 
people’s standing in social hierarchies and whether they occupy powerful or 
powerless social roles in real-life (e.g., possessing a managerial vs. a subordinate 
role at work; Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). As a consequence, differences in social 
power can be measured as an individual difference variable through social roles 
(Guinote & Phillips, 2010) or the sense of power scale (Anderson & Galinsky, 
2006), 
In addition, as suggested by the definition, one’s sense of power is also 
malleable because it can rely on an individual’s relative control over outcomes 
during a particular situation. For example, in a single day, one may experience both 
having power (e.g., supervising employees at work) and lacking it (e.g., getting a 
traffic ticket). Since the degree of power experienced can depend on one’s 
circumstance such that those with high sense of power can also activate low-power 
emotions and vice versa, then it can also be manipulated in the laboratory. 
Laboratory manipulations of power allow researchers to empirically investigate the 
effect that power has on behavior and cognition.  
One popular manipulation of power is to randomly assign participants to 
manager or subordinate roles based on ostensible leadership abilities (e.g., DeWall, 
Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs, 2011; Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007a). This can 
simulate real-life power experiences in a controlled environment. Power has also 
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been operationalized through experiential priming by asking participants to recall a 
past event where they felt powerful or powerless (Galinsky et al., 2003), by 
exposing participants to power-related words (Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009; 
Smith & Trope, 2006), and, more recently, by embodying power through mimicking 
low- vs. high-power body postures (Bohns & Wiltermuth, 2012; Carney, Cuddy, & 
Yap, 2010; Huang, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Guillory, 2011). Priming power can 
function in the same manner as actually experiencing it, because the concept of 
power is linked in memory to various characteristics and behavioral tendencies. 
Therefore when the construct of power is activated, whether via actual experience of 
a powerful or powerless role or by mere exposure to cues related to powerfulness or 
powerlessness, then the same associated concepts and tendencies will also be 
activated (Bargh, 1997).  
The converging results obtained from different power manipulations support 
the idea that merely exposing individuals to the concept of powerfulness or 
powerlessness is enough to alter people’s mindsets to correspond to their respective 
roles. For example, power increased tendency for action regardless of whether it was 
structurally manipulated (Experiment 1) or primed (Experiment 2; Galinsky et al., 
2003; see also DeWall et al., 2011). Moreover, experimental manipulations of power 
yield similar results to naturally occurring power. For instance, power increases 
attention to stereotype-consistent information and reliance on ease of retrieval in 
both randomly assigned power conditions and actual power in managerial contexts 
(Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Guinote & Phillips, 2010; Weick & Guinote, 2008).  
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1.2.2 The Power Mind-Set and Theories of Power 
Regardless of how power is operationalized, it can have a profound impact 
on an individual’s world and mind-set by affecting sense of security and control 
(Keltner et al., 2003). This, in turn, can have a significant effect on how 
environmental information is processed and attended to, which can then influence 
cognition and action in meaningful and predictable ways. According to many 
scholars, organisms respond to the environment either through approaching or 
avoiding (Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 2000; Elliot & Covington, 2001; Gray, 1982, 
1987, 1991, 1994; Higgins, 1997). For example, Higgins’s (1997, 1999) theory of 
promotion and prevention self-regulatory focus proposes that individuals can either 
have a promotion focus on gaining and approaching rewards and positive outcomes, 
or a prevention focus towards securing needs and avoiding punishments or negative 
outcomes. Behavior approach system allows individuals to focus on obtaining goals 
and increases forward locomotion, whereas the behavioral inhibition system 
increases feelings of threat and uncertainty, and creates vigilance and attention 
towards potential punishments. As will be described later in the thesis, having a 
promotion or prevention goal orientation may not only be affected by power, but it 
can also influence how resources are allocated during multiple-goal situations 
(Schmidt & DeShon, 2007).   
Keltner and colleagues applied this idea of approach and inhibition to the 
social context of power, and argued that power can influence the relative balance 
between approach and inhibition tendencies. The approach/inhibition theory of 
power (Keltner, et al., 2003) suggests that different levels of power can alter the 
frequency of threats and uncertainties that an individual will face. High-power is 
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associated with abundant resources and rewards, and the freedom to act according to 
one’s own will without the types of external interferences experiments by powerless 
individuals. This reward-rich environment, and freedom from evaluation, should 
promote the approach-related cognition, affect, and behavior that are focused on 
rewards and opportunities. For example, in the real world, adults from higher 
socioeconomic status (a measure correlated with high power) tend to report lower 
levels of mistrust in others (Mirowsky & Ross, 1983) and lower levels of worry 
about crime (Riger, LeBailly, & Gordon, 1981) than individuals from low 
socioeconomic status. Moreover, people who have high sense of power perceived 
less risk in their own lives and in the world, and were more optimistic about 
uncontrollable situations such as avoiding airplane turbulence (Anderson & 
Galinsky, 2006). This optimism and reward-focused attention also led to higher 
engagement in risky behaviors.   
On the other hand, powerlessness should activate the behavioral inhibition 
system, because less powerful individuals have fewer material and social resources. 
This decreases security and independence, because in order to survive, those who 
are powerless must focus on the threats and potential punishments that are 
continuously imposed on them by their environment (Fast & Gruenfeld, 2009; Fiske, 
1993; Guinote, 2007a; Steele & Aronson, 1995). This inhibited behavior of 
powerless individuals is adaptive for survival, as they are more likely to be 
victimized by those with more power. For example, discrimination and violence are 
targeted more towards minority groups and those in lower status or social classes 
(Gottfredson & Hindelang, 1981; Sanday, 1981; Sidanius, 1993; Whitney & Smith, 
1993). Being constrained by the environment and having to rely on other’s 
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evaluations should encourage powerless individuals to regulate their behaviors in a 
more inhibited manner in order to avoid threats and punishments.  
Instead of focusing on approach vs. inhibition-related behaviors, another 
theory of power emphasizes the effect that power has on the need for control. 
According to Fiske’s (1993) power as control model, the experience of power can 
alter the satisfaction of the fundamental need for control, and is based on the idea of 
control motivation where individuals have a universal need to seek and maintain 
control and predictability. Several theorists from a range of areas including social, 
health, and developmental psychology agree that being able to control the 
environment is a core motive (Brehm, 1993; Fiske & Emery, 1993; Stevens & Fiske, 
1995). For example, individuals have an instinct to master and control (Hendrick, 
1943), to avoid helplessness (Sullivan, 1947), and to strive for personal causation 
(de Charms, 1968). This desire to control the environment is present from infancy 
(Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979), and can determine adult’s mental health by reducing 
stress and increasing one’s capacity to cope with unavoidable negative events (Fiske 
& Taylor, 1984; Lefcourt, 1972). In contrast, lack of control increases reactivity to 
stress both in terms of physiological changes and reported symptoms. Together, 
evidence from various psychology disciplines concedes that sense of control is a 
central human need.  
Past research also suggests that control deprivation increases activities that 
can compensate for this loss, such as information-seeking behaviors or engaging in 
effortful impression formation processes (Pittman & Heller, 1987). Common 
empirical manipulations of control include non-contingencies between actions and 
outcomes, variations in naturally occurring depression episodes, unexpected 
  
25 
 
negative events, or concern over outcomes (for a review, see Pittman & Heller, 
1987). In most situations, those who lack control are more likely to seek information 
and knowledge not because of increased curiosity and interest, but to gain prediction 
and control in order to effectively manage themselves and their environments 
(Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1972). This is because having a 
comprehensive and coherent understanding of another person’s behavior or of their 
surroundings can help low-power individuals to better anticipate other people’s 
action and possible situational changes. Hence information seeking tendencies are a 
natural consequence of control deprivation.  
As a consequence, power can exert its influence on an individual by either 
depriving or providing control (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Depret & Fiske, 
1993). Numerous findings support the idea that feelings of control are associated 
with power. For example, people with real-life power such as those in high 
socioeconomic status (Lachman & Weaver, 1998) and members of dominant groups 
(Guinote, Brown, & Fiske, 2006), are more likely to believe that they can control the 
future compared to individuals with a more disadvantaged background. Similarly, 
experimental manipulations of power can also elevate one’s sense of personal 
control, even when the control is illusory. Moreover, participants who recalled a 
time when they felt powerful preferred to role a dice themselves compared to low-
power and baseline participants. Elevated sense of control could also explain 
approach-related behaviors such as the tendency to act (Galinsky et al., 2003; 
Magee, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Wagner, 2007), as well as mediating the relationship 
between power, optimism, self-esteem, and risk-taking (Anderson & Galinsky, 
2006; Fast & Gruenfeld, 2009). In addition, powerful individuals, who already have 
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control over their own as well as their dependent’s outcomes, have lower 
perspective taking abilities compared to powerless individuals (Galinsky, Magee, 
Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006). This is because those with high power do not need to rely 
on an accurate and comprehensive understanding of others in order to accomplish 
their goals. They therefore have greater freedom and an increased sense of control, 
and can act without any external interference.  
In contrast, people who are powerless usually follow orders and are at the 
disposal of the powerful (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003), and this outcome 
dependency makes the world seem less controllable. Since having a sense of control 
is a highly adaptive human motive, and its absence can lead to depression, 
pessimism, and withdrawal from challenging situations (Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978; Price, Choi, & Vinokur, 2002), then lacking control can have a 
profound impact on an individual. As a result, powerless individuals are constantly 
motivated to gain and restore control and predictability in order to avoid potential 
threats. For example, powerless individuals spontaneously adopt another person’s 
visual perspective and are more accurate in determining emotions expressed by 
others (Galinsky et al., 2006). Increasing perspective taking and empathy is an 
effective way to restore control by predicting and understanding other people’s 
intentions. This need to restore control is so strong that it even drives them to see 
non-existent patterns in their environments (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). This thesis 
will propose that in order for powerless individuals to restore control, they will be 
motivated to multitask because multitasking allows them to attend to all information 
and treat all tasks as equally important, as opposed to only focusing on and 
prioritizing a single task.  
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In sum, there is indisputable evidence that being in a high- or low-power role 
can transform people psychologically. Powerless individuals experience a more 
ambiguous and unstable situation compared to the reward-rich and predictable 
environment of the powerholder (Fast & Gruenfeld, 2009). Since much of human 
cognition is motivated by our basic needs to interact effectively with the 
environment (Fiske, 1992; Pittman & D’Agostino, 1989; Skinner, 1995), then these 
feelings of security and control associated with having or lacking power can alter the 
way we view the world and guide our attention and action. The relationship between 
power and attention is important, as the way individuals attend to and process 
information around them can influence how they approach multiple goals and their 
multitasking ability (Kernan & Lord, 1990; Ophir et al., 2009; Shah & Kruglanski, 
2002; Strayer, Watson, & Drews, 2011). Thus the next section will discuss how 
decreased (vs. increased) control and inhibition (vs. approach) focus elicited by low 
(vs. high) power can affect attention and behaviors.  
1.3 Power and Attention Allocation  
Attention refers to a cognitive system that allows us to select and process 
specific information while ignoring other information in the environment that is 
deemed as less relevant or important (Driver, 2001; Maitlin, 2005; Pashler, 1998; 
Posner & Petersen, 1989; Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2010). Researchers have long 
recognized the importance of studying the concept of attention (Hillyard & Picton, 
1987; James, 1890), and have proposed three major functions of attention 
(Kahneman, 1973; Posner & Boies, 1971): orienting to sensory events, detecting 
signals of focal processing, and maintaining a vigilant or alert state.  
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Regardless of which attentional subsystem is being used, an individual’s 
attention can be selective and focused on a specific stimulus or it can be divided 
between multiple stimuli (Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Petersen, 1991; 
Pashler, 1998). For example, situational demands may require an individual to detect 
only one stimulus from the environment, or it may be necessary to detect multiple 
cues and inputs (e.g., when faced with multiple demands). Attention can also be 
differentiated between top-down (goal-driven) vs. bottom-up (stimulus-driven) 
information processing (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Taatgen, 2005). Top-down 
attention is when we voluntarily concentrate on or look for a certain type of cue, 
such as focusing on a given task or goal. On the other hand, bottom-up processing of 
information is when salient cues in our environment grab our attention unexpectedly 
and involuntarily (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). This attentional system is recruited 
during the detection of behaviorally relevant sensory events, and is more adaptive 
during unpredictable situations that call for heightened vigilance (Moser, Becker, & 
Moran, 2012).  
Sometimes, individuals may voluntarily adopt a focused and top-down 
attention, instead of a divided and bottom-up attention, depending on personal 
motivations and preferences. However, in other situations our attention might be 
involuntarily guided by stimulus-driven information and divided between relevant 
and irrelevant information. The ability to voluntarily maintain a focused and top-
down attention even in the face of distractions is known as attentional control 
(Burgess et al., 2010; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & 
Calvo, 2007). Since attention is functionally linked to the needs and challenges that 
individuals face in their situations, then the different goals that powerful and 
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powerless individuals try to satisfy can affect both the voluntary focus of attention 
as well as attentional control. The next sections will first illustrate how power affects 
voluntary allocation of attention in terms of information seeking tendencies and 
goal-related behaviors, and then present evidence for the relationship between power 
and attentional control.  
1.3.1 Power and Information Seeking  
Power can influence how individuals attend to and process information as it 
activates different modes of behavioral control that is more adaptive to one’s 
respective high or low-power positions. According to the previously mentioned 
approach/inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) and the power as control 
model (Fiske, 1993), powerless individuals are faced with constraints and 
dependency on external circumstances. Therefore those without power should 
exhibit a wider scope of attention because they are constantly attending to multiple 
sources of information in order to increase predictability and control, and to encode 
potential warnings. Thus they will by default have a more divided attention. On the 
other hand, and as proposed by the situated focus theory of power (SFTP), the 
freedom and control of powerholders allow them to concentrate on the primary 
factors that drive cognition in a particular situation, and decrease their need to 
process all available information (Guinote, 2007a; Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 2012). 
This is because living in a safe and unthreatening environment increases sense of 
security and control, which will in turn decrease vigilance to potential dangers or 
challenges. Powerful individuals can therefore afford to ignore irrelevant inputs by 
selectively processing superfluous information and demonstrate attentional focus 
(Guinote, 2007a).  
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A number of empirical studies, especially in social attention and decision-
making literature, support the idea that power affects how individuals voluntarily 
seek information from the environment. It has been documented that those who have 
less power, in both human populations (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & 
Yzerbyt, 2000; Smith & Trope, 2006) and nonhuman primates (Shepherd, Deaner, 
& Platt, 2006), tend to be more vigilant towards the actions and characteristics of 
those who possess a higher role in the social hierarchy. For example, in the animal 
world, having lower status and power correlates with heightened arousal and 
scanning behavior, which translates to fast and reflexive gaze-following and 
monitoring of higher-status primates (Deaner, Khera, & Platt, 2005; Keverne, 
Leonard, Scruton, & Young, 1978).  
Similarly, low-power individuals are also more vigilant and attend to others 
more carefully in order to navigate through a more threatening social environment. 
Powerless people are motivated to form an accurate impression of others by 
gathering and processing as much information as they can about those that they 
depend on in order to predict and potentially influence and control their own 
outcomes (Fiske, 1992). Gathering more information regarding another person 
means that powerless individuals will increase their chances of understanding their 
current situation, which can help them infer how it will affect their outcomes in 
order to discern potential actions. For example, in many situations powerless 
individuals need to wait for instructions before they can act (Galinsky et al., 2003), 
and are unable to fully commit to one type of action as they need to be prepared to 
change their plans according to their superior’s goals and directions. Therefore in 
order to be prepared for unexpected events, low-power individuals are willing to 
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frequently attend to the behaviors of high-power individuals in order to recognize 
their intentions. On the other hand, lacking outcome dependency decreases 
incentives to engage in accuracy-based impression strategies when perceiving other 
people. This is because those with power do not need to pay extra attention, as their 
fates are not dependent on other people.  
The literature on power and stereotyping also supports the notion that 
powerless individuals prefer to allocate attention to more features of a target 
compared to powerful individuals. Due to outcome dependency, powerless 
individuals prefer to engage in the more effortful process of individuation in order to 
form more accurate and less stereotype-consistent attributions and impressions of 
others (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). In contrast, powerholders can afford to make 
inaccurate judgments and attempt to simplify impression formation of understanding 
others by categorizing them as members of familiar social groups (Ashmore & Del 
Boca, 1981; Trolier & Hamilton, 1986). As a result of directing attention to only a 
limited number of information, high power increases stereotyping and the use of 
categorical, instead of individual, information when perceiving and evaluating 
others (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin et al., 2000; Overbeck & Park, 2001). 
For example, studies have shown that manipulations of short-term outcome 
dependency can increase attention to individual attributes and information that are 
inconsistent with one’s stereotypes and expectations about a given target (Erber & 
Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). In one experiment, participants were 
randomly allocated to powerful, powerless, or neutral roles by allowing powerful 
participants to determine how certain tasks are allocated among other participants 
and controlling the chance of other participants winning a prize (Goodwin et al., 
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2000). They were then presented with a target person to evaluate and were asked to 
read several traits. These traits were either stereotype-consistent with the target’s 
group membership (e.g., gender and age), or stereotype-inconsistent. Powerless 
participants attended to both stereotype consistent and inconsistent information by 
reading sentences describing each of the traits, whereas powerful participants 
attended to only stereotype-consistent information and devoted significantly less 
attention to stereotype-inconsistent information. Powerless participants even 
attended to more information than participants in the control condition, which 
supports the idea that both having and lacking power affects attention allocation. In 
addition, like people who are powerful because of the social structure, people with 
dominant personalities also attend to less information by ignoring stereotype-
discrepant traits and attending only to stereotype confirming attributes. In contrast, 
non-dominant people behave like powerless individuals and attend equally to both 
types of attributes, and thus encoding more information (Goodwin et al., 2000).  
Research has also showed that powerless individuals actively seek out more 
information during decision making processes than their powerful counterparts. 
Low-power individuals are more concerned with developing accurate impressions 
and choices as they have more to lose compared with powerful individuals. For 
example, in a negotiation task, powerless participants asked more diagnostic instead 
of leading questions (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004), which allows them to develop a 
more accurate impression of their partners (Klayman & Ha, 1987). In addition, 
powerless individuals also consider more information before they make a decision. 
For example, participants who recalled a powerless past event took longer to decide 
on a course of action because they required more information than those who 
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recalled powerful events (Guinote, 2007b, Study 1). These included interviewing 
more people than powerful participants when looking for a roommate and preferring 
to wait longer before buying a car in order to gather more information about the 
available options. Moreover, a study looking at decision-making of real-life U.S. 
Supreme Court justices found that justices writing from positions of less power 
(those with smaller sized coalitions) attended to more information, leading to longer 
deliberations and cognitively more complex reasoning styles (Gruenfeld & Kim, 
1998).  
This tendency for powerful individuals to voluntarily focus attention, 
whereas powerless individuals are more concerned with attending to multiple 
aspects, is present even in situations where attentional focus and prioritization can 
be detrimental. For example, power was found to increase one’s susceptibility to the 
planning fallacy (Weick & Guinote, 2010), which is a bias in time estimation where 
individuals underestimate the time it takes to accomplish a task. It has been 
proposed that this bias originates from the ways individuals process information 
(Buehler & Griffin, 2003; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Newby-Clark, Ross, 
Buehler, Koehler, & Griffin, 2000). Specifically, those who focus attention too 
narrowly on the specific task that they are estimating will fail to take into account 
other information that they possess that can help them make more accurate and less 
optimistic predictions. For example, individuals may ignore past experiences with 
similar situations that can help with their estimations, or fail to take into account 
other goals that they may have that can interfere with their focal goal and create 
possible setbacks in the future. Powerful individuals’ focused attention increased 
their likelihood of committing this fallacy, because encouraging powerful 
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participants to adopt a broader attentional scope (by asking them to take into account 
additional information) made their time predictions more realistic (Weick & 
Guinote, 2010).  
In sum, past studies have shown that powerless individuals engage in more 
thorough attention and judgment of others compared to powerful individuals, and 
also deliberate more before making a decision. Together, these results support the 
idea that power affects information processing styles such that, by default, powerful 
individuals have a more selective and narrow attentional focus compared to 
powerless individuals. Being relatively unconstrained, powerful people are in a 
position to act in accordance with predetermined plans and goals. They are able to 
prioritize certain types of information over others as they can afford to disengage 
from effortful processing of additional information. In contrast, powerless 
individuals possess additional goals related to increasing control and safety. These 
extra demands increase voluntary information seeking tendencies, so that powerless 
individuals can be continuously monitoring their environment in order to ensure 
predictability, control, and accuracy. Powerless individuals are more likely to treat 
all information as equally important and therefore are more likely than powerful 
individuals to balance their attention between different types and sources of 
information that they encounter. These differences in attentional allocation and 
prioritization between powerful and powerless participants not only affect general 
information seeking tendencies, but can also have significant consequences for goal 
pursuit by helping us coordinate our attention, actions, and behaviors.  
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1.3.2 Power and Goal Pursuit  
Goals are defined as cognitive representations of a desired end-point that 
impact evaluations, emotions, and behaviors. Goals may be divided into various sub-
goals or tasks, which are defined as a discrete set of activities that one engages in for 
the purpose of attaining a goal. There is a general consensus that goals exist in 
memory as knowledge structures with facilitative as well inhibitory links between 
different motivational constructs. Therefore goals can be activated on the basis of 
the perception of a goal-related stimulus in a situation (Kruglanski et al., 2002). 
According to goal systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002), once a goal is activated, 
information that is relevant to goal achievement become more accessible and 
evaluated more positively via facilitative links, whilst the accessibility of goal-
irrelevant information is decreased via inhibitory links. Whether or not individuals 
can successfully achieve the goal can, to some extent, depend on how well 
individuals focus on goal-relevant, and inhibit goal-irrelevant, information. 
Moreover, environmental cues may trigger only one type of goal, or it may 
simultaneously activate multiple goals that compete for an individual’s attention 
(Austin & Vancouver, 1996; DeShon, Kozlowski, Schmidt, Milner, & Wiechmann, 
2004). This section will first review past research looking at the effects of power on 
single-goal pursuit, and then focus on how power may also influence multiple-goal 
pursuit.  
Past literature looking at goal pursuit has been interested in what factors can 
influence how goals are stored, activated, and pursued. One of the most commonly 
documented phenomenon in this area is how traditionally disempowered groups 
(e.g., minorities) are worse at goal attainments in health (Marmot, 2005), academic, 
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and work areas (Sackett, Kuncel, Arneson, Cooper, & Waters, 2009). Therefore, in 
recent years, there has been a large and growing body of literature investigating 
whether high social power can enhance behaviors and cognitions facilitative of goal 
pursuit, while low social power can impede successful performance. Results from 
previous studies offer two reasons for why power can influence goal pursuit. First, 
power affects how willing individuals are at prioritizing one goal over another and to 
focus all of their attention on a single task. Second, powerful and powerless 
individuals also differ in their ability to control attention towards successful goal 
completion. It is important to point out that that these two factors are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive as they can influence each other. The current section will first 
describe how power affects the motivational aspect of attention allocation and how 
this relates to prioritization during goal pursuit in ambiguous situations (i.e., in 
situations where individuals can choose to either employ a focused or divided 
attention). It will then review how power also influences attentional control in 
unambiguous situations where they are explicitly instructed to adopt a focused 
attention and to ignore irrelevant distractors. 
Voluntary Goal Prioritization 
Past research looking at the relationship between power and goal pursuit 
suggests that power motivates prioritization of goal-related information in terms of 
what individuals attend to and how they behave. Since powerholders live in 
environments with objectively fewer threats than the powerless, then they feel less 
need to attend to multiple sources of information and can thus devote more 
undivided attention to their current goals. In other words, powerholders are quicker 
than powerless individuals at detecting and acting upon opportunities for goals or 
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rewards because they have fewer concerns and are more able to focus unequivocally 
on a single aim. They are therefore more sensitive to their focal goals and respond 
more flexibly and effectively to opportunities for goal attainment (Guinote, 2007c 
Guinote et al., 2002).  
This pattern of activation has been found in individuals using a lexical 
decision task (LDT) containing goal-related and unrelated words. Powerholders 
responded faster to goal-related words, indicating increased accessibility of goal-
related constructs during goal pursuit. This heightened accessibility decreased after 
goal attainment (Slabu & Guinote, 2010). Actively inhibiting a completed focal goal 
is beneficial as it can free up resources that can be efficiently reallocated to other 
future demands (Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005). On the other hand, powerless 
individuals had equal reaction-times and accessibility to all constructs, regardless of 
their relevance to the current goal and whether or not the goal is still being pursued 
or was already completed. Since participants were unaware of the purpose of the 
LDT and the relationship between the words in the LDT and their activated goal, 
then these results support the idea that high power leads to spontaneous, instead of 
deliberate, goal prioritization.  
The idea that powerholders are more goal focused is also supported by 
studies looking at how power orients attention to instrumental social information. 
That is, powerful individuals tend to objectify others by viewing them in functional 
ways (i.e., as objects or means) that can facilitate the attainment of the 
powerholder’s personal goals (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008). 
Powerholders also rated instrumental targets more positively, and were more likely 
to approach others based on how useful they are to goal attainment (e.g., 
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competency), and saw other important attributes that are not directly relevant to the 
current goal (e.g., similarity and kindness) as less valuable. Moreover, and similarly 
to the devaluation of instrumental objects after goal completion, it was also found 
that powerholders approached subordinates when they were instrumental towards an 
active goal, but decreased approach when performance goal was no longer active 
and the subordinates were no longer useful (Gruenfeld et al., 2008). Whereas 
powerful participants were more focused and responsive to a single goal that can be 
satisfied by a social target, powerless individuals treated all qualities as equally 
valuable. This suggests that powerless individuals are constantly trying to satisfy 
multiple goals, even when these goals are not directly relevant or active in a 
particular situation. For example, low-power participants only preferred instrumental 
(i.e., competent) targets half of the time, which means that they took into 
consideration additional target features that can satisfy other goals, such as 
important interpersonal attributes.  
In another line of research, powerless individuals were found to be more 
distracted by irrelevant cues during goal pursuit (Guinote, 2007b, 2008), whereas 
powerful individuals focused more on the most accessible construct in a situation 
(Guinote, 2007a; Overbeck & Park, 2001; Vescio, Snyder, & Butz, 2003). For 
example, during work situations and on weekdays, participants with power were 
more likely to engage in, and read information related to, mundane and work-related 
activities as compared to leisure and social activities. The reverse was true for 
weekends, holidays, or social situations (Guinote, 2008). This flexible behavior 
shows once more that powerful individuals are willing to prioritize one pursuit over 
another depending on the goal that is activated or afforded by the current situation. 
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Moreover, a study by Guinote (2008) showed that even when powerful participants 
were presented with the opportunity to pursue an irrelevant goal (e.g., attend an 
academic conference during the first day of their holiday), they still focused on goal-
related activities, and their plans were not influenced by this additional information. 
On the other hand, powerless participants showed less priorities in their planning 
strategy compared to powerful participants as they were more likely to consider all 
of the information provided. They preferred to divide their attention between 
situational consistent and inconstant information, and were willing to modify their 
holiday plans accordingly.  
Supplementing these results, a recent EEG study also provided neural 
evidence for the idea that power affects goal-directed attention and information 
processing (Boksem, Smolders, & De Cremer, 2012). In this experiment, EEG 
activity was measured while participants were engaged in a task priming procedure 
of either high or low power. Results showed that different power priming can 
activate two separate attentional pathways. High power is associated with greater 
left-frontal brain activity compared to low power, and increases activation of a 
medio-dorsal pathway that is involved in planning, goal-directed behavior, and 
applying top-down control over the bottom-up selection of stimuli from the 
environment (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Tucker & Williamson, 1984). This 
‘dorsal’ control system is considered to be proactive and is engaged when behavior 
follows a predetermined action plan. Conversely, powerlessness is associated with 
the right lateralized ventrolateral pathway that projects from the limbic area to the 
orbitofrontal cortex and ventral prefrontal cortex. This pathway is more sensitive to 
external cues and is specialized in detecting salient, unexpected events in the 
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environment. The ‘ventral’ system is considered to be reactive, and can interrupt 
dorsal goal-directed behavior when events in the environment call for a change of 
plans. Powerful individuals therefore rely more on proactive dorsal control system, 
stimulating approach and goal-directed behavior, while powerlessness activates the 
right lateralized, reactive ventral system that makes them sensitive to any salient 
external event. Interestingly, differential hemispheric activation associated with 
powerlessness also affects how individuals interact with the physical world. That is, 
powerless participants have an increased spatial bias to the left side compared to 
powerful participants, due to higher activations of the right hemisphere (Wilkinson, 
Guinote, Weick, Molinari, & Graham, 2010).  
The differences in attentional focus and cognitive flexibility between 
powerful and powerless individuals also have significant consequences for actual 
behavior by increasing actions towards attaining goals (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; 
Galinsky et al., 2003). As demonstrated by Galinsky et al. (2003) power increases 
the propensity to act upon their needs even in socially ambiguous situations, such as 
removing an annoying fan from their environment even though it was not clear 
whether or not participants were allowed to. In contrast, powerless individuals are 
less likely to act in line with a single goal because they may be concerned about how 
their actions may conflict with other goals that they have, such as acquiring social 
acceptance.  
In research focusing specifically on power and goal pursuit, it was found that 
powerless individuals were also slower than powerful individuals at determining the 
appropriate course of action and at setting, initiating, and implementing goal-
directed activities (Guinote, 2007b; Overbeck & Park, 2006). Powerless participants 
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also exhibited less flexibility in means of approaching a goal and persisted for a 
shorter period of time in the face of challenges compared to powerful participants 
(Guinote, 2007b), possibly because they are distracted by other goals or concerns. 
Since careful reflection and processing more information leads to inaction 
(Gollwitzer, 1996; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Moskowitz, Skurnik, & Galinsky, 
1999), then these results suggest that powerholders are more focused on their end 
goals and deliberate less on the consequences of their actions (Galinsky et al., 2003; 
Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). In contrast, powerless individuals weigh all types of 
information as equally relevant, which can result in unfocused behaviors.  
Despite these evidences, some may argue that instead of prioritizing a focal 
goal, powerful individuals are merely “lazy information processors” compared to the 
vigilant nature of the powerless, and simply overlook additional inputs and prefer to 
attend to as little information as possible (Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 
2007; Galinsky et al., 2006; Keltner et al., 2003). However, powerful individuals are 
willing to adapt their information seeking tendencies depending on their goals and 
intentions (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Côté et al., 2011; Guinote, 2007b; 
Overbeck & Park, 2006). For example, if one’s primary objective was to foster a 
sense of inclusion, then powerholders will indeed employ a more effortful 
processing style by attending to individuating information when perceiving other 
people. If, however, the primary goal was to focus on organizational output, then 
attention is no longer directed at understanding others but rather at how the social 
target can benefit production (Overbeck & Park, 2006). Likewise, although powerful 
individuals rely more on stereotypes, but this is not the case when individuating 
information is relevant to their goals  (Overbeck & Park, 2001). Similar patterns 
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were found in a more recent study, where high power leads to more cognitively 
costly processing of messages if they contain goal-relevant information (Min & 
Kim, 2013). Therefore, although powerholders by default have a more focused 
attention and attend to less information, but they are also goal-oriented and can 
flexibly adapt their information processing strategies depending on what goal they 
are trying to attain.  
In sum, past research demonstrated that power can motivate individuals to 
voluntarily adopt a focused and selective attention by concentrating on and 
prioritizing an activated goal. In contrast, powerless individuals voluntarily exercise 
a more divided attention, as they want to be attentive to extra information, and 
display less goal-focused information processing (Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Overbeck 
& Park, 2006) and behaviors (Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007c). Together, 
these results seem to suggest that power induces a general tendency to 
spontaneously focus on goal-related concepts and to prioritize information related to 
the primary construct of a particular situation, whereas powerlessness motivates 
individuals to attend to multiple different goals. The present thesis will examine this 
issue in the context of multiple goals.  
Moreover, power does not only affect attention in situations where 
individuals can freely choose their processing styles. Indeed, there is also ample 
evidence on how powerless individuals are less able to adapt to situational demands, 
such as being able to successfully focus on a single task in situations where doing so 
can unambiguously benefit performance. The next section will therefore look at how 
having a powerless or powerful mindset can also affect basic cognitive abilities, or, 
in other words, the ability to control attention and to ignore irrelevant information.  
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Attentional Control and Goal Pursuit 
The previous section illustrated how powerless individuals are motivated to 
process additional vs. only goal-relevant information, which may be a result of 
having multiple concerns and restraints (Fiske, 1993; Guinote, 2007a; Keltner et al., 
2003). This motivation can hinder goal pursuit by increasing distractibility and 
consuming limited resources, which can have a negative impact on cognitive 
abilities. The current section will first explain what cognitive control is and what 
factors can influence one’s ability to control attention. It will then present previous 
research looking specifically at the effects of power on attentional control and 
executive functions, and how this relationship can influence multitasking behavior 
and performance.  
The ability to focus only on task or goal-relevant information by adopting a 
goal-driven vs. a stimulus-driven attention system is known as attentional or 
cognitive control. Attentional control is defined by a set of neural processes that 
allow us to interact with our complex environment in a goal-directed manner 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) and is proposed to be related to 
the central executive component of Baddeley’s working memory (WM) system 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). WM is defined as a set of mental processes, such as 
processing, storing, and manipulating limited information over a short period of time 
in the service of ongoing higher-order cognitive functions and problem solving 
(Baddeley, 1996; Cowan et al., 2005). It consists of one major component, the 
central executive, and two ‘slave’ systems known as the phonological loop (used for 
rehearsal of verbal materials) and the visuo-spatial sketchpad (used for processing 
and storing visual and spatial information). Recently, an additional component 
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known as the episodic buffer has been added to the central executive system 
(Baddeley, 2000). The episodic buffer is responsible for integrating information 
from the subcomponents of WM and long-term memory. Of particular interest to 
cognitive performance is the central executive system, which is the most complex 
but least well-understood component of WM. This is an attention-like, domain-free 
system, which oversees the two ‘slave’ systems. It is involved in attentional control 
and is used for integrating and regulating various cognitive functions necessary for 
goal execution, such as planning, focusing, and prioritizing (Miyake et al., 2000; 
Monsell, 1996; Stuss & Knight, 2002).  
There is an ongoing debate concerning the exact number and nature of 
executive functions, as it is often seen as an umbrella term encompassing a wide 
range of high-level cognitive processes necessary for controlling, organizing, and 
monitoring behaviors that can influence performance across a range of different 
areas. Most researchers agree that four main functions of the central executive 
(Baddeley, 1996; Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996; Miyake et al., 2000): inhibition, 
updating, shifting, and coordinating separate task performances, such as dual-
tasking. Inhibition is the ability to selectively attend to a particular stimulus while 
simultaneously inhibiting a separate stimulus. It involves using attentional control in 
a negative way to prevent (i.e., move away) attentional resources from being 
allocated to task-irrelevant stimuli and response (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). The 
updating function involves using attentional control in a positive way to shift, or 
move the allocation of attention towards, maintaining focus on task-relevant stimuli 
(Hasher, Zacks, & Rahhal, 1999; Kim, Rasher, & Zacks, 2007; Rowe, Valderrama, 
Hasher, & Lenartowicz, 2006; Wühr & Frings, 2008). These include manipulating 
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information sourced from temporary stores. The latter two functions of the central 
executive, shifting and coordinating, are linked to multitasking ability. These 
functions are responsible for switching between various retrieval strategies for 
different task-sets, as well as for coordinating concurrent processing of different 
streams of information.  
There is an extensive amount of empirical evidence suggesting that the 
ability to control attention and to avoid distraction is highly dependent on the 
amount of WM resources available. For example, individual differences in WM 
capacity can determine one’s ability to maintain goal-related information in a highly 
active state despite of interferences (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; Engle, 
Laughlin, Tuholski, & Conway, 1999; Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; 
Kane & Engle, 2003; Kimberg, D’Esposito, & Farah, 1997; Rapport et al., 2008; 
Stins, Polderman, Boomsma, & De Geus, 2005). In one study, Kane et al. (2001) 
showed how individuals with low WM capacity were more distracted by an 
irrelevant visual cue during an antisaccade task compared to participants with high 
WM capacity. That is, individuals with low WM capacity found it difficult to inhibit 
natural tendencies to look in the direction of a distractor cue. They therefore took 
longer target identification times compared to high WM capacity participants when 
the target location appeared opposite to the location of a distractor cue.  
Moreover, individual differences in WM capacity was found to affect 
performances on classic measures of inhibition using the Stroop task (Kane & 
Engle, 2003) and the dichotic listening task (Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001). In 
the Stroop task, participants are shown color words printed in different ink colors. 
These words can be either congruent (e.g., the word “red” printed in red ink) or 
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incongruent (e.g., the word “red” printed in blue ink), and participant’s job was to 
maintain the single goal of naming the word’s color and inhibiting the prepotent 
response of reading the word’s meaning. Performance on incongruent trials differed 
substantially for high and low WM capacity participants, with low WM capacity 
participants making almost twice as many errors as people with high WM capacity. 
Similarly, WM capacity predicted performance on a dichotic listening task, which 
measures individuals’ ability to focus attention on words presented to one ear, while 
ignoring irrelevant information presented to the other ear (Conway et al., 2001). 
Although WM capacity may differ between individuals, it is also highly 
variable across situations such that individuals may have different amount of WM 
resources available for one task depending on the amount of information that they 
need to process in another task (Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2010). In other words, 
successful attentional control depends significantly on the amount of WM resources 
devoted to the focal task. Numerous evidences support the relationship between the 
active processing of information in WM and performance of traditional executive 
functions such as suppression of prepotent responses. Roberts, Hager, and Heron, 
(1994) first demonstrated this idea by showing how performance on an antisaccade 
task decreased as active processing required for WM increased. Specifically, they 
found that increasing WM load using a concurrent mental arithmetic task 
significantly impaired inhibitory task performance. A similar study using the 
suppression of reflexive saccades as its inhibition task found that performance 
declined as a function of increasing WM load (Mitchell, Macrae, & Gilchrist, 2002). 
In addition, it has been shown that burdening the phonological loop of the WM 
system detracts resources from executive function tasks because individuals rely on 
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inner speech to maintain the relevant task goal or program (Baddeley, Chincotta, & 
Adlam, 2001; Hester & Garavan, 2005). 
Another example of the relationship between WM and response selection 
includes the finding that selective visual attention can be influenced by WM load (de 
Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001). This study combined a WM paradigm with a 
selective visual attention task that asked participants to classify famous written 
names, such as those of pop stars or politicians, while ignoring either congruent 
(same name and face) or incongruent (different name and face) distractor faces. 
Participants were either given a high WM load by remembering a sequence of digits 
in different orders, or a low WM load, by remembering a sequence of digits in the 
same order. It was found that under high WM loads (compared to under low WM 
loads), participants were slower to respond to incongruent compared to congruent 
faces, and also had greater activation of brain areas that are implicated in face 
processing. The authors concluded that high WM load decreases one’s ability to 
inhibit distractor face processing compared to being under a low WM load. 
Together, these results indicate that WM capacity is limited, can be manipulated, 
and affects one’s ability to control attention.  
The relationship between WM capacity and attentional control has relevance 
for situations that elicit anxiety, threat, and, central to the current thesis, 
powerlessness. Research in areas such as stereotype threat (Steele, Spencer, & 
Aronson, 2002) and anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007) suggest that WM capacity can be 
taxed by internal (e.g., self-generated worries) as opposed to external (e.g., WM load 
manipulation) information processing. This is because regulating negative affect and 
active monitoring of one’s performance can function as a competing demand and 
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consume attentional resources that could otherwise be devoted to the focal task 
(Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). 
For example, members of stigmatized groups (e.g., African Americans and 
women) display worse performance on tasks requiring executive functions (e.g., 
intelligence and math tests) when their group membership is made salient (i.e., 
under stereotype threat) compared to when it is not salient. Exams that have 
performance connotations may create extra situational burden and increase intrusive, 
task-irrelevant thoughts, which can then reduce the stigmatized individuals’ WM 
capacity (Beilock, Rydell, & McConnell, 2007; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Steele & 
Aronson, 1995). Similarly, the processing efficiency theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992) of anxiety suggests that high levels of state anxiety reduces the efficiency of 
cognitive processing and often lead to impaired performance on the inhibition and 
shifting functions (Derakshan, Smyth, & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos, & Calvo, 2007). This is because the vigilance in anxious individuals can 
lead to more self- and other-monitoring that can tax WM capacity.  
Furthermore, studies have shown that these experiences may specifically 
impair the central executive system. In one experiment looking at anxiety and 
resource consumption, participants were asked to perform a primary visuo-spatial 
task while concurrently performing a secondary task that involved the central 
executive, the phonological loop, or the visuo-spatial sketchpad (Eysenck, Payne, & 
Derakshan, 2005). Only when the secondary task required the central executive did 
the high anxious group perform worse than the low anxious group. This suggests 
that anxiety reduces the available resources of the WM’s central executive required 
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for attentional control, but has minimal effects on the phonological loop and the 
visuo-spatial sketchpad.  
In recent years, conclusive behavioral evidence has demonstrated how power 
can also influence attentional control and executive functioning abilities (DeWall et 
al., 2011; Guinote, 2007b; Smith et al., 2008). Two of the most commonly studied 
systems are those responsible for maintaining goal-focus: inhibition and updating. 
For example, assigning participants to a powerless role impairs one’s ability to 
update relevant information as they made more errors on a 2-back task compared to 
those assigned to a powerful role (Smith et al., 2008). The 2-back task requires 
participants to constantly update and monitor new information in WM. In addition, 
powerlessness has also been found to impair inhibitory regulation, as powerless 
individuals have a higher susceptibility to interference from distractors and an 
inability to filter out extraneous information effectively (DeWall et al., 2011; 
Guinote, 2007b; Smith et al., 2008). For example, powerless participants had lower 
performance compared to their powerful counterparts on the Stroop task (Smith et 
al., 2008) and the dichotic listening task (DeWall et al., 2011).  
In addition, powerless individuals exhibit less attentional flexibility across 
situations because they are unable to control their attention according to situational 
demands, even when they are given explicit instructions to do so (Guinote, 2007b). 
For example, when inhibiting contextual information was relevant to the task, 
participants in the powerful conditions were more attuned to the focal object and 
were more successful at inhibiting contextual information compared to participants 
in the powerless condition (Guinote, 2007b). However, when contextual information 
was relevant for task execution, no differences were found between powerful and 
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powerless participants’ performance. These results suggest that powerful 
participants have greater attentional flexibility as they were able to inhibit, or attend 
to, peripheral information depending on task demands. In contrast, powerless 
participants were unable to inhibit peripheral information even though they were 
told explicitly that doing so will impair their performance.  
It is probable that differences in WM capacity may be responsible for 
decreased attentional control and attentional flexibility in powerless compared to 
powerful individuals. This explanation is similar to how situational factors, such as 
anxiety and stereotype threat, can decrease executive function performance via 
reduced WM capacity (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Beilock et al., 2007; Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992; Schmader & Johns, 2003). Powerless, compared to powerful 
individuals, voluntarily seek more information in order to restore control in their 
environment and worry more about potential adversities (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 
2004; Fiske, 1993; Goodwin et al., 2000). These tendencies are thought to arise from 
a greater dependency on others, which channels WM resources away from preparing 
and implementing one’s own actions toward monitoring other people and the 
environment (Guinote, 2007a). They therefore prefer to process more inputs by 
treating all information as equally important and by attending to multiple sources of 
information. Powerful individuals, on the other hand, are more likely to treat some 
information as relevant and other information as irrelevant. As described previously, 
WM resources are limited, such that at any one time only a number of information 
can be attended to carefully and processed extensively; therefore having more 
concerns than their powerful counterparts can reduce WM resources available for 
controlling attention and decrease one’s ability to inhibit irrelevant distractions when 
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it is necessary to do so. This may influence powerless individuals by making them 
less focused and more easily distracted by task-irrelevant information.  
To summarize, the current section described how WM capacity is related to 
the ability to control attention, where higher WM load can reduce processing 
efficiency and cognitive performance by making it difficult for individuals to 
organize, regulate, and monitor perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes required 
for flexible and goal-directed behaviors. This suggests that the tendency for 
powerless (compared to powerful) individuals to attend to task-irrelevant 
information, such as dealing with internal worries about their uncontrollable 
situation or excessive encoding of external inputs due to vigilance, can decrease 
WM resources available for attentional control. Decreased WM capacity can explain 
why powerless participants underperform on single executive function tasks in 
previous research (DeWall et al., 2011; Guinote, 2007b; Smith et al., 2008). The 
current thesis will investigate whether power can affect WM capacity and attentional 
control in the context of multitasking.  
1.4 Summary and Limitations of Power Research  
Thus far, studies looking at power and goal pursuit suggest that powerless 
people often achieve less than powerful people because lacking power itself alters 
information processing strategies and increases vulnerability to performance 
decrements during complex executive functions tasks (Smith et al., 2008). 
Specifically, past studies have shown that in the domain of single-goal pursuit, 
power increases, whereas powerlessness decreases, resistance to distractibility, 
prioritization of goal-relevant information, action facilitation, and behavior 
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flexibility and persistence (DeWall et al., 2011; Guinote, 2007c, 2008; Smith et al., 
2008). These differences in successful goal pursuit between powerful and powerless 
individuals could derive from their willingness as well as their ability to direct all of 
their attention to the focal goal and to prevent internal and external distractions.  
First, powerful individuals have higher selective attention, and are therefore 
willing to focus more on their current goals and to approach a desired end state 
(Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007c; Keltner et al., 2003). In contrast, powerless 
individuals have a tendency to be concerned with various issues or threats that are 
not directly related to the task at hand, such as performance evaluations given by 
their superiors. They therefore, by default, prefer to attend to multiple information 
and operate under a more divided attention than the focused mindset of the powerful 
individual (Guinote, 2007a). By inhibiting fewer distracting information from the 
environment than the powerful individual, and by voluntarily attending to task-
irrelevant stimuli, powerless individuals are less likely to prioritize goal-related 
information, which can impair successful single-goal pursuit by making them more 
distractible.  
Second, processing excess information that are normally bypassed by 
powerful individuals can also tax limited WM resources typically recruited to carry 
out a set of cognitive functions. This can lead to suboptimal performance on difficult 
tasks that require attentional control and executive functions (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Gollwitzer, 1996; Smith et al., 2008). Lacking 
power may impair goal pursuit by decreasing one’s ability to adopt a selective or 
top-down (vs. a bottom-up) attention (Guinote et al., 2009; Guinote, 2007b). As a 
consequence, power not only affects vigilance and information seeking tendencies, 
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with powerful individuals adopting a focused attention and powerless individuals 
being motivated to consider more information. Instead, powerful individuals also 
have better attentional control that allows them to distinguish between relevant and 
irrelevant information, and are more capable than powerless individuals at adjusting 
processing effort depending on the task at hand.  
However, past studies looking at power and goal pursuit have only focused on 
how powerlessness impairs the activation and achievement of a single, isolated goal, 
such as attending to only one stimuli or having to solve one puzzle. Whether power 
affects the pursuit of multiple goals is yet unknown. Similarly, past research only 
examined performance on single central executive tasks (e.g., inhibiting irrelevant 
information and updating) and not on central executive tasks linked to multitasking 
(e.g., shifting and dual-tasking). Since executive functions may not be unitary 
(Friedman et al., 2006; Miyake et al., 2000), then it is necessary to investigate the 
ways power affects multiple task performance.  
This is an important gap in the literature because of power’s ubiquity and the 
consequences of multitasking for individuals and society. For example, numerous 
studies have shown negative side effects of multitasking including lack of focus, 
decreased performance, as well as increased stress levels (Appelbaum et al., 2008; 
Fried, 2008). If power affects an individual’s multitasking tendency and ability, then 
it can contribute to additional stress and perpetuate to negative performances 
experienced by disempowered individuals and groups. Moreover, it is necessary to 
investigate how power affects goal management and performance in more 
ecologically valid conditions of multiple goals in order to fully understand the effect 
that power has on goal pursuit. The current dissertation seeks to address this gap by 
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examining how social power affects multiple goals and aims at gaining insight to 
whether powerholder’s enhanced attentional focus and prioritization strategies also 
extends to the context of multiple goals and multitasking. It will address this issue 
by looking at how individuals approach multiple tasks (i.e., the tendency to 
multitask) and its effect on multitasking ability. The next section will review the 
literature on multiple goals, focusing specifically on the factors that affect how 
people approach multiple goals and multitasking ability.  
1.5 Multiple Goals 
In everyday lives, individuals are usually trying to achieve a variety of goals 
ranging from basic rudimentary tasks, such as eating, to more abstract higher-order 
pursuits, such as attaining successful careers. For example, governors, politicians, 
and managers may need to implement goals and succeed at multiple projects that 
overlap in time. Moreover, in many professions such as medicine and aviation, 
employees are required to simultaneously manage multiple tasks or to rapidly switch 
between one task and another. For example, in emergency situations, keeping track 
of several pieces of information and taking the right action at the right time can be 
extremely critical (Laxmisan et al., 2007). Similarly, duties of an air traffic 
controller also include switching attention between various tasks such as 
coordinating arriving aircrafts while listening and responding to radio calls 
(Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009).  
In addition, the onset of media and technology use in recent years (Foehr, 
2006; Lindbeck & Snower, 2000) have increased the number of options available for 
task implementation and have a profound impact on how individuals approach 
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multiple tasks. Technology and other resources in recent years promote multitasking 
by providing more options and opportunities to multitask. For example, technology 
promotes multitasking by providing natural breaks (e.g., download times) and 
regular interruptions (instant messages; Foehr, 2006). Indeed, the percentage of time 
people spend on the consumption of multiple forms of media at the same time (e.g., 
watching TV while reading) has increased from 16% in 1999 to 25% in 2005 
(Foehr, 2006). In addition, cell phone messages and email notifications activate 
alternative goals that can easily detract workers from the task at hand. In fact, 
computer users at work change windows or check other programs nearly 37 times an 
hour (Foehr, 2006).  
Enhanced organizational flexibility and versatility also encourages 
multitasking behavior, making them more prevalent in everyday life as well as in 
contemporary work environments (Benbunan-Fich & Truman, 2009; González & 
Mark, 2005; Otto, Wahl, Lefort, & Frei, 2012). The modern workplace is 
introducing opportunities to multitask by increasing work demands such as number 
of goals and projects, which can result in conflicting priorities. As organizations try 
to do more with less, employees are constantly faced with a number of projects with 
imposing deadlines, reports to write, and meetings to attend, all of which can 
encourage multitasking. In fact, in an employment context, nearly all jobs demand a 
balancing of multiple concurrent responsibilities as a consequence of having to work 
within more flexible organizations. For example, telemarketing jobs are often seen 
as simple with regard to job complexity, but individuals who perform such jobs 
typically have numerous goals to balance such as engaging customers in dialogue, 
operating calling system, and learning about the products or services they sell. 
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Similarly, it was found in a sample of office workers that the average time 
employees spend on one continuous, uninterrupted segment of work before 
switching to another task was only 10.5 minutes (González & Mark, 2005). As a 
consequence, employees typically waste more than a quarter of their daily work time 
checking, answering, and organizing emails instead of doing tasks that have priority. 
Since people are constantly faced with multiple cues that can activate different goals 
simultaneously (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Kruglanski et al., 2002), then having 
difficulties attending to more than one thing at a time can be a severe limiting factor 
in work and daily life (Zimmermann & Leclercq, 2002).  
Due to the fact that multiple-goal pursuit is the norm, not the exception, 
researchers have started to address the question of how individuals handle various, 
potentially contradicting, demands (Ashford & Northcraft, 2003; Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996; Kernan & Lord, 1990; Locke & Latham, 2002; Louro, Pieters, & 
Zeelenberg, 2007; Mitchell, Harman, Lee, & Lee, 2008; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007; 
Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002). These goals can often be competing for 
limited resources, and the literature on multiple goals has focused on two main types 
of goal conflicts. One area looks at multiple goals that are directly in conflict with 
each other such as dieting and enjoying fattening food. These types of goals 
undermine each other’s attainment as they have opposing behavioral implications 
and no additional resources can resolve this conflict (Fishbach & Shah, 2006; 
Kleiman & Hassin, 2011).  
On the other hand, multiple goals can also be indirectly conflicting. These goal 
conflicts occur when the pursuit of one goal prevents or detracts from the pursuit of 
another at any one time due to physical (e.g., time) or psychological (e.g., attention) 
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limitations. Examples of indirectly conflicting goals include completing two or more 
different projects, or trying to balance between family and career goals. This thesis 
will focus on and review how individuals manage and pursue multiple goals for 
different tasks that are indirectly conflicting. It will first describe the factors that can 
influence individual’s strategies when approaching multiple goals and tasks and 
subsequently review the literature on multitasking ability. 
1.5.1 Polychronicity  
Both intuition and scientific evidence suggest that dynamics of goal pursuit in 
multiple-goal environments can present individuals with different kinds of 
regulatory challenges as compared to single-goal environments (Louro et al., 2007). 
When only one goal is activated, all of our available resources can be devoted to the 
focal goal. Thus effective self-regulation entails identifying the appropriate level of 
resources that must be allocated to ensure the goal is attained. In such single-goal 
contexts, only inaction has an opportunity cost in terms of failed or slower goal 
progress in the focal goal domain (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960).  
In multiple-goal environments, effective self-regulation requires achieving an 
on-going balance between the competing demands that multiple goals have on one’s 
limited resources, such as time and attention. This is because an individual’s time, 
energy, and cognitive capacity are limited, and any resources allocated to one task 
will take away resources from another (Ogden, Levine, & Eisner, 1979; Wickens & 
Kessel, 1980). Therefore optimizing one goal will happen at the expense of another 
goal. As a consequence, when two goals compete because of time or attentional 
constraints, a primary concern is how to effectively allocate available resources 
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among the different goals. For example, individuals need to be able to identify 
whether they should prioritize one task over the others or approach all tasks 
simultaneously, and decide when it is necessary to switch focus between the various 
tasks in order to maximize goal attainment. In other words, when we have multiple 
goals, we need to choose whether to approach them one by one in a sequential 
manner (single-tasking strategy), or to approach them more simultaneously 
(multitasking strategy).  
One of the earliest literatures looking at how individuals approach multiple 
goals is in the area of cross-cultural psychology (Hall, 1959, 1988). Research in this 
field has documented how individuals from different cultural backgrounds have 
different temporal perceptions (Bluedorn et al., 1999; Bluedorn, 2002; Graham, 
1981). Monochronic cultures, typical of North American, Swiss, German, and 
Scandinavians, view time as linear, separable, and capable of being divided into 
units, and therefore emphasize doing one thing at a time. On the other hand, 
polychronic cultures from Japan, Middle East, Latin American, and South Asia, 
view time as a system where the same events occur in natural cycles (Feldman & 
Hornik, 1981; Hall, 1983; Kaufman, Lane, & Lindquist, 1991). A polychronic 
cultural orientation emphasizes working on many projects at the same time with 
little regard for formal time constraints. Polychronic cultures value loose scheduling 
and prefer to simultaneously fulfil multiple agendas such as organizing meetings 
within meetings (Gesteland, 1999).  
These cultural differences in time perception have been later developed into an 
individual variability construct known as polychronicity (Benabou, 1999; Kaufman-
Scarborough & Lindquist, 1999; Persing, 1999). An individual’s level of 
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polychroncity has been defined as the extent to which he or she prefers to be 
engaged in two or more tasks or activities at the same time, and believe that this 
approach is the best way of doing things (Bluedorn et al., 1999; Slocombe & 
Bluedorn, 1999). Individuals who prefer to actively work on several different 
projects, tasks, or activities across a specific time period are high in polychronicity 
(polychrons). Polychrons are more likely to adopt a multitasking strategy, where 
they engage in different tasks in parallel either by switching constantly between 
several activities within a short time period or doing two or more tasks 
simultaneously.  
On the other hand, individuals who prefer to work on and complete one 
project or task before moving on to another during a specific time period are low in 
polychronicity (monochrons). Monochrons employ a single-tasking strategy by 
responding to competing demands one after the other. They employ a priority 
system where the attainment of one goal is viewed, at least temporarily, as more 
important than the other and devote all their attention and time to only one of their 
multiple pursuits at a time. Such a process maintains attention to the focal goal in the 
presence of background alternatives, and individuals only switch focus to alternative 
goals once sufficient progress has been made on one of them. Therefore the terms 
multitasking and polychronicity have been used in the literature interchangeably to 
refer to one’s tendency to engage in frequent switches between tasks or to engage in 
simultaneous pursuits, whereas single-tasking and monochronicity can both refer to 
the tendency to pursue different goals in a sequential manner.  
Polychronicity level can be measured using the Multitasking Preference 
Inventory (MPI; Poposki & Oswald, 2010), and these self-reports have been found 
  
60 
 
to affect actual behaviors and choices when working on different tasks. For example, 
when given two tasks to process and work on (e.g., a math task and a letter search 
task), monochrons attempted to perform both processes sequentially, and selected 
one process at random to work on first. In contrast, polychrons were more likely to 
control the two processes simultaneously (Goonetilleke & Luximon, 2010; Zhang, 
Goonetilleke, Plocher, & Liang, 2005). In these experiments, multitasking tendency 
was operationalized using number of switches between tasks, such that higher 
number of switches corresponds to higher polychronicity. In another study, 
researchers found how polychronic individuals chose to work on more tasks 
simultaneously compared to monochromic individuals (Poposki & Oswald, 2010). 
Therefore self-reported multitasking preference can, to some extent, predict actual 
multitasking behavior.  
1.5.2 Goal Accessibility, Inhibition, and Multitasking 
Although there is substantial evidence that individuals can vary in their 
propensity to multitask, the causes of these different behaviors, and its consequences 
for performance, are still unclear. There are several possible factors that may 
determine the extent to which individuals engage in single-tasking vs. multitasking 
strategies. One line of research suggests that how well individuals can inhibit 
alternative goals from a focal goal can determine how individuals choose to 
approach multiple goals (Bélanger, Lafrenière, Vallerand, & Kruglanski, 2013; Shah 
et al., 2002; Shah & Kruglanski, 2002). This process is known as “goal shielding”, 
where the focal goal shields itself from alternative ones by directly reducing the 
accessibility of additional goals in memory. Decreased accessibility of alternative 
goals has been proposed to render the individual more focused on a certain pursuit 
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and be less distracted by other tasks (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002). Goal shielding is 
highly dependent on motivation and goal commitment, where higher commitment to 
and motivation on a task can increase prioritization of the focal goal and shielding 
from interfering goals (Shah et al., 2002). As a consequence, individuals who inhibit 
alternative goals may be more likely to adopt a single-tasking strategy.  
Other studies also suggest that accessibility of secondary goals or tasks can 
influence multitasking behavior. Specifically, it has been proposed that multitasking 
behavior in daily life may be uniquely associated with deficits in basic cognitive 
processes related to attentional control, such as the ability to successfully filter out 
irrelevant information and ignore distraction (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Ophir et al., 
2009). To test this idea, Ophir et al., (2009) have developed a media multitasking 
index (MMI) to measure media related multi-tasking behaviors and to identify 
individuals who frequently engage in multiple tasks concurrently, such as surfing the 
internet while talking on the phone. It was found that chronically high-multitaskers 
were more readily distracted than low-multitaskers by both irrelevant external 
stimuli as well as recently activated internal representations during singular task 
performance (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2013; Ophir et al., 2009). For example, in 
one study (Ophier et al., 2009), participants were given a visual short-term WM 
task, and were asked to remember red shapes and ignore blue shapes. Low-
multitaskers were unaffected by the number of irrelevant blue distractors, suggesting 
that they successfully filtered out the irrelevant information. However, high-
multitaskers were negatively affected by increasing number of irrelevant distractors. 
The negative correlation between one’s tendency to multitask in real life and 
inhibition ability suggests that those who have difficulties filtering out irrelevant 
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information may be more easily distracted, and will often attend to information that 
is unrelated to their focal goal.  
Similar conclusions were made by Watson and Strayer (2010), who 
correlated measures of Operation Span (OSPAN) with multitasking tendency. 
OSPAN has been developed by Engle (2002) to measure WM and executive 
functioning. It employs a dual-task paradigm with a letter memorization task and an 
arithmetic task, and is therefore a classic example of multitasking where people 
must simultaneously attempt to perform two independent tasks that compete for 
limited capacity. It was found that individuals who scored low on the OSPAN 
task—those who have lower WM capacity and executive control required for 
effective multitasking—were more likely to engage in multitasking than individuals 
who scored high on the OSPAN task. The negative correlation between OSPAN task 
performance and multitasking activity provides further evidence that multitasking 
behavior does not correspond to better multitasking ability, and that deficits in WM 
and executive functioning are associated with enhanced multitasking activity.  
Moreover, recent work by Cain and Mitroff (2011) also indicates that 
individuals who maintain a wider attentional scope, are more easily distracted and 
are more likely to engage in secondary task processing. That is, basic attentional 
focus can also affect multitasking behavior, regardless of whether or not these 
attentional tasks rely on WM processes (Cain & Mitroff, 2011). To test this 
assumption, the researchers first divided participants into high vs. low-multitaskers 
using the MMI. They then measured performance on an addition singleton 
paradigm, where participants had to search for a shape singleton in the possible 
presence of an irrelevant color singleton. Participants saw displays of square 
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distractors with a single target circle. Each shape contained either a + or a =, and 
they were asked to report which symbol (+ or =) was within the shape singleton 
(circle). Top-down attentional instructions varied across conditions to test whether 
high-multitaskers are negatively influenced by irrelevant distractions when there are 
strong attentional demands. On half the trials, all shapes were green, and on the 
other half of the trials, there was a red colored singleton amongst the green shapes. 
Participants were told to withhold response if the target circle was red instead of 
green. In the “never” condition, participants were validly instructed that the red 
singleton would never be the target circle. In the “sometimes” condition, participants 
were validly instructed that the red singleton would sometimes be the target circle.  
It was found that low-multitaskers were able to use top-down instructions to 
improve their performance by not attending to the red singleton in the “never” 
condition. That is, low-multitasker’s RTs did not differ depending on the presence of 
the colored singleton in the “never” condition, but were significantly slower when 
the red singleton was present (vs. when it was absent) in the “sometimes” condition. 
However, high-multitaskers attended to and processed the red singleton to the same 
degree regardless of the top-down instructions. In other words, high-multitaskers 
responded slower to trials containing (vs. trials that did not contain) the red 
singleton, regardless of whether or not the red singleton could be the target circle. 
Variations in attentional mechanisms are likely to be a strong contributor to these 
performance differences. Specifically, high-multitaskers may have a broader 
attentional filter than low-multitaskers, which may bias them towards taking in more 
of the available visual information.  
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The results on goal accessibility and attentional scope on multitasking 
tendency suggest that cultural differences in multiple goal strategies could also be 
due to differences in processing styles. That is, individuals who have a selective 
information processing style tend to prioritize one goal at a time and engage in 
single-tasking. For example, individuals from Western cultures tend to process 
information more selectively, and are also more likely to have a monochronic time-
orientation. In contrast, individuals from East-Asian countries have a broader focus 
of attention (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & 
Norenzayan, 2001) and are therefore more polychronic (Hall & Hall, 1990; 
Schoorman & Palmer, 1999).   
Even within cultures, individuals who have a broader and defocused 
attentional style multitask more. For instance, individual differences in impulsivity, 
and in particular attentional impulsiveness, are significantly correlated with higher 
levels of multitasking (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2013). Multitasking was shown to be 
particularly high amongst impulsive individuals who act without thinking and who 
find it difficult to regulate their attention. Similarly, high sensation seekers, 
particularly those scoring high in disinhibition, were more likely than low sensation 
seekers to report media related multitasking. The MMI was also found to be 
correlated with higher depression and social anxiety symptoms (Becker, Alzahabi, & 
Hopwood, 2013), which are disorders associated with poor attentional control, 
susceptibility to distractions by salient but irrelevant information, as well as the 
inability to block out ruminative thoughts (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 
2004).  
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1.5.3 Discretionary Switching and Prioritization 
There are a limited number of studies in past literature looking at how 
individuals regulate their behaviors in contexts where they need to pursue two or 
more goals within the same deadline, and where the goals are incompatible such that 
they compete for limited time and resources and cannot be enacted truly 
simultaneously. These studies investigated why participants preferred to prioritize 
instead of to interleave a task, even when such switching is not strictly necessary 
and is driven by internal factors as opposed to external demands (i.e., discretionary 
switching). Several situational factors have been proposed to influence resource 
allocation decisions between multiple goals including sensitivity to goal progress, 
situational predictability, goal expectancy, and goal orientation.  
In laboratory studies with multiple-goal simulations, participants’ behaviors 
are usually guided by task dynamics and goal-performance discrepancy (GPD), 
otherwise known as the progress made towards one’s goals (Kernan & Lord, 1990; 
Schmidt & DeShon, 2007; Schmidt & Dolis, 2009). Focusing on goals with higher 
GPD yields more task switches, as the GPD of unattended tasks will eventually 
exceed the GPD of the attended task. However, prioritizing tasks with lower GPD 
will lead to more single-tasking, because the task that participants are currently 
pursuing is already the one with the lowest GPD and closest to attainment. In highly 
dynamic and unpredictable situations, where external factors may impede on 
progress toward goal attainment, participants typically switch more between the 
tasks. This is because when goal progress can vary not only as a result of 
participant’s own actions, but also due to unpredictable external influences, then 
participants prefer to allocate time towards goals that are further from attainment 
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(those with higher GPD). However, when the task environment is stable, and it is 
clear what level of performance is necessary to achieve the task goals and 
performance is solely a result of participant’s own action, then they tend to switch 
less and prioritize resources towards the goal closest to attainment (those with lower 
GPD; Kernan & Lord, 1990; Schmidt & Dolis, 2009). Such resource allocation is 
similar to decision processes, where unpredictable external situations elicit more 
bottom-up, progress-driven decisions, whereas static choice contexts yield a more 
systematic, top-down decisions (Brehmer, 2005; Zakay, 1994).  
This effect may be due to the need for individuals in unpredictable 
circumstances to remain responsive to changes in the environment (Allport, 1989; 
Lord & Levy, 1994). Even when engaging in one task, individuals’ attention need to 
be somewhat diverted from the focal goal in order to address emerging external 
needs. That is, rather than being able to focus on a single task, individuals need to 
divide their attention in an attempt to address possible changing circumstances. By 
flexibly reallocating their attention to other information, such as GPD discrepancies, 
participants’ behaviors will be guided by goal progress and will be constantly 
switching to tasks with lower GPDs (Carver & Scheier, 1998; DeShon & Gillespie, 
2005; Lord & Levy, 1994). Switching between different tasks ensures that all tasks 
are within seemingly manageable bounds, which is adaptive in a dynamic context 
where individuals need to remain vigilant to external changes. 
Another factor determining task switching is goal expectancy (Schmidt et al., 
2009). When goal expectancy is high, individuals switch more between the tasks and 
devote more time towards the goal with higher GPD as they believe that all goals 
can be attained. However, if participants do not expect to complete all of the tasks 
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by the deadline, then they are more likely to move to single-tasking by prioritizing 
the easier task which has lower GDP rather than switching to a more difficult task 
with a higher GPD. This is because focusing on the goal closest to being attained 
may ensure that at least one of the goals can be completed, whereas pursuing goals 
with larger GPD could result in neither goal being met. This tendency for goal 
expectancy to guide task switching has been shown in the literature by measuring 
behavioral changes as participants approach the deadline (Schmidt & DeShon, 
2007). In the beginning, goal expectancy is relatively high as individuals believe that 
all goals can be attained with remaining time, but the passage of time decreases goal 
expectancy. As the deadlines approach, participants may start to perceive little 
likelihood of attaining all of the goals and will therefore allocate resources to goals 
that are experiencing the most success (Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). During late 
stages of goal pursuit, large discrepancies may be discouraging instead of 
motivating, and hence participants are less likely to reduce this discrepancy and will 
prioritize the goal that is more likely to be achieved.  
 Lastly, goal orientation, otherwise known as anticipated consequences of 
meeting or failing to meet the goals, can also guide resource allocation. Past studies 
have shown that losses are more salient than gains, and are weighed more heavily 
such that the negative value of a given loss is greater than the positive value of a 
gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). As a consequence, individuals exhibit greater 
sensitivity to avoidance-oriented (i.e., an undesired end state to be avoided) as 
opposed to approach-oriented (i.e., a desired end state to be gained) pursuits. Tasks 
that are framed as losses also seem more urgent, and can affect resource allocation 
decisions and whether or not participants switch to that goal (Schmidt & DeShon, 
  
68 
 
2007). For example, in a multiple-goal scenario, greater time was allocated to 
pursuing the goal associated with an avoidance-framed incentive than those 
associated with an approach-framed incentive (Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). 
Moreover, research in regulatory focus found how participants presented with 
promotion-focused (i.e., approach-framed) and prevention-focused (i.e., avoidance-
framed) tasks preferred to complete prevention-framed tasks earlier than the 
promotion-framed task (Freitas, Liberman, Salovey, & Higgins, 2002). The current 
thesis will therefore incorporate these previous findings by looking at how goal 
expectancy (in terms of difficult vs. easy goals) and goal orientation (in terms of 
prevention-focused vs. unspecified goals), can moderate the relationship between 
power and multitasking tendency.  
1.5.4 Phases of Goal Pursuit 
The previous sections illustrated how researchers investigated multitasking 
tendency by measuring how individuals intend to behave, such as reporting how 
many tasks they would like to work on simultaneously (Poposki & Oswald, 2010). 
Previous studies also measured how individuals behave during actual goal striving 
in multiple-goal contexts by recording discretionary switches between tasks (Carver 
& Scheier, 1998; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). Even though both intentions and 
actions help promote goal attainment, it is important to note that goal-oriented 
behavior is not a homogeneous phenomenon and can be conceived as a succession 
of distinctive stages that are governed by their own principles (Gollwitzer, 1990).  
According to the “Rubicon model” of action phases, goal pursuit occurs in 
various stages, each requiring its own distinct cognitive operations (Gollwitzer, 
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1996; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). These include a preactional phase, which 
comprises the predecisional phase and the postdecisional phase, an actional phase, 
and a postactional phase. Each phase of goal pursuit are guided by distinct “mind-
sets” (i.e., deliberative, implemental, actional, and evaluative), which are cognitive 
orientations associated with the various demands and requirements of each particular 
phase (Gollwitzer, 1990).   
During the predecisional phase, individuals choose which goals they want to 
pursue and deliberate whether or not to take action. In this phase, the individual aims 
to make the best possible choice between potential goals and to set priorities 
amongst multiple wishes and desires. Thus the predecisional phase is characterized 
by a deliberative mind-set, where individuals are attuned to information relevant to 
the issues of goal feasibility and desirability. Individuals in the predecisional phase 
are usually open-minded and have heightened receptivity to general information. 
The subsequent postdecisional phase aims to promote action initiation and includes 
planning action implementations. This phase is characterized by closed-mindedness, 
where individuals concentrate on information that can promote goal attainment such 
as when, where, and how to approach the goal(s) that they decided to pursue during 
the predecisional phase. 
Following the preactional phase is the actional phase, where individuals are 
required to initiate and efficiently execute actions toward desired outcomes. During 
this phase, individual’s mind-set should promote cognitive tuning towards internal 
and external cues that can sustain the course of action toward goal attainment and 
inhibit potentially disruptive information (e.g., self-reflective thoughts, competing 
goal intentions, and distractive environmental stimuli). Successful completion of the 
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actional phase depends on how well individuals can avoid disruptions that may 
postpone goal achievement. Lastly, individuals enter a postactional phase where 
performance outcome is evaluated and decisions are made on whether further action 
is required (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Heckhausen & Kuhl, 1985).  
People’s decisions and choices during the preactional phase depend 
primarily on personal desires, needs, and interests, whereas how people actually act 
upon their goals during the actional phase can be determined by additional variables. 
During the actional phase, situational constraints and influences may be more 
conducive for certain types of implementations compared to others, and can alter the 
plans and intentions made during the preactional phase. It has also been suggested 
that planning and self-reports of multitasking intention reflect a preference for 
performing multiple tasks at once, or a positive attitude towards multitasking. 
Although attitudes and pre-formulated schedules are sometimes consistent with 
actions (Aronson, 1997; Bem, 1972; Cooper & Fazio, 1984), but in actual 
multitasking situations, individuals may rely on additional factors that are not 
present during planning which can often impair implementations of initial plans and 
intentions (Fazio, 1986, 1990; Mitchell et al., 2008; Reason, 1979).  
For example, when individuals are planning how they want to approach their 
goals, they may not experience actual goal progress, which is a reduction in the 
discrepancy to goal attainment. According to previous studies, goal progress is often 
used to guide behaviors, and this sense of partial goal attainment can only be altered 
when individuals are actively moving towards a goal during the actional phase 
(Brown & McConnell, 2011; Carver & Scheier, 1998). Moreover, additional 
affective states such as boredom and fatigue, or frustration from unforeseeable 
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challenges and obstacles, are all factors that can guide behavior but are absent 
during the preactional phase. Therefore individuals may not implement their a priori 
strategies as they need to employ online adaptations according to how the situation 
unfolds (Jobidon, Rousseau, & Breton, 2005; Kerstholt, 1995). As a result, plans can 
often be biased and inaccurate (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994; Kruger & Evans, 
2004). This difference between planning and actual behavior is commonly 
illustrated by the planning fallacy, where individuals typically underestimate the 
time required to attain their goals, especially when the deadline is further in the 
future (Buehler et al., 1994; Kruger & Evans, 2004). 
In sum, the conceptual framework explaining how much effort is allocated 
to, and how much individuals persist on, a given task during the actional phase may 
be different than the factors affecting goal choice and goal planning during the 
preactional phase. This is important to consider as individuals may report working 
on multiple tasks in a certain way but choose to act differently as they move from an 
implemental to an actional mind-set. In addition, goal seekers may encounter 
additional external pressures and constraints during the actional phase. Based on the 
different cognitive operations required at various phases of goal pursuit, the current 
thesis will differentiate intention from actual behavior by assessing multitasking 
intention during the preactional phase as well as actual multitasking behavior during 
the actional phase.   
1.5.5 Summary and Limitations  
Past research suggests certain situational and individual factors that can 
influence whether individuals adopt a single or multitasking strategy. These include 
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culture (Poposki & Oswald, 2010), cognitive accessibility of focal and alternative 
goals (Shah et al., 2002), difficulties focusing on a single task (Ophir et al., 2009; 
Sanbonmatsu et al., 2013), and situational factors such as GPD and goal orientation 
(Schmidt & Dolis, 2009). In general, these studies suggest that poor attentional 
control and processing additional information may increase multitasking (Cain & 
Mitroff, 2011; Ophir et al., 2009), regardless of whether susceptibility to distracting 
information is internally driven, such as being highly impulsive (Sanbonmatsu et al., 
2013), or externally determined, such as through priming (Shah et al., 2002) or 
operating under a highly volatile environment (Schmidt & Dolis, 2009). The 
attentional state and the environmental situation of people who multitask are similar 
to those of powerless individuals, who also find it difficult to inhibit irrelevant 
information (DeWall et al., 2011; Guinote, 2007b; Smith et al., 2008) and are faced 
with external constraints and unpredictability (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003). 
However, one major limitation in the area of multitasking is that most of the 
findings on individual differences in attentional control and multitasking tendency 
are correlational and relied on self-reports (Becker et al., 2013; Poposki & Oswald, 
2010; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2013). This limits the conclusions that can be drawn about 
the actual causes of multitasking activity since the cognitive correlates of 
multitasking could be a byproduct of multitasking behavior. Moreover, although the 
multiple-goals literature has looked at how certain factors, such as culture and 
inhibition, can influence the kind of strategy we employ, but the question of whether 
social factors can also affect the use of single-tasking vs. multitasking strategies has 
not been investigated. Therefore the current thesis seeks to understand how social 
power affects multiple-goal pursuit using both experimental as well as correlational 
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methods. The next section will discuss the second aim of the thesis, which is to 
investigate the consequences of having multiple active goals for performance, and 
what affects an individual’s ability to multitask.  
1.6 Multitasking Ability 
Research in the multitasking literature has investigated how different 
approaches to multiple goals may result in varied performance levels. Under single-
tasking strategies, individuals can optimize performance on only one of the goals 
and forgo another, whereas under multitasking strategies, individuals tend to 
“satisfice” by doing a satisfactory job on each task (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2013; 
Carver, 2003). It has been suggested that these two types of approaches do not yield 
similar overall performance level, as simultaneous goal activations often generate 
negative work outcomes. When a person undertakes more than one task within a 
given time by allocating available cognitive resources among them, then 
performance in some or all of the tasks may be affected (Wickens & Hollands, 
1999). For example, observational studies of office workers suggest that interruption 
leads to a substantial loss of productivity and time (González & Mark, 2005), and an 
estimated 28% of an employee’s hours are wasted due to self-initiated interruptions 
(Spira & Feintuch, 2005). Performance decrements associated with multitasking can 
even amount to businesses losing approximately $650 billion a year (Lohr, 2007).  
It has been proposed that these decrements occur because merely the 
activation of multiple goals can be distractive and interfere with task performance 
(Marien, Custers, Hassin, & Aarts, 2012; Shah & Kruglanski, 2002). For example, 
when multiple goals are activated simultaneously, people often experience 
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indecision and goal conflict (Kleiman & Hassin, 2011). Moreover, our cognitive 
resources are extremely limited (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Kahneman, 1973). Thus 
constantly dividing attention between two or more different goals can be 
challenging, as motivational resources are pulled away from the focal goal (Fishbach 
& Dhar, 2007; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Marien et al., 2012; Shah & Kruglanski, 
2002; Van Dillen, Papies, & Hofmann, 2013). That is why goal shielding, which 
promotes single-tasking behaviors, can also affect goal commitment and 
performance by decreasing the need to share resources and to manage multiple goals 
in memory (Shah et al., 2002). For example, it has been shown that participants 
persisted for a shorter period of time, and had poorer performance, on the focal goal 
(solving anagrams) when they were subliminally primed with an alternative goal (vs. 
a neutral concept) that was in indirect conflict with the focal goal (naming different 
functions of a box; Shah & Kruglanski, 2002).  
Choosing to multitask by engaging in discretionary switches between various 
goals may also lead to inefficiencies. When individuals switch from one task to 
another, the processing of the initial task must be interrupted and delayed (Kiesel et 
al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). At the same time, 
individuals need to maintain the results from the interrupted task so that they can 
quickly refocus and switch attention back to that initial task and reinstate its 
processing. Indeed, studies have suggested that individuals who engage in a single-
tasking approach, in which one goal is completed prior to allocating time to another, 
show greater likelihood of completing at least one goal without reducing the chances 
of meeting both compared to those who engage in discretionary switches (Adler & 
Benbunan-Fich, 2013; Schmidt, Dolis, & Tolli, 2009). These results suggest that 
  
75 
 
choosing to adopt a polychronic behavior could be more attentionally demanding 
and cognitively taxing than a monochronic behavior. As a consequence, 
performance on individual tasks may suffer due to indecisiveness, higher 
distractibility, and unfocused attention, which can diminish overall productivity.  
Although there is a self-regulatory advantage to inhibiting alternative goals, 
as this will free up resources needed for goal pursuit, but in many situations 
individuals do not have a choice and are required to multitask due to work demands 
(Benbunan-Fich & Truman, 2009; González & Mark, 2005; Laxmisan et al., 2007; 
Otto et al., 2012). In fact, multitasking has been developed into an imperative and 
desired trait in many settings even though it can be detrimental for performance 
(Benbunan-Fich & Truman, 2009). There is some support that when participants 
need to attend to two tasks, polychrons perform better than monochrons 
(Goonetilleke & Luximon, 2010; Zhang et al., 2005). This is in line with Hall’s 
(1989) hypothesis that monochrons feel disoriented and perform worse than 
polychrons whenever there are many things to do. However, the notion that high-
multitaskers exhibit better multitasking ability than low-multitaskers has been 
challenged by other researchers (Ophir et al., 2009; Watson & Strayer, 2010). For 
example, Ophir et al. (2009) examined cognitive abilities of chronic multitaskers, 
and found that people who frequently multitask actually exhibited greater costs 
when switching between two different tasks compared to infrequent multitaskers 
(but see Alzahabi & Becker, 2013).  
Accordingly, effective and efficient multitasking performance does not 
necessarily depend on how likely and often individuals engage in multitasking 
behavior, but relies more on the amount of WM capacity and attention available to 
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exercise a high level of executive control (Baddeley et al., 2001; Baddeley & Della 
Sala, 1996; Szameitat, Schubert, Müller, & Von Cramon, 2002). Executive attention 
is central to multitasking because the information and goals relevant to one task 
must be actively maintained while other tasks are performed. The next section will 
therefore review how WM resources can affect two of the most extensively 
researched functions that are essential for successful multitasking performance: 
rapidly switching attention between different tasks (task-switching) and attending to 
information simultaneously (dual-tasking). Both task-switching and dual-tasking are 
defining aspects of multitasking behavior when individuals are trying to accomplish 
many goals within a certain period of time (Delbridge, 2001).  
1.6.1 Task-Switching Ability 
Task-switching is the ability to quickly and flexibly reallocate attention from 
one cognitive task to another, such as switching attention to a telephone call when 
writing an article (Monsell, 2003). Task-switching can be driven by external stimuli, 
such as a phone ring, or guided by internal cues, such as satisfaction with current 
goal progress (Carver, 2003). Some have attributed improvements in multitasking 
ability to one’s ability to switch between multiple components in a complex task. 
Switching between different task sets can be challenging and time-consuming and it 
can incur a “switch cost” (Rogers & Monsell, 1995).   
Switch costs are a result of increased reaction-times (RTs) and/or error-rates 
(ERs) when individuals are required to switch from one type of task to another 
compared to working continuously on the same task (see Monsell, 2003, for a 
review). Numerous laboratory studies have found task-switching to be challenging 
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(Kiesel et al., 2010; Rubinstein et al., 2001; Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson, & Cohen, 
2006). For example, participants who switched between addition and subtraction 
operations responded slower than those who continued with the same operation. 
These costs have also been found in real life situations, where judges who switch 
between different court cases take more time than judges who work sequentially 
(Coviello, Ichino, & Persico, 2014).  
It has been proposed that there are two main reasons for why switch costs 
occur. One is attributable to the time taken to adjust mental control settings that 
correspond to the new task. That is, every time individuals switch to a different task, 
extra resources are required to refocus attention on the new task set. Task-set 
reconfiguration may involve the retrieval, with the help of executive control 
processes, of task-related information (e.g., task rules) from long-term memory 
(Luria & Meiran, 2005; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). The second reason is due to task 
competition, such as the carry-over of the processing and representations from the 
previous task-set (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In order to perform well, individuals 
need to successfully inhibit these interfering activations and responses. Attentional 
control is required during task-switching to minimize interference from the 
representations and stimuli associated with the off-task. 
Theoretical models of attentional control also argue that the central executive 
has a major role in the switching of attention, and that successful task-switching 
ability relies on the amount of WM capacity available for the control of attention 
(Baddeley, 2002). Higher attentional control allows individuals to rapidly 
reconfigure to a new task and to more completely inhibit the old task. This will 
minimize interferences from the representations and stimuli associated with the off-
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task, which results in lower switch costs. For example, studies have shown that 
increasing WM load has a deleterious influence on task-switching performance, 
where high WM loads can decrease the speed with which participants switched from 
a primary task to a secondary task (Baddeley et al., 2001; de Fockert et al., 2001; 
Hester & Garavan, 2005; Mitchell et al., 2002; Roberts et al., 1994). These findings 
are consistent with the idea WM capacity relates directly to executive control 
functions, such as switching of attention. Moreover, Baddeley and colleagues (2001) 
demonstrated in a series of dual-task experiments that secondary tasks requiring the 
use of the central executive and the phonological loop can both tax WM resources, 
which also interfered with task-switching performance. 
In sum, higher attentional control can facilitate rapid reconfiguration of a new 
task and complete inhibition of the old task, which result in fewer switch costs. 
Switch costs occur if available resources cannot meet the higher demand for 
attentional control when one task is replaced by a second task, such as for 
disengagement from an irrelevant task-set and for reconfiguring mental processes 
associated with the new task-set (Monsell & Driver, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 
1995). Task-switching can therefore be difficult because if inhibitory regulation is 
reduced, then individuals will encode more information and sustain access to them 
even when tasks change (Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999). Since powerless individuals 
fail to down-regulate nonrelevant information, then representation of distracting 
information from a previous task may still be accessible during the processing of a 
subsequent task, and this may influence the reconfiguration process as well as 
performance (Healey, Campbell, & Hasher, 2008). The next section will outline 
another type of multitasking ability, dealing with multiple concurrent tasks, which is 
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also highly dependent on attentional control and WM resources and can therefore be 
susceptible to the influences of power.     
1.6.2 Dual-Tasking Ability 
Carrying out more than one task at the same time, such as using cell phones 
while driving, has become commonplace in everyday life due to society’s emphasis 
on productivity (Strayer & Drews, 2007). Therefore the ability to dual-task is a 
major concern for both public and scientific interest. This section will focus on dual-
tasking ability, which is defined as the capacity of sharing or dividing attention 
between two simultaneously incoming stimuli. Dual-tasking requires individuals to 
concurrently process a number of distinct stimuli and select their appropriate 
responses, to execute a number of distinct acts simultaneously, and to coordinate 
among the different task components within a short period of time (Campbell, 1988; 
Wood, 1986).  
Research has showed that when mental resources need to be shared between 
more than one simultaneously presented cues, then individuals take longer to 
respond and commit more errors as compared to when the information are presented 
separately (Levy & Pashler, 2001; Welford, 1952). It has been found repeatedly that 
comprehension and effective processing of one medium are reduced while 
simultaneously consuming a second medium (Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & 
Anderson, 1996; Mulligan, Duke, & Cooper, 2007). For example, individuals 
perform considerably worse, in terms of increased errors and delays in response 
times, if they are asked to do an auditory and a visual task together compared to 
when they do the tasks independently (Levy & Pashler, 2001; Pashler, 1994). These 
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dual-task costs have been observed even when pairing together simple tasks that 
would have been easily performed separately (Pashler, 1994). Additionally, in more 
realistic every-day tasks where participants were asked to copy a short paragraph 
while listening to a series of isolated words, it was found that writing speed 
decreased as a function of the attentional load of the auditory task (Brown, 
McDonald, Brown, & Carr, 1988). These dual-task costs are not trivial as it can lead 
to severe consequences in many real-life situations. One common situation is driving 
an automobile while conversing, either on a mobile phone or with a passenger. This 
type of dual-tasking can lead to noticeable interference with all tasks, such that both 
driving performance and conversation flow are significantly impaired (Charlton, 
2009; Pashler, 1994, 1998; Strayer & Drews, 2007).  
Based on numerous conclusive evidence, most researchers agree that dual-
tasking is more difficult than single-tasking, and that there is specific interference 
when tasks require the same stage of processing and simultaneous response selection 
(Pashler & Kang, 2006). However, what determines the nature of this interference is 
still under debate. Two main and fundamentally different perspectives have emerged 
in this area to account for the undisputed presence of dual-task cost: the structural 
theory and the central capacity theory. 
Structural Theory 
The structural theory proposes that dual-task interference stems from the 
fundamental structure of human cognition, which places limits on dual-tasking ( 
Pashler, 1993; Pashler & Johnston, 1998; Tombu & Jolicœur, 2003). One of the 
most well-known structural theory is the bottleneck model, which proposes that 
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parallel processing of information may be impossible for certain mental operations 
due to a cognitive bottleneck (Broadbent, 1958, 1982; Pashler, 1994; Welford, 
1952). It is assumed that there are broadly three stages of processing: an early stage 
involving perceptual processing, a central stage involving response selection, and a 
final stage involving execution of the response. When two stimuli or messages are 
presented at the same time, both can gain access to a sensory buffer at the same 
time. Similarly, execution of the responses for the two tasks can also occur largely in 
parallel.  
The critical assumption is that the limit to divided attention occurs because 
there is a bottleneck at the central processing stage (Welford, 1952). This bottleneck 
acts as a filter in the central processor, where only one input is allowed in order to 
prevent overloading of the filter’s limited capacity. Therefore processes leading to 
response selection can only be carried out for one task at a time (Lien, Ruthruff, & 
Johnston, 2006) and attention involves a system of “turn-taking” where only one of 
the inputs can pass through the filter in the central processor (Pashler & Johnston, 
1989). The other input remains in the buffer and its analysis must be postponed until 
central processing of the first task is complete. For example, if someone is trying to 
divide their attention between two tasks, they might first select and launch action 
that is part of Task A; whilst this is happening, Task B must be put on hold, 
resulting in delays and dual-task costs (Pashler & Johnston, 1989)  
This theory is supported by evidence from studies using the psychological 
refractory period (PRP) paradigm, where participants are asked to respond to two 
tasks that are presented in a sequential order. The intervals between the two tasks 
can vary from long to short, allowing one to measure the source of the interference 
  
82 
 
between the tasks. A common finding in these PRP studies is that reducing the delay 
between the tasks impairs performance in the second task. This PRP effect has been 
taken to support the idea of a structural bottleneck, where the first answer must be 
completely processed before another one, thus creating a delay for the second task 
(Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Pashler, 1993). That is, the second task must wait until 
some critical processing of the first task is complete (Pashler, 1993). These results 
from the PRP studies have often been used as an argument that perfect time-sharing 
between two tasks is not possible and that at some point in time, execution of the 
second task must await the completion of the first task. It also explains why 
interference occurs between concurrent but quite different tasks, because there is a 
general limitation to how much information the entire cognitive system can transmit 
at one time 
In sum, structural accounts of dual-task interference assume that, due to 
structural limitations, parallel processing is impossible as one task will always have 
to queue (Pashler, 1990). It is therefore not possible to make two decisions about 
appropriate responses to two or more different stimuli at the same time because as 
the two tasks must be performed one at a time, and this delay will impair dual-task 
task performance (Welford, 1952). However, critics of the bottleneck model have 
pointed out that the PRP effect may be a result of strategic control processes, such as 
a voluntary organization of processing priorities that ensures the first stimulus is 
always responded to before the second one (Meyer & Kieras, 1997). For example, 
the instructions given during the PRP paradigm may have inadvertently encouraged 
participants to prioritize one of the tasks at the expense of the other. In fact, when 
given appropriate instructions (explicitly told not to prioritize any of the tasks) and a 
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moderate amount of practice, participants are able to achieve almost perfect time-
sharing (no PRP effect) on certain combinations of audiovocal and visuomanual 
tasks (Schumacher et al., 2001). For example, studies have shown that this 
processing bottleneck may disappear when well-practiced participants perform 
simple tasks, such as those with highly compatible stimulus response mappings 
(McLeod & Posner, 1984; Pashler, Carrier, & Hoffman, 1993) and highly practiced 
visual manual mappings (Greenwald & Shulman, 1973).  
Capacity Theory 
As a consequence of the bottleneck theory’s limitations, other researchers 
have proposed that dual-task costs may reflect optional control strategies rather than 
structural processing limitations. This second perspective is known as the capacity 
(or resource) models of attention (Kahneman, 1973). Capacity theories do not 
assume a structural bottleneck, but rather, they propose that several and parallel 
processes are possible from the first perceptual analyses up to the higher cognitive 
decision processes.  
Two types of capacity theories have dominated the literature. One is the 
multiple capacity theory, which favors the notion that there are several specific and 
independent pools of processing resources or modules (e.g., Allport, 1989; Wickens, 
1980). The second is the central capacity theory, which assumes that there is a 
single, multi-purpose central processor or executive (e.g., Kahneman, 1973; Norman 
& Shallice, 2000). Central capacity theories argue that there is some general, central 
capacity, such as the central executive system of the WM model (Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974), which can be used flexibly across numerous activities, but which has limited 
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capacity. This general resource or processor must be drawn upon for the successful 
performance of almost all tasks (Kahneman, 1973; Moray, 1967), and is also 
required to monitor and coordinate performance on a wide range of tasks. Dual-task 
interference occurs when concurrent demands on the central executive are too great 
to be met.  
According to the central capacity theory, when two tasks are performed 
simultaneously, they share the same available resources and less capacity can be 
devoted for each individual task (Kahneman, 1973; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Navon 
& Miller, 2002). This can then result in impaired dual-task performance. In addition, 
extra capacity is also needed to synchronize between two concurrent outputs by 
deciding and preparing the order in which the tasks are to be carried out. In other 
words, responses must be programmed and executed for two incompatible tasks in 
order to engage in successful response selection, and this requires substantial 
coordination and maintenance of the two task-sets in WM. If insufficient resources 
are available for task coordination, then this may increase confusion and cross-talks 
between the two tasks. For example, some have suggested that dual-task 
impairments are not dependent on what sort of operation is to be carried out per se, 
but on the content of the information actually being processed (Hazeltine, Ruthruff, 
& Remington, 2006). That is, dual-task interference may be caused by an “outcome 
conflict” (Navon & Miller, 1987) in which one task produces outputs or side-effects 
that are harmful to the processing of the other task.  
This assumption is supported by findings that performance on tasks requiring 
attention to two different types of stimuli is affected by task similarity. For example, 
stimuli of different sensory modalities (combination of a verbal and spatial task) can 
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be attended to together more effectively than stimuli from the same sensory 
modality (combination of two verbal tasks; Allport et al., 1972). Likewise, similar 
tasks (e.g., both tasks requiring hearing words) were found to employ the highest 
amount of mental resources because they compete more with each other for 
resources and also demand more resources to decrease interference by keeping the 
two task-sets separate in WM (Cowan & Morey, 2007). Less similar task 
combinations, such as hearing words and seeing words, required less mental effort 
and the last combination of hearing words and seeing pictures required the least 
mental effort. These results suggest that the likelihood of dual-task interference 
depends on the amount of resources that are required—the more one allocates 
resources towards conflict resolution and minimizing cross-talks, the fewer 
resources are left available for dual-task execution.  
Since processing two tasks simultaneously can result in interference and 
cross-talk, then it has been proposed that goal conflict should be associated with 
difficutlies in or lack of prioritization (i.e., seeing the goals as equal rather than 
unequal in priority; Erez, Gopher, & Arzi, 1990; Schmidt, Kleinbeck, & 
Brockmann, 1984). For example, individuals need to be able to manage two tasks by 
sustaining appropriate inhibition between the upcoming stimuli in order to decrease 
confusion and crosstalk between them. Since one of the roles of the central 
executive system in the WM model is to act as an attention controller (Baddeley, 
1996), then it can also help individuals focus on specific information and reject 
information from other sources that are not task-relevant.  
Therefore WM capacity is greatly involved in divided attention tasks by 
allowing people to generate control over how they distribute their finite resources 
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among different but simultaneously presented tasks. Individuals can, to some extent, 
control how their attention and resources are allocated to cognitive processes 
involved in different tasks via the central executive system (Baddeley, 1996; 
Norman & Shallice, 2000). Deficits in executive operations could therefore 
exacerbate dual-task costs as individuals are no longer able to decrease the 
interference between the two tasks, such as by temporarily emphasizing one task 
over the other. Thus in order to carry out these processes successfully, one needs to 
employ some sort of efficient organization of information or resource allocation, 
which in turn is dependent on the amount of WM capacity available.  
Accordingly, capacity theories suggest that dual-task costs can be minimized 
if individuals are able to control their attention. Therefore the more central capacity 
is available the better individuals are at dealing with demanding dual-task situations. 
Empirical support for these assumptions come from studies showing how various 
factors that decrease resource availability can also hinder dual-tasking performance. 
Specifically, task complexities (Bourke, Duncan, & Nimmo-Smith, 1996), practice 
(Ruthruff, Hazeltine, & Remington, 2006; Schumacher et al., 2001; Spelke, Hirst, & 
Neisser, 1976), and an individual’s current state (Maquestiaux, Hartley, & Bertsch, 
2004; Maquestiaux, Laguë-Beauvais, Ruthruff, & Bherer, 2008; Ruthruff et al., 
2006) can contribute to the amount of resources available. First, how demanding 
dual-tasking is can depend on how difficult or complex the individual tasks are. 
Complex tasks require more resources to process and to complete them properly. 
For example, studies have shown that higher demanding tasks (e.g., random number 
generation vs. tone monitoring) interfered with dual-task performance the most 
(Bourke et al., 1996). Therefore the more difficult a task, the less likely it is that it 
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can be easily performed simultaneously with another task because they increase 
cognitive load by taking up more attentional resources (Duncan, 1979; Sullivan, 
1976).  
Second, practice has also been found to affect performance (Ruthruff et al., 
2006; Schumacher et al., 2001; Spelke et al., 1976). This is because the more we 
practice a task, the more automatic it becomes and demands less attention. As a task 
becomes more automatized, it also becomes easier to be performed simultaneously 
with another task. For example, expert typists can type and shadow speech at the 
same time (Shaffer, 1975). Furthermore, students who were given tasks of trying to 
understand stories while writing down words to dictation improved after six weeks 
of training (Spelke et al., 1976). In addition, using a dual-task paradigm with basic 
choice reaction tasks (vocal response to auditory tone and manual response to visual 
information) Schumacher and colleagues (2001) found that some individuals were 
able to bypass the central bottleneck of information processing by achieving perfect 
time-sharing after five practice sessions. Perfect time-sharers could execute a task in 
dual-task condition as fast as they could when the tasks were performed alone, and 
the execution of the second task does not suffer from reducing the delay between the 
two tasks.  
Lastly, the amount of central capacity available can also be affected by task-
independent factors such as situational or individual differences. Indeed, numerous 
studies have reported individual differences in the ability to divide attention between 
the two tasks in a PRP paradigm (Maquestiaux et al., 2004, 2008; Ruthruff et al., 
2006). For some people, the simultaneous performance of tasks is achieved quite 
easily and efficiently, while others have more difficulties. These individual 
  
88 
 
differences in dual-task abilities might be related to different executive functions 
abilities. For example, behavioural studies that explored the relation between dual-
task performance and neuropsychological tests support the idea that individual 
differences in executive functions can predict the ability of an individual to perfectly 
share attention between tasks (Holtzer, Stern, & Rakitin, 2005; Laguë-Beauvais, 
Gagnon, Castonguay, & Bherer, 2013; Tun, O’Kane, & Wingfield, 2002; but see 
Bull & Scerif, 2001). For example, dual-task performance was best predicted by 
performance on tasks measuring executive functions, such as the Forward and 
Backward Digit Span, the Trail Making Test, and the Stroop Task. These 
correlations suggest that the effective management of two tasks requires one to 
successfully hold multiple task-sets in WM, to inhibit automatic responses to a task, 
and to easily switch between two tasks. Together, these results provide evidence for 
the presence of a general (vs. multiple) limited capacity responsible for task 
coordination during dual-tasking instead of a structural bottleneck. 
In sum, past studies suggest that, instead of a structural limitation, dual-task 
costs depend on a central attentional capacity that has limited availability 
(Kahneman, 1973; Norman & Shallice, 2000). Consequently, dual-task costs occur 
because processing more than one task will compete for limited mental resources 
(Bourke et al., 1996; Hazeltine et al., 2006; Schumacher et al., 2001). The ability to 
perform two tasks together depends on how much resources are available for 
maintaining and coordinating two concurrent tasks in WM. If the combined 
demands of the tasks do not exceed the central capacity, then they will not interfere 
with each other and perfect time-sharing between two tasks is then possible 
(Schumacher et al., 2001).  
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1.6.3 Summary and Limitations of Multitasking Literature 
To conclude, the current section illustrated how the executive system of the 
WM can increase attentional control, which will then aid multitasking performance. 
Although past studies have focused more on how different types of tasks or 
individual differences in abilities can influence task-switching and dual-tasking 
performance, relatively few studies have examined how social relationships and 
one’s current situation can affect multitasking ability. Thus the present thesis 
investigates the effect of power on multitasking ability, as it is highly likely that 
powerless individuals are more easily distracted, have fewer WM resources, and are 
less able to successfully control attention in multitasking situations compared to 
powerful individuals. Since concurrent processing of two tasks places high demands 
on the central executive for coordination and for managing cross-talks, then 
powerless individuals should show impaired performance in dual-task situations. 
Likewise, powerlessness should also impair performance during task-switching as 
task-switching also requires executive control for attentional refocusing and for 
inhibiting previous task-sets (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000). This 
thesis will therefore look specifically at whether powerlessness can affect task-
switching and dual-task performance. 
1.7 Summary and Aims of the Present Thesis 
1.7.1 Aims and Hypotheses 
Past literature has proposed that social power, defined as interpersonal 
outcome dependency, alters the fundamental need for security and control (Fiske, 
1993; Guinote, 2007a; Keltner et al., 2003). This in turn has a profound impact on 
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how individuals attend to and process information and on how they behave. As a 
consequence of satisfying fundamental needs, high power increases (whereas low 
power decreases) approach-orientation towards rewards and opportunities and 
attentional focus on current goals and demands (Guinote, 2007a; Keltner et al., 
2003). Since successful goal pursuit requires individuals to be both motivated and 
have the ability to concentrate on goal-related tasks, then it is unsurprising that high 
power can facilitate, whereas low power can hinder, goal achievement and 
performance (Guinote, 2007a).  
In spite of the research on power and goal attainment and performance in the 
context of single-goal pursuit, the literature lacks evidence on how power affects 
goal-related intention, action, and ability in the domain of multiple-goal pursuit. It is 
unclear whether the willingness and ability of powerful and powerless participants 
to prioritize relevant information when pursuing a single goal can affect behaviors 
and performance in the context of multiple goals, where all information can be 
potentially relevant. This aspect is important to investigate as people are often 
juggling between competing demands every day (Locke & Latham, 1990). Thus the 
current thesis will address this gap in the literature and has two main aims. First is to 
look at whether power affects how people approach multiple tasks (intentions and 
behaviors) and, second, is to investigate whether power influences one’s ability to 
multitask.  
Multitasking Tendency and Prioritization 
The first aim of the thesis is to look at how social power can affect the 
balance between multiple goals. Powerholders are more likely to prioritize 
  
91 
 
information that are relevant to a focal goal or situational affordance, and attend less 
to other considerations because they are seen as less crucial (Guinote, 2007b, 2007c; 
Overbeck & Park, 2001; Slabu & Guinote, 2010). On the other hand, powerless 
individuals are less focused on information relevant to their focal goal because they 
have multiple concerns and are faced with a more volatile and unstable environment. 
As a consequence, they prefer to gain additional information in order to satisfy the 
multiple goals that they have. They may therefore treat various goals as equally 
important and are more willing to be guided by all the information that demands 
their attention, such as differences in GPD (Kernan & Lord, 1990; Schmidt & Dolis, 
2009).  
Moreover, individuals who are limited in their ability and willingness to 
inhibit secondary activities may be especially prone to multitasking (Cain & Mitroff, 
2011; Ophir et al., 2009). Powerholder’s tendency to prioritize goal-relevant, and to 
inhibit goal-irrelevant, information in single-goal contexts may also be extended to 
the context of multiple goals. That is, prioritization during multiple-goal contexts 
will encourage powerholders to behave similarly to monochrons by taking up 
important tasks first and allocating most of their time to that one task while other 
tasks are left to do later or omitted if time runs out (Hall, 1989). Power should 
therefore decrease multitasking tendency, since goal commitment and prioritization 
encourage a more focused, single-tasking strategy.  
Multitasking tendency has been measured in the past using self-reports (e.g., 
MPI) as well as measuring behavior during laboratory multitasking simulations. 
However, past studies have not investigated whether there are differences in how 
individuals plan and schedule multiple goals. As indicated in previous sections, 
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planning is important to look at in addition to actual behaviors, as cognitive 
operations differ depending on whether the individual is in the preactional or 
actional phases of goal pursuit (Gollwitzer, 1996; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). 
As a result of these possible differences, the current study aimed to measure 
multitasking tendency in the preactional phase using self-reports and task planning, 
as well as to investigate actual multitasking behavior in the actional phase.  
Based on the finding that attentional strategies and information seeking 
tendencies seem to vary with the level of power and control that individuals have at 
their disposal (e.g., Smith & Trope, 2006; Weick & Guinote, 2008), it is first 
hypothesized that multitasking tendency should have a positive relationship with 
powerlessness. That is, powerless participants should have a higher multitasking 
tendency compared to participants in neutral positions, who will have a higher 
multitasking tendency compared to powerful participants. Moreover, since power 
increases prioritization of goal-relevant information whereas powerless individuals 
treat all information as equally important, then the second hypothesis proposes that 
powerholders are also more likely to spontaneously prioritize one of their multiple 
goals.  
Boundary Conditions 
The current thesis also aims to investigate the boundary conditions of 
multitasking behavior by manipulating task difficulty and task outcome. As outlined 
earlier in the introduction, task switching can be influenced by goal expectancy and 
goal orientation (Kernan & Lord, 1990; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007; Schmidt & Dolis, 
2009). First, low goal expectancy decreases switching to that particular goal, and 
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may moderate the relationship between powerlessness and multitasking. Therefore 
the current thesis manipulated task difficulty in order to investigate whether a more 
difficult goal can decrease switching behaviors by encouraging participants to focus 
on the easier task with higher goal expectancy. Therefore the third hypothesis states 
that task difficulty should decrease multitasking tendency as participants switch less 
to the difficult task.  
Second, previous studies found that individuals have a high tendency to 
avoid negative consequences and outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Therefore prevention tasks that call for loss aversion should moderate the 
relationship between high power and single-tasking, because switching toward goals 
instrumental to avoiding losses should be weighed more heavily than focusing on a 
goal without loss-aversion (Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). Since discrepancies relevant 
to the prevention task are likely to be seen as more severe than discrepancies to non-
prevention (i.e., neutral) tasks, the fourth hypothesis predicts that powerful 
participants should be willing to multitask more if the secondary task is prevention-
focused as opposed to being neutral.  
Multitasking Ability 
Past research suggests that individuals who prefer to engage in multitasking 
are not necessarily better at multitasking compared to individuals who prefer to 
pursue multiple goals sequentially (Konig, Buhner, & Murling, 2005; Ophir et al., 
2009). As a consequence, even though powerless individuals may multitask more, 
this does not necessarily mean that they have an advantage when multitasking. 
Multitasking ability is primarily constrained by the amount of WM resources 
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available (Colom, Martínez-Molina, Shih, & Santacreu, 2010; Kahneman, 1973; 
Konig et al., 2005). Therefore the second aim of the thesis was to investigate 
whether power affects overall multitasking ability. This is probable because in 
addition to affecting the willingness to focus on current needs and desires (Galinsky 
et al., 2003; Magee et al., 2007; Smith & Bargh, 2008), power can also affect the 
ability to control attention (DeWall et al., 2011; Guinote, 2007b; Smith et al., 2008).  
Processing and seeking task-irrelevant information, such as worrying over 
evaluations and regulating affect in powerless individuals, can consume more WM 
resources (Beal et al., 2005) compared to powerful individuals, who attend to less 
extraneous information. Powerless individuals will therefore have fewer resources 
available to devote to the central ongoing task. These deficits in WM capacity will 
be especially apparent in demanding situations such as dual-tasking, where 
individuals need to simultaneously store and process multiple sources of information 
(Baddeley, 1992). Thus, dual-task performance is indicative both of WM capacity 
and of the ability to complete two goals in parallel. Therefore the fifth hypothesis 
predicts that powerlessness should decrease WM capacity, which is manifested 
through higher dual-task costs.  
Lastly, since the shifting function is also highly dependent on executive 
control to successfully refocus attention and inhibit previously activated task-sets 
(Monsell & Driver, 2000), then the sixth hypothesis predicts that powerless 
individuals should have higher switch-costs than powerful individuals. The effect of 
power on task-switching ability should occur in situations where individuals are 
required to multitask, as well as in situations where individuals can choose to switch 
between tasks according to their own discretion due to similar underlying cognitive 
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operations (Spira & Feintuch, 2005). Whereas both low and high power is predicted 
to affect multitasking tendency, the prediction regarding multitasking ability focuses 
primarily on powerless individuals. This is because past studies have only found 
consistent support that powerlessness decreases performance, whereas experiencing 
high social power may not increase WM resources above the baseline capacity 
(DeWall et al., 2011; Guinote, 2007b; Smith et al., 2008). 
1.7.2 Overview of Studies 
The proposed research questions are addressed in Chapters 2-4. The first two 
chapters focused on the impact of social power on multitasking tendency by testing 
the hypothesis that social power increases single-tasking, whereas powerlessness 
leads to multitasking. Six studies were presented to examine this proposition using 
both correlational (Experiment 1) as well as experimental (Experiments 2-6) 
designs. Chapter 2 investigated multitasking intention during the preactional phase 
of goal pursuit by looking at self-reported multitasking behavior (Experiments 1 and 
3) and planning between multiple projects (Experiments 2 and 3). It also addressed 
the moderating role of goal orientation on the relationship between power and 
multitasking (Experiment 3).  
Chapter 3 examined how individuals in high and low power behave when 
faced with multiple possible tasks to pursue during the actional phase. These studies 
utilized a computerized (Experiment 4) and a manual (Experiment 5) task, and the 
moderating role of task difficulty on switching was examined as well (Experiment 
5). Chapter 3 also looked at whether power affected individuals’ prioritization of a 
single goal when faced with multiple different goals to pursue (Experiments 4-6), 
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and whether power affected the number of tasks that participants choose to pursue 
during the predecisional phase (Experiment 6). In sum, Chapters 2-3 examined the 
hypothesis that individuals low (vs. high) in power had higher multitasking intention 
as well as behaviors, and were less likely to prioritize a single goal when faced with 
the opportunity to pursue multiple goals.  
The next chapter, Chapter 4, tested the second question regarding power and 
multitasking ability by investigating the hypothesis that low power decreases 
multitasking ability. This was done both in constant experimental conditions 
(Experiments 7-9) and in natural settings (Experiment 10). Participants were invited 
to engage in dual-tasking (Experiment 7) and task-switching paradigms 
(Experiments 8 and 9), and the speed and accuracy of their responses were recorded. 
Multitasking ability was also examined using self-reported abilities to control 
attention when faced with multiple tasks or interruptions (Experiment 10).  
Past studies have suggested that cognitive and behavioral tendencies 
associated with power are activated whenever individuals are in a high-power role or 
even when people simply recall an experience of role power (Berdahl & Martorana, 
2006; Galinsky et al., 2003). Therefore the present thesis manipulated power 
experimentally by inviting participants to enact high- and low-power hierarchical 
roles (Experiment 6), by priming power through past recollections (Galinsky et al., 
2003; Experiments 2, 4-5 and 7-9), and by asking participants to imagine and 
describe a day in the role of a manager or subordinate (Guinote, 2008) (Experiment 
3). Power was also measured as an individual trait variable using the Sense of Power 
scale (Experiment 1). Lastly, Experiment 10 examined how individuals in real-life 
high and low organizational power positions self-report their performance during 
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multitasking. This allows us to investigate the effects of social power on ability 
under conditions of high external validity. 
In addition, past theories of power have suggested that high and low power 
produce opposite effects (Keltner et al., 2003). However, data supporting this claim 
is limited as most research on power has used a two-group design which only 
compared differences between powerful and powerless participants (Moskowitz, 
2004). Therefore empirical evidence is limited on whether possessing power is 
associated with increased prioritization and executive functions, or lacking power 
leads to a multitasking mindset and higher distractibility, or both. To tease apart and 
examine the effects of possessing and lacking power on behaviors and performance 
independently, a neutral or control condition was included in which participants 
completed a version of the manipulation task that is unrelated to power. Hence in all 
of the experimental manipulations of power, participants either possessed power 
(powerful condition), lacked power (powerless condition), or were in a neutral 
situation (control condition).  
The current experiments also controlled for other confounding factors that 
can affect the results. For example, the effects of power on switching behaviors and 
performance might be a result of a change in participants’ moods (Keltner et al., 
2003). There are studies that show how powerholders experience more positive 
rather than negative emotions (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Berdahl & Martorana, 
2006), even though the relationship between power and mood is inconsistent. Since 
the hypothesis proposes a direct link between power and behavior that does not 
require the mediation of mood or other affective changes, then additional measures 
were included to rule out potential confounding factors and to discover other 
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potential mediators of power. These include differences in positive affect 
(Experiments 2-9), anxiety (Experiments 8 and 9), confidence (Experiments 4 and 
6), rumination, and arousal level (Experiment 9). Perceptions of task interest, task 
difficulty (Experiments 4 and 5), and goal orientation (Experiment 6) were also 
examined. These factors were assessed because they could affect multitasking 
behavior and ability (Ansari et al., 2008; Carver, 2003; Rokke, Arnell, Koch, & 
Andrews, 2002) and have been related to power (Briñol et al., 2007; Fast, 
Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky, 2012; Keltner et al., 2003).  
Finally, Chapter 5 included the General Discussion of the empirical 
evidences presented in Chapters 2-4. The findings are summarized and strengths and 
limitations are discussed, followed with implications of the current findings for 
research on social power and research on multiple-goal pursuit. It also proposed 
directions for future research as well as potential practical interventions to enhance 
productivity in organizations and the ability to multitask.  
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Chapter 2:  
Power and Multitasking Intention 
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2.1 Introduction 
One challenge in multiple goal situations is to be able to successfully juggle 
between multiple activities within a given deadline, such as scheduling one’s time 
and choosing which task to work on and when. For example, individuals need to 
decide whether they should attend to multiple tasks simultaneously to save time, and 
whether they should switch to another task or finish the current one first. However, 
the issue of whether power affects how individuals allocate resources back and forth 
across competing goals over time has been largely neglected.  
The purpose of Chapter 2 was to investigate whether power affects how people 
approach multiple, competing demands, and specifically focuses on intentions prior 
to the actional phase. Powerless individuals are more vigilant (Keltner et al., 2003) 
and may be more motivated to attend to multiple sources of information to better 
predict the future and to increase their sense of control (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; 
Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Guinote & Phillips, 2010; Overbeck & Park, 2001). This 
tendency to occupy their minds with more information (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; 
Guinote, 2007a) may lead to higher multitasking as opposed to single-tasking 
intentions. In contrast, high power promotes a selective and voluntary deployment of 
attention (Guinote, 2007a), which should increase single-tasking tendency. For 
instance, in the social domain, powerholders attend selectively to social information 
depending on their goals (Goodwin et al., 2000; Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Overbeck & 
Park, 2001; Vescio et al., 2003), their current states (Weick & Guinote, 2008), and 
the stereotypes that easily come to mind (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; 
Guinote & Phillips, 2010; Richeson & Ambady, 2003).  
  
101 
 
Based on these relationships between power and attention, it was hypothesized 
that powerless participants should have a higher multitasking intention compared to 
control participants, who will have a higher multitasking intention than powerful 
participants. This was tested using a multitasking questionnaire and by asking 
participants to plan how they will approach multiple tasks.  
2.2 Experiment 1: Power and multitasking preference 
Experiment 1 used an on-line questionnaire to measure the relationship between 
generalized sense of power (SOP) and multitasking preferences, otherwise known as 
polychronicity. Polychronicity reflects the preference for multitasking as opposed to 
performing only one task at a time (Slocombe & Bluedorn, 1999). Higher 
polychronicity indicates a higher preference for shifting attention among ongoing 
tasks, rather than focusing on completing one task before switching to another task. 
An individual’s level of polychronicity reflects a combination of past experiences 
with multitasking and a stable tendency to perceive multitasking as enjoyable and 
rewarding rather than stressful. Therefore polychronicity is a particularly useful 
predictor of multitasking related constructs (Poposki & Oswald, 2010), and can 
measure participant’s intentions to multitask during the preactional phase of goal 
pursuit.  
Since low power increases divided attention whereas high power enhances 
selective attention, a negative relationship was predicted between the amount of 
power and the preference for multitasking. Ethnicity and gender were recorded and 
controlled for in the regression model. These variables could confound the results 
because they can correlate both with power and with polychronicity (Bluedorn, 
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2002; Ren, Zhou, & Fu, 2009). For example, Caucasian participants are more likely 
to be monochronic (e.g., emphasize single-tasking) and Asian and African 
participants are more polychronic (e.g., emphasize multitasking; Bluedorn, 2002).  
Methods 
Participants  
Participants (N=135; 93 women) were recruited from the UCL Subject Pool. 
Average age was 23.3 (SD=6.49). Eighty-nine participants were Caucasian, 40 were 
Asian, and 6 were African. Participants were entered into a lottery to win £40.  
Materials and Procedure 
The questionnaire was administered through eSurveyPro.com and included 
the generalized Sense of Power Scale (SPS; Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) and the 
Multitasking Preference Inventory (MPI; Poposki & Oswald, 2010). The SPS is an 
8-item questionnaire measuring individual’s generalized beliefs about the power that 
they have in their relationships (e.g., “In my relationships with others, I think I have 
a great deal of power”). The scale showed internal consistency, α=.75. The MPI is a 
14-item questionnaire measuring individual preferences for multitasking (e.g., “I do 
not like to shift my attention between multiple tasks”). The scale showed internal 
consistency, α=.73. Answers for both questionnaires were provided on a scale from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Subsequently, participants indicated their 
demographic information and were provided with a description of the study.  
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Results and Discussion 
A regression analysis was conducted with preferences for multitasking as an 
outcome variable. Culture, gender, and sense of power were entered as predictor 
variables. The overall regression model was significant, F(3, 131)=4.85, p=.003, 
explaining 7.9% of the variance in multitasking preferences. Culture and sense of 
power were both significantly associated with multitasking preferences, (β=.278, 
p=.004 and β=-.199, p=.028, respectively). In line with previous literature, Asian 
and African participants from polychronic cultures had a higher preference for 
multitasking than Caucasian participants who are from monochronic cultures
1
. More 
importantly, the hypothesis that low sense of power is associated with higher 
multitasking preference was also supported, even after controlling for culture and 
gender. However, no cause and effect can be inferred in the current study because 
power was not manipulated. This limitation was addressed in Experiment 2 by 
manipulating power experimentally.  
2.3 Experiment 2: Planning between assigned and self-generated tasks 
Experiment 2 aimed to extend the findings of Experiment 1 by manipulating 
instead of measuring power, and aims to further investigate if power affects 
multitasking during the preactional phase of goal pursuit by measuring how 
individuals plan and schedule their tasks. Participants were given two weeks to 
finish two Essays, and were asked to plan how they will approach the two tasks. 
Experiment 2 also encouraged participants to consider and plan out other activities 
                                                 
1
 The results from Experiment 1 and from past literature on polychronicity (Bluedorn et al., 1999; 
Bluedorn, 2002; Graham, 1981) indicate that cultural and temporal orientations can influence 
multitasking tendency. Therefore only participants who were not from an East-Asian nationality were 
invited to participate in subsequent studies. 
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that they will normally undertake in their everyday lives, which measures whether 
power affects attention to multiple goals when deciding which goals to pursue. That 
is, powerless participants may have more concerns than powerful individuals (Fiske, 
1993; Keltner et al., 2003; Weick & Guinote, 2010), which may motivate them to 
consider additional goals that are beyond the tasks at hand. This allows one to 
investigate how many spontaneous switches are generated among tasks that are not 
assigned by the experimenter. In addition, increased number of tasks that powerless 
participants consider represents increased attention to multiple information and 
concerns, which may mediate the relationship between power and multitasking 
tendency. A negative relationship was expected between power and multitasking, 
where number of switches planned between the different tasks (an indication of 
multitasking behavior) decreases with increased power. Powerless participants were 
also expected to plan more activities than control and powerful participants.  
Moreover, previous studies have shown how affect can influence multiple-
goal pursuit. Positive affect have been found to increase switching behaviors, as it 
signals that a goal is well maintained and effort can be reallocated to other tasks, 
whereas negative affect indicate that greater effort and sustained attention on the 
current task is necessary (Carver, 2003; Carver & Scheier, 1998). In a later study it 
was shown how negative affect increases effort towards goals that are close to 
attainment and have lower GPD, whereas positive affect directs effort toward distant 
goals with high GPD (Louro et al., 2007). Also, positive feelings may open people 
to noticing and taking advantage of emergent opportunities and to be distracted into 
enticing alternatives. For example, positive affect promotes an enjoyment of 
varieties and a wide range of possibilities, where participants switched among 
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choice alternatives of food more than control participants (Kahn & Isen, 1993). 
Since some studies have demonstrated a link between power and positive emotions 
(Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Keltner et al., 2003), 
whereas others have shown null effects of power on mood (Anderson & Berdahl, 
2002, Study 2; Galinsky et al., 2003; Smith & Trope, 2006; Weick & Guinote, 
2008), then this possible mediating factor of power was accounted for in the current 
study.  
Methods 
Participants and Design 
Thirty-four participants (31 females; mean age=22.2, SD=10.67) were 
recruited from UCL. Two outliers (those who switched 3 SDs above the mean) were 
excluded from the analysis. Thus, 32 participants (30 females, mean age = 22.0, 
SD=8.82) completed the study in exchange for £3 and were randomly assigned to 
one of the three between-subjects conditions: powerless (N=10), control (N=12), and 
powerful (N=10).  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants expected to take part in two unrelated studies. The first study 
was allegedly investigating everyday life situations in organizational contexts, but in 
reality it was the power manipulation (Appendix 1). Participants were asked to 
imagine being in the role of a person in a given organizational context, and write 
about what a typical day in their life would be if they were in that particular role 
(Guinote, 2008). Powerful participants were assigned to the role of a managing 
director in a marketing organization. Managers were told that they had 20 
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employees working under them and that they could evaluate the employee’s projects 
and had control over the employee’s workload and salary. Those in the powerless 
condition were asked to imagine that they were an employee in a marketing 
organization. Employees were told that they had to follow the manager’s 
instructions and that the managers were able to evaluate their performance and 
determine their workload and salary. Control participants were asked to imagine 
working in a team of 20 people, but that they work mostly independently on the 
tasks and can determine their own salary and workload depending on how many 
project-based bonuses they undertake. All participants were asked to describe a day 
in their work role as vividly as possible, from morning to evening. Participants were 
given an empty sheet to write their responses, and they completed the experiment at 
their own pace.  
 Afterwards, participants were asked to participate in what was supposedly a 
separate experiment, which investigates how people plan events in the future 
(Appendix 2). They were asked to imagine that they don’t need to go to lectures or 
work for two weeks, but they had to hand in two 1000-words essays at the end of the 
two weeks. This task was chosen because it was familiar to participants, who were 
university students. Participants were instructed to plan how they will work on the 
two essays. They were given 12 steps that they could consider whilst planning, such 
as “picking the essay topic” and “writing the introduction”. It was clarified that they 
don’t need to plan the essay in the particular order given as these are just possible 
suggestions. However, it was emphasized that they had to label clearly whether the 
task they were doing was for Essay 1 or Essay 2 (e.g., “writing the introduction for 
Essay 1”). They were also told to plan other activities that they may pursue in a 
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normal 2-week period, such as socializing, checking-emails, eating, etc. A calendar 
for two weeks was then given to the participant. Each day on the calendar was 
divided into four sections: morning (6:00 – 12:00), afternoon (12:00 – 18:00), 
evening (18:00 – 24:00), and night (24:00 – 6:00). Participants were asked to plan 
their days as precisely and accurately as possible. The number of switches between 
Essay 1 and Essay 2, as well as the number of switches that participants planned 
between all activities, were recorded.  
After participants finished planning, they were asked to reflect back to the 
essay that they wrote for the first experiment and indicate on two 9-point scales how 
much influence they felt they had at work and the extent to which they felt in charge 
of the work situation. This served as a power manipulation check. Following 
(Galinsky et al., 2003), participants in the control condition did not complete the 
manipulation check because the situation reported by control participants were 
unrelated to power. Participants’ mood was then assessed with 4-items ranging from 
-3 (very sad, very discontent, very tense, very bad) to 3 (very happy, very content, 
very calm, very good), as power can affect mood (Keltner, 2003). Demographic 
information was then recorded. Participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation at the end of the experiment.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
The average ratings for the manipulation check were combined into one 
score (α=.816). An independent t-test on the combined score revealed that powerful 
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participants felt more in control (M=6.95, SD=1.23) than powerless (M=3.11, 
SD=1.21) participants, t(17)=6.74, p<.001, ηp
2
=.72
2
. 
Number of Switches Planned  
There were two types of switches. The number of switches made from Essay 
1 to Essay 2 (i.e., essay switches), and the number of switches made between 
additional activities that are generated by participants themselves (other switches). . 
Due to the directional nature of the hypothesis that number of switches increases 
from the powerful to the powerless condition, with control condition in between, the 
number of switches were subjected to a 3(power: powerful vs. control vs. powerless) 
x 2(switch type: essay switches vs. other switches) mixed ANOVA, with repeated 
measures on the second factor. Because of the directional prediction that preferences 
for multitasking will decrease as power increases, a linear contrast analysis was used 
for power (powerless=-1; control=0; powerful=+1). In order to test for deviation 
from linearity, a quadratic contrast analysis was also used (powerless=+1; control=-
2; powerful=+1). Both the linear contrast, F(1, 29)=6.15, p=.019, ηp
2
=.18, and the 
quadratic contrast analyses, F(1, 29)=7.37, p=.011, ηp
2
=.20, were significant. No 
other effects were significant. Powerful participants planned fewer switches between 
the activities (M=20.6, SD=3.87) compared to control (M=37.4, SD=3.53) and 
powerless participants (M=32.2, SD=3.87), but the control condition did not fall in 
between the two power conditions (see Table 2.1).  
 
                                                 
2 Following Galinsky et al. (2003) participants in the control condition did not complete the 
manipulation check because the situations reported by control participants were unrelated to power. 
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Table 2.1. Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Switches and Tasks in 
Experiment 2 
  Switches Tasks  
Power M SD M SD 
Powerless 32.2 3.87 10.1 2.51 
Control 37.4 3.53 10.4 3.63 
Powerful 20.6 3.87 9.1 3.70 
 
Note. “Switches” indicate the combined number of switches between essay switches 
and other switches. “Tasks” indicate the amount of extra activities that were 
spontaneously generated by participants themselves.  
 
Furthermore, there were no differences between the power conditions on the 
total number of activities planned, F(2, 29)=.447, p=.644, ηp
2
=.03, indicating that 
power only affected how many switches participants planned and not how many 
activities were planned. Total number of activities planned was also unrelated with 
number of switches made, r=.21, p=.24. This shows that power does not affect the 
number of goals that participants are pursuing and attending to, and number of 
switches made is not dependent on how many activities participants are pursuing.  
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In addition, some participants did not plan for the full 2-week period as they 
submitted both essays before the deadlines. However, there was no difference 
between the power conditions on the number of days planned, F(2, 29)=2.07, 
p=.145, ηp
2
=.125. Mood ratings were also combined into a single score (α=.879, 
M=4.88, SD=1.33) and subjected to a One-way ANOVA. The results indicated that 
power did not affect mood, F(2, 27)=0.165, p=.849, ηp
2
=.012. Together these results 
provide further support for the hypothesis that reduced power elicits a multitasking 
intention, whereas increased power triggers a single-tasking intention. This is true 
for tasks that were assigned to participants, but also for tasks that participants 
spontaneously generated when planning their weekly schedule. Also, the effect of 
power on multitasking tendency is not influenced by how many tasks participants 
wanted to consider. Mood, total number of activities, and total days planned did not 
account for these effects.  
Experiment 2 only partially supported the hypothesis as powerless 
participants did switch more than powerful participants, but the control condition did 
not fall in between the two power conditions.  One possible explanation is due to the 
type of power manipulation used. That is, the control condition used in this 
experiment might have induced feelings of powerlessness, as participants could have 
felt dependent on others for evaluating their performances and determining their 
salaries and bonuses. Unfortunately, no manipulation check was given for control 
participants in order to support this claim. Therefore the absence of a general pattern 
that multitasking increases with decreased power in this particular experiment could 
have been attributed to an ineffective neutral condition, instead of concluding that 
there is no effect of powerlessness on multitasking.  
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2.4 Experiment 3: Hypothetical scenarios and scheduling work day 
Experiment 2 showed how power decreases the amount of switches that 
participants made between two tasks over a two-week period. However, little is 
known about how individuals allocate their time and attention as they pursue 
multiple goals over a shorter period of time, such as a few hours instead of a few 
days. The reduction in deadline would be interesting to investigate, as planning 
goals with shorter deadlines has been found to be more accurate and reflective of 
actual behaviors than planning for goals with further deadlines. For example, goals 
with closer deadlines are less susceptible to the planning fallacy (Buehler et al., 
1994; Kruger & Evans, 2004; Sanna & Schwarz, 2004; Zauberman & Lynch, 2005). 
Therefore the first aim of Experiment 3 was to replicate the results of Experiment 2, 
and extend it to situations where individuals need to plan for a shorter period of time 
(8 hours instead of 2 weeks). Moreover, Experiment 3 used three distinct tasks for 
participants to plan with no deadline, whereas Experiment 2 only asked participants 
to plan their time between two tasks that were similar, and both had a two-week 
deadline. Experiment 3 therefore simulates hectic work environments where 
individuals face the difficult decision about how to juggle the many demands placed 
on their limited time and attention.  
The second aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate whether power affects a 
general tendency to report multitasking behavior and whether this relation can be 
affected by the type of task. Past studies suggest that individuals are more likely to 
switch to prevention-focused goals (Schmidt & DeShon, 2007); hence powerholders 
may adapt to the situation (Guinote, 2007a) by increasing the tendency to switch 
between tasks if the secondary task was prevention-focused. The tasks were framed 
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either as a prevention goal, where inattention can lead to negative consequences, or 
a non-prevention goal, where the consequences of inattention are not specified. 
Lastly, a different power manipulation was also used in order to examine 
whether the effect of power on multitasking tendency remains consistent across 
various operationalizations of power. By using a more established power 
manipulation in the literature (Galinsky et al., 2003), the current experiment aimed 
to find the predicted pattern that multitasking increases with powerlessnes, which 
was not present in Experiment 2.  
Participants were first primed with power (vs. control or powerless). They 
were then asked to imagine themselves in scenarios that encompassed multiple goals 
in order to investigate the relationship between power and preferences for either 
single-tasking or multitasking strategies when faced with the pursuit of multiple 
concomitant goals (following Bluedorn et al., 1999). Specifically, participants were 
given a series of scenarios and were asked to what extent they preferred to deal with 
these situations simultaneously or sequentially. Upon completion of these scenarios, 
participants were invited to plan a day and were given multiple tasks that they 
needed to accomplish in that day. The tasks simulated real-life work scenarios by 
giving individuals multiple tasks that they need to work on independently. 
Participants were able to have considerable control over their resource allocations 
and make volitional switching decisions throughout the day. Since power may 
influence mood (Keltner et al., 2003), then mood measures were also included in the 
current study to rule out the possible mediating factor. 
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Based on previous research on power, attention, and information seeking 
styles, it was predicted that powerlessness triggers a polychronous pursuit of 
multiple goals rather than a monochronous approach, both in rating the scenarios 
and in planning the day (i.e., plan more switches between the tasks). In contrast, 
powerholders were expected to prefer a monochronous management of multiple 
tasks. The preferences of control participants were predicted to fall in between 
powerless and powerful participants. Therefore a general pattern was expected 
where reported multitasking intention (vs. single-tasking intention) and number of 
switches planned between the various tasks decrease with increased power. 
However, all participants, even those in powerful conditions, will report more 
switches if the secondary task is prevention-focused and can lead to negative 
consequences.  
Methods 
Participants and Design 
Fifty-three participants (33 women; mean age=20.3, SD=3.88) were recruited 
from UCL. Participants completed the study in exchange for entering a raffle to win 
£30. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three between-subjects 
conditions: powerless (N=18), control (N=19), and powerful (N=16).  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants expected to take part in two unrelated studies. The first study 
was ostensibly described as investigating how people recollect past events. 
Following Galinsky et al. (2003), participants wrote a narrative essay about an 
incident in which they had power (powerful) or did not have power (powerless), or 
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the last time they went to the supermarket (control). Power was defined as having 
control over the ability of someone to get something they wanted, or being in a 
position to evaluate others (Appendix 3).  
Subsequently, participants were told that they will participate in a second 
study looking at decision-making and planning. Participants read and responded to 
three scenarios (Appendix 4) adapted from Bluedorn et al. (1999). The scenarios 
depicted a work situation in which an initial task (task A) was interrupted by another 
demand (task B). For two of the scenarios, goal consequence was not specified (e.g., 
“you were inspecting the production line when you received a call from the 
company’s sales representative”). However, for one scenario the goal was 
prevention-focused where inattention can lead to negative consequences (e.g., “you 
were inspecting the production line when you noticed a machine had been left 
running, which created an extremely dangerous safety hazard”).  They were then 
asked to indicate their preferred strategy to deal with this situation on a likert-scale 
ranging from 1 (focus on task A) to 9 (switch to task B). The scale median (5) 
represented the choice of working on the two tasks simultaneously. Lower scores on 
the scale therefore indicated a preference for single-tasking strategies whereas 
higher scores indicated a preference for multitasking. Multitasking involves either 
performing the first and second task concurrently or switching to the second task 
without completion of the first one.  
Participants were then invited to write a plan for a hypothetical work-day. 
They were given three projects to work on (developing a website, preparing a 
presentation, and writing a request) for an 8-hour working day. Participants were 
informed that each project takes 4-hours to complete, and therefore they will not 
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have time to finish everything and should schedule these tasks based on their 
personal preferences. At the end, participants were given one last question regarding 
their preferences for dealing with the three tasks on a scale ranging from 1 (I prefer 
to leave the other 2 projects untouched until I have finished the first one) to 9 (I 
prefer to frequently switch back and forth among the projects). Participant’s 
responses to the four questions and the number of times participants planned to 
switch between the three projects were measured.  
As a power manipulation check, participants indicated on a 9-point-scale the 
extent to which they felt in charge of the situation that they recollected. Participants’ 
mood was assessed similarly to Experiment 2. Demographic information was then 
recorded. Participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation at the end 
of the experiment.  
Results and Discussion  
Manipulation Check 
An independent t-test revealed that powerful participants felt more in control 
(M=7.06, SD=1.57) than powerless (M=2.06, SD=1.06) participants, t(32)=11.03, 
p<.001, ηp
2
=.792. Therefore the manipulation was successful.  
Multitasking Preference 
The average ratings of the two unspecified multitasking scenarios and their 
preferences at the end of the planning task were combined into one score (α=.71) to 
yield an overall preference score for unspecified goals. These ratings were then 
subjected to a 3(power: powerful vs. control vs. powerless) x 2(goal orientation: 
unspecified vs. prevention-focused) mixed ANOVA, with repeated measures on the 
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second factor. This analysis yielded a main effect of goal orientation, where 
participants preferred to switch more to the prevention-focused secondary demand 
(M=4.16, SD=0.22) compared to unspecified secondary demands (M=1.98, 
SD=0.23), F(1, 50)=55.8, p<.001, ηp
2
=.53. Because of the directional prediction that 
preferences for multitasking will decrease as power increases, a linear contrast 
analysis was used for power (powerless=-1; control=0; powerful=+1). In order to 
test for deviation from linearity, a quadratic contrast analysis was also used 
(powerless=+1; control=-2; powerful=+1). As expected, power significantly 
influenced strategy preferences, F(1, 50)=3.21, p=.049, ηp
2
=.114. Powerless 
participants had a higher preference for multitasking (M=3.58, SD=0.30) compared 
to control participants (M=3.14 SD=0.29), who had higher multitasking preference 
compared to powerful participants, (M=2.49, SD=0.32). There was no quadratic 
deviation from linearity, F(1, 50)=0.071, p=.79, ηp
2
=.001.  
The analysis also yielded a significant power x goal orientation linear 
interaction, F(2, 50)=6.63, p=.003, ηp
2
=.21. As shown in Table 2.2, there was no 
effect of power on the prevention-focused task, F(1, 50)=0.16, p=.69, ηp
2
=.003. All 
participants preferred to switch to the prevention-focused task before completing the 
current one (M=7.02, SD=1.63). However, for the unspecified task, the linear 
contrast was significant indicating that power influenced preferences for goal 
pursuit, F(1, 50)=18.7, p<.001, ηp
2
=.272. Powerless participants preferred 
multitasking (M=5.33, SD=1.97) more than control participants, (M=4.23 SD=1.30), 
who in turn had higher preferences for multitasking than powerful participants, 
(M=2.92, SD=1.56).  
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Table 2.2. Means and SDs for Scenario Ratings in Experiment 3 
  Unspecified Goal  Prevention-Focused Goal 
Power M SD M SD 
Powerless 5.33 1.97 7.17 1.58 
Control 4.23 1.30 6.95 1.75 
Powerful 2.92 1.56 6.94 1.65 
 
Note. Higher means indicate an increased multitasking (vs. single-tasking) intention. 
 
Similar contrast analyses were conducted on the number of switches among 
tasks that participants planned in their schedule. These analyses showed a significant 
linear contrast for power, F(1, 50)=6.19, p=.016,  ηp
2
=.110. The quadratic contrast 
analysis was not significant, F(1, 50)=0.099, p=.75, ηp
2
=.002, showing no deviation 
from linearity. Powerless participants switched more often (M=3.22, SD=1.56) than 
control participants (M=2.60, SD=2.18), who switched more often than powerful 
participants (M=1.81, SD=1.22),   
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Lastly, mood ratings were combined into a single score (α=.84, M=3.05, 
SD=2.20) and subjected to a One-way ANOVA. Power did not affect mood, F(2, 
50)=0.791, p=.459, ηp
2
=.031. Together, these results provide further support for the 
hypothesis that reduced power elicits a multitasking intention, whereas increased 
power triggers a single-tasking intention. That is, powerless participants switched 
more often to a secondary task whereas powerful participants continued longer on 
the initial task before switching to another one. However, powerholders are able to 
adapt their behaviors flexibly and are willing to switch attention if doing so can 
prevent negative consequences.  
2.5 Summary and conclusions 
Chapter 2 looked at how power affects the ways individuals approach multiple 
tasks during preactional phases of goal pursuit. It also investigated whether 
preferences for monochronic behaviors reflect a general tendency to consider fewer 
goals (Experiment 2) and the role of goal orientation (Experiment 3). The results 
from Experiment 1-3 provide initial evidence that power affects how individuals 
plan to approach multiple goals, and this is not related to how many goals 
individuals were willing to pursue. In general, powerlessness was found to increase 
polychronic tendency and powerfulness was found to promote monochronic 
tendency. This tendency occurs irrespective of task type, such as how similar the 
tasks are to each other or if they are assigned by the experimenter or generated by 
the participant. The effects of power on multitasking is also consistent across a short 
(a normal 8-hour work day; Experiment 3) as well as a long (over 2 weeks; 
Experiment 2) time period. However, powerful participants do report more 
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multitasking behavior if switching to the secondary task can prevent negative 
consequences (Experiment 2). 
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Chapter 3:  
Power, Multitasking Behavior, and Prioritization 
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3.1 Introduction 
So far, the current thesis has looked at the effects of power on reported 
multitasking intention and how individuals plan to approach multiple tasks during 
the preactional phase of goal pursuit. For example, the MPI questionnaire used in 
Experiment 1 usually refers to an individual’s preferences or intentions for doing 
several things at one time and not the behavior of multitasking per se (Persing, 
1999). In fact, most of the studies in the multitasking literature associated 
multitasking choice with personal characteristics using questionnaires or asking 
participants to report how many tasks they would like to engage in. Only a few 
studies (e.g., Schmidt & DeShon, 2007) investigated whether individual 
characteristics affect how someone distribute their time on different tasks by 
measuring actual behavior in a given time period. This difference between intention 
and behavior is important because one may believe they prefer one strategy over the 
other and intend or plan to behave in a certain way, yet they could behave differently 
in an actual environment where they experience various environmental pressures or 
constraints.  
Chapter 3 will examine whether power not only affects reported intention to 
multitask, but it can also influence multitasking behavior during the actional phase 
of goal pursuit. This is investigated by measuring the number of switches 
participants make between tasks (an indication of multitasking). Moreover, by 
measuring actual behaviors, one can also assess whether monochronic behaviors 
yield better performance compared to polychronic behaviors, and examine whether 
one type of strategy is more demanding and/or depleting than the other. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, multiple goals not only compete for limited time, but goals 
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also acquire their motivational force from a limited pool of resources (Shah & 
Kruglanski, 2002). Therefore, if individuals attend to multiple goals by switching 
between them, then this may decrease overall performance by reducing attention and 
commitment to each of the goals. 
Moreover, the current chapter was also interested in assessing prioritization in 
the context of multiple-goal pursuit, by measuring how many questions participants 
answered from each of the tasks that they were assigned. That is, although powerful 
participants may multitask less than powerless participants, they may have treated 
all tasks as equally important (e.g., answered 10 questions from each task) instead of 
spontaneously approaching them in order of priority (e.g., answered 19 questions 
from one task and 1 question from the other task). Based on previous literature 
showing how power increases attentional focus and prioritization whereas 
powerlessness leads to divided attention and the tendency to treat all information as 
equally important (Fiske, 1993; Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007a, b; Slabu & 
Guinote, 2010), it was predicted that power should have a positive relationship with 
single-tasking behaviors, prioritization, and performance.  
3.2 Experiment 4: Multitasking behavior and goal accessibility 
The aim of Experiment 4 was to examine whether power affects the ways 
individuals pursue multiple goals by assessing actual behavioral choices, rather than 
only multitasking intention in a hypothetical situation, and the associated 
consequences for performance. It also investigated whether power affects balancing 
vs. focusing (e.g., spontaneous prioritization) when individuals are faced with 
multiple tasks. Moreover, the current study aimed to assess the underlying 
  
123 
 
mechanism of the effect of power on multitasking by measuring levels of goal 
accessibility.  
Participants were given a set of three simple tasks to work on (arithmetic, 
picture, and geometric) and they were allowed to allocate their time and effort across 
the tasks at their own discretion. This paradigm simulated real-life work situations 
where people are required to decide when to engage in their multiple projects and to 
decide for themselves what is an acceptable target and when they have reached it 
(González & Mark, 2005). The number of times participants switched from one task 
to another indicated their multiple-goal pursuit strategies. The more participants 
switched, the more they adopted a multitasking (vs. a single-tasking) strategy. 
Performance was measured by how many total correct questions participants 
answered, and prioritization was measured by differences in the number of questions 
answered between the three tasks. Accessibility of goal-relevant information was 
then assessed using a lexical decision task (LDT). Participants were asked to 
indicate whether the words presented were real-words or non-words. The real-words 
were either relevant or irrelevant to each of the three tasks, such that there were 
three types of goal-relevant words (arithmetic-relevant words, picture-relevant 
words, and geometric-relevant words). Since individuals activate goal-related 
information from long-term memory more easily compared to neutral memories 
(Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998), then faster reaction times to 
goal-related words vs. neutral words indicate greater accessibility of goal-related 
constructs (Neely, 1991). 
If decreased power instills multitasking, then the less power individuals have 
the more often they should switch between tasks in an effort to pursue the tasks 
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simultaneously. That is, number of switches was predicted to increase with 
decreased power. Due to powerholder’s selective and focused mindset, and 
powerless individual’s tendency to divide attention and render all information as 
equally important, it was first hypothesized that there will be a negative relationship 
between power and number of switches. Specifically, number of switches was 
predicted to be lower for the high-power condition compared to the neutral-power 
(control) condition, which was predicted to switch less than the low-power 
condition. Similarly, powerholder’s preference for attentional focus may encourage 
spontaneous prioritization. That is, they will answer more questions from the task 
that they prioritized compared to the task that they did not prioritize. Therefore the 
second hypothesis predicted that the difference in the number of questions answered 
between the three tasks will be larger for powerful, than control, than powerless 
participants. 
Furthermore, self-initiated interruptions can also decrease overall 
productivity. This is because deciding and choosing which task to work on next may 
be cognitively demanding (Vohs et al., 2008) and leave less resources available for 
actual task performance. Moreover, task-switching can incur cognitive costs as 
mental resources are required for attentional refocusing (Borst, Taatgen, & Van 
Rijn, 2010; Buser & Peter, 2012; Rubinstein et al., 2001). Thus switching between 
tasks can cause delays in response times and people who prefer to interleave their 
activities may have worse overall performance than those who do not switch 
between tasks. Since multitasking behavior can incur further costs that decrease 
performance in the context of multiple-goal pursuit, then it was expected that 
reduced power would decrease overall performance. Therefore the third hypothesis 
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predicts a positive relationship between the total number of items correctly answered 
and power.  
Lastly, the motivation to multitask and the defocused attentional strategies of 
powerless individuals should create a mindset that renders multiple goals more 
equally important and accessible (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2013). Thereby the 
frequent interruptions and multitasking behavior displayed by powerless individuals 
should be reflected in their equal levels of goal accessibility. On the other hand, 
powerful individuals prioritize a focal goal and decrease accessibility of other goals 
(Guinote, 2008; Slabu & Guinote, 2010). Thus the fourth prediction was that 
powerless individuals should respond faster to all three goal-related words (vs. 
neutral words), whereas powerful participants will be focused on only one of the 
tasks and will therefore respond faster only to words that relate to the prioritized task 
(i.e., the task that they answered the most questions from) than to neutral words.  
In addition the current study measured some possible factors that could be 
related to multitasking and are confounded by the power manipulation. Past studies 
suggest that allocation of resources is driven by goal attractiveness (e.g., interest and 
motivation) and perceived probability of obtaining the goal (e.g., confidence and 
goal difficulty; Kernan & Lord, 1990; Klein, 1989). Increased confidence in one’s 
ability and motivation to attain a goal can increase goal focus and accessibility 
(Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 2009; Förster et al., 2005). For example, previous studies 
found that participants prioritized tasks in which they reported greater expectancies 
of achieving the goal (Kernan & Lord, 1990). Among tasks of equal urgency, 
individuals are more likely to allocate resources to those tasks for which they have 
the highest relative levels of self-efficacy and have the most confidence in attaining 
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(Ashford & Northcraft, 2003). In contrast, if efficacy is judged to be low, the person 
may abandon the task and move on to a different one, which causes switching 
behaviors (Bandura & Cervone, 1986; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Moreover, 
motivation and goal importance could also affect behaviors as the extent to which 
individuals pursue a focal goal and inhibit competing goals depends on focal goal 
importance (Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach, & Kruglanski, 2011; Shah et al., 2002). 
Therefore mood, motivation, and confidence in their ability to complete the tasks 
were measured since these factors have been implicated in multitasking behavior 
(Carver, 2003) and have also been associated with power (Briñol et al., 2007; 
Keltner et al., 2003).  
Methods 
Participants and Design 
Fifty-three participants (37 women; mean age=23.8, SD=2.75) were recruited 
from UCL and received £3 for their participation. Participants were randomly 
assigned to powerless, control, or powerful conditions. Three participants were 
excluded from the analyses: two for not following directions regarding the essay 
topic and one for being an outlier (switching 3 standard deviations above the mean). 
Thus, 50 participants (35 females, mean age = 22.8, SD=2.80) were included in the 
final analyses. The study utilized a between-subjects-design with three conditions: 
powerless (N=17), control (N=16), and powerful (N=17). 
Materials and Procedure 
Power was manipulated similarly to Experiment 3. Participants were then given 
three simple tasks to work on for the second study, which was allegedly 
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investigating problem solving (Appendix 5). The tasks were adapted from Gouveia, 
Brucki, Malheiros, & Bueno (2007), and consisted of an arithmetic task (simple 
additions and subtractions), a picture-naming task (writing the names of everyday 
objects), and a geometric task (copying simple figures). To ensure that switching 
was not an artifact of perceived task difficulty and motivation, and that 
powerholders did not disdain any of the tasks (see DeWall et al., 2011), a pilot study 
(N=16) was conducted to match the tasks for difficulty, level of interest, and 
suitability for participants in different power conditions to perform. The pilot study 
ensured that all three tasks did not differ in difficulties, how interesting they were 
perceived to be, and how appropriate they were for a person with influence over 
others to complete, ps>.40.  
The items from each task appeared individually on the computer screen and 
participants could choose which task they wanted to do by pressing one out of three 
keys on a computer keyboard. The keys were labeled according to the task it 
contained. Participants were asked to write down their answers to each question on 
separate pieces of paper, and could move on to the next question at their own pace. 
Participants were further informed that they can work on the three tasks in any order 
that they prefer and that they could return to each task as often as they liked. The 
only restriction was that they will need to answer at least one item from each of the 
three tasks within 20 minutes. After giving participants one practice item from each 
task, they were asked to begin the actual experiment. Participants were given 
allegedly 20 minutes to complete the tasks but were stopped after nine minutes. 
Participants were stopped earlier because our interest was on multiple-goal initiation 
and progress, rather than the dynamics triggered by approaching a deadline, such as 
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possible increases in goal focus and goal expectancy (Louro et al., 2007; Schmidt & 
DeShon, 2007; Schmidt et al., 2009). Moreover, a generous time limit (20 minutes) 
was given to avoid interference from stress and concern about time, and increased 
the perceived possibility of attaining the goals within the allotted time (Schmidt & 
DeShon, 2007). Number of switches between tasks and number of items answered 
were recorded.  
Participants were then told that before they continue on the three tasks, they will 
complete another task for a side project on perception and attention. Participants 
were made to believe that they will continue working on the three tasks in order to 
avoid the feeling of goal completion. This is important because powerful individuals 
are more attuned to the current situation; therefore they may have decreased 
accessibility of all goal-related information after goal fulfillment (Slabu & Guinote, 
2010). For the LDT, participants were asked to indicate, as quickly and as accurately 
as possible, whether a string of letters presented on a computer screen formed a real-
word or a non-word. Responses were made by pressing one of two keys using their 
left and right index fingers; the two keys were counterbalanced across participants. 
The LDT was carried out on a computer, with a 60-Hz color monitor. Participants 
sat at a viewing distance of 60 cm. There were 108 trials in total, half of which were 
non-words. Out of the real-words, nine contained words related to the arithmetic 
goal (e.g., subtract, math, addition), nine contained words related to the picture goal 
(e.g., picture, label, name), and nine contained words related to the geometric goal 
(e.g., figure, geometric, draw). The rest were neutral words that were matched to 
each of the target words in frequency and in length using the English Lexicon 
Project database (Balota et al., 2007). Each trial began with a fixation cue consisting 
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of a letter-string (xxxxxxxxxxxx) printed in black against a white background at the 
center of the screen. After a delay of 100 ms, this fixation cue was replaced by a 
sequence of lower-case letter-strings presented in a Courier New Font (16 point 
size). The letter-string remained on the screen until participants gave their response.  
Upon completion of the LDT, participants filled in the power manipulation 
check, indicated their mood, optimism in being able to finish the tasks, and 
confidence in their abilities to perform well. To measure motivation, participants 
indicated the amount of attention and time devoted to each task, how interesting 
each task was, and the flow of time (how quickly the time had passed). In addition, 
participants reported their perceived difficulty of the tasks and confidence in their 
ability to perform the tasks. Lastly participants were asked to rate how indicative 
each task was for a person with influence over others to complete. This was to 
ensure that switching was not an artifact of perceived difficulty and interest, and that 
powerholders did not disdain any of the tasks (see DeWall et al., 2011). All of the 
answers were given on 9-point scales. Mood was also assessed using a 4-item mood 
questionnaire ranging from -3(very sad, very discontent, very tense, very bad) to 
3(very happy, very content, very calm, very good), as mood can affect task-
performance (Forgas & George, 2001). As a power manipulation check was also 
administered, where participants indicated on a 9-point-scale the extent to which 
they felt in charge of the situation that they recollected. Demographic information 
was then taken and participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed.  
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Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
An independent t-test revealed that powerful participants felt more in control 
(M=7.06, SD=1.60) than powerless (M=2.06, SD=1.06) participants, t(32)=4.77, 
p<.001, ηp
2
=0.79. The manipulation was therefore successful.  
Behavioral Strategies 
The first analysis was conducted on the total number of switches. Due to the 
directional nature of the hypothesis that number of switches increases from the 
powerful to the powerless condition, with control condition in between, a linear 
contrast analysis was conducted on the total number of switches made (powerless=-
1; control=0; powerful=+1). In order to test for deviation from linearity, a quadratic 
contrast analysis was also used (powerless=+1; control=-2; powerful=+1). The 
analysis revealed a significant Levene’s test, indicating unequal variances across 
cells, F(2, 47)=3.47, p=.039. Therefore the degrees of freedom were adjusted from 
47 to 30.2. As expected, the adjusted linear contrast analysis showed that number of 
switches increased as power decreased, t(25.3)=2.31, p=.029, ηp
2
=.118. The 
quadratic contrast analysis was not significant, t(36.7)=1.30, p=.20, ηp
2
=.028, 
showing no deviation from linearity. As shown in Table 3.1, powerless participants 
switched significantly more (M=20.6, SD=13.5) than control participants (M=12.7, 
SD=7.90), who switched more than powerful participants (M=11.9, SD=7.66). These 
results support the hypotheses that the less power participants have, the more they 
switch across tasks.  
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Table 3.1. Means and SDs for Number of Switches and Total Items Answered in 
Experiment 4 
  Number of Switches Total Items Answered 
Power M SD M SD 
Powerless 20.6 13.5 48.9 14.9 
Control 12.7 7.90 57.9 16.1 
Powerful 11.9 7.66 60.1 15.1 
 
Note. Higher values indicate increased multitasking (vs. single-tasking) behavior 
when pursuing multiple goals, and better overall performance. 
 
Prioritization  
The previous analysis confirmed that powerful participants switched less 
between various task demands compared to powerless participants and employed a 
more single-tasking strategy. Further analyses were conducted to measure task 
performance and spontaneous prioritization (i.e., whether powerful individuals 
preferred to focus on a single task compared to powerless participants). For 
example, powerful participants may have switched less, but still answered an equal 
number of questions across the three tasks. Similarly, powerless participants may 
have switched more often, but they could have focused more on a particular task by 
constantly switching back to this focal task.  
To test whether power affected prioritization, the number of questions 
correctly answered was analyzed. Power did not affect error rates, F(2, 45)=0.89, 
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p=.42, ηp
2
=.038. This was expected given the simplicity of the tasks (ERs: M=0.014, 
SD=.017).  The number of questions that participants answered for each task were 
then converted into task 1 (task with most questions answered and the task that 
participants spent the most time on), task 2 (task with second-most questions 
answered), and task 3 (task with least questions answered). In other words, task 1 
represented the task that the participant focused on the most, and task 3 was the one 
they focused on the least. Task prioritization was determined by how many 
questions participants answered from that particular task and how much time they 
spent on the task because these factors have been used to indicate the amount of 
effort and scarce resources devoted to a certain goal (Larson & Callahan, 1990).  
These variables were then subjected to a 3(power: powerful, control, 
powerless) x 3(task 1 type: arithmetic, geometric, picture) x 3(tasks: task 1, task 2, 
task 3) mixed ANOVA with within-subject measure on the last factor. The ANOVA 
yielded a significant Mauchly’s test, indicating that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated, chi-square=31.1, p<.001. Therefore degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (epsilon=.653). The 
results showed a main effect of task, F(1.31, 54.8)=24.4, p<.001, ηp
2
=.367. Post-hoc 
analysis revealed that all three tasks were significantly different from each other, 
p<.001, indicating that overall, all participants prioritized one of the tasks instead of 
balancing their time and effort across the tasks. More importantly, there was a 
significant power x task linear interaction, F(2.49, 54.8)=3.51, p=.044, ηp
2
=.11. No 
other effects were significant, F<1, indicating that the results were not confounded 
by the type of task that was prioritized. There was no main effect of power, which 
means that power did not affect overall performance (see Figure 3.1).  
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Further analysis showed that there was a significant effect of power on the 
number of questions answered for task 1, F(1, 47)=4.51, p=.036, ηp
2
=.088. As 
shown in Figure 3.1, powerful participants (M=40.8, SD=17.3) answered more 
questions compared to control participants (M=37.5, SD=18.7), who answered more 
than powerless participants (M=28.6, SD=14.0). There were no significant 
differences on the number of questions answered for task 2, F(1, 47)=0.824, p=.369, 
ηp
2
=.017, and task 3, F(1, 47)=2.45, p=.124, ηp
2
=.050.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Mean number of questions answered for the three tasks as a function of 
power in Experiment 4; error bars represent 1 standard error above and below the 
mean. 
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Moreover, the difference in number of questions answered between task 1 and 
task 2 increased as a function of power, F(1, 47)=4.50, p=.039, ηp
2
=.087. 
Specifically, the differences between task 1 and task 2 were smaller for powerless 
(M=15.6, SD=16.1) compared to control (M=22.0, SD=23.3), which was smaller 
compared to powerful (M=30.4, SD=21.2) participants. Similar pattern was found 
for the differences between task 1 and task 3, such that the differences in number of 
questions answered between task 1 and task 3 increased as a function of power, F(1, 
47)=4.96, p=.031, ηp
2
=.095. The differences were smaller for powerless (M=20.4, 
SD=16.9) than control (M=33.3, SD=20.9), than powerful (M=35.0, SD=19.6) 
participants. Lastly, the differences in the number of questions answered between 
task 2 and task 3 did not vary across the three power conditions, F(1, 47)=0.004, 
p=.951, ηp
2
<.001. Hence these results suggest that power promotes a tendency to 
prioritize one of the tasks. 
This pattern indicates that task prioritization (measured by the difference in the 
number of questions answered between task 1 and task 3) could mediate the 
relationship between power and number of switches. A mediation analysis (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986)  was conducted with power as the independent variable, number of 
switches as the outcome variable, and prioritization as the mediator. As noted above, 
power was related to prioritization and number of switches. However, when 
prioritization was regressed on power and number of switches, the originally 
significant relationship between power and number of switches became non-
significant, t(48)=1.57, p=.12, β=-.20, but prioritization remained significant, t(48)=-
3.56, p=.001, β=-.46. These results, as well as a Sobel test using raw coefficients 
(z=1.87, p=.061), suggest that the effect of power on switching behaviors was 
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mediated by differences in prioritization. A more sensitive and robust bootstrapping 
estimate of the 95% confidence interval around the indirect effect of power on 
number of switches via difference in prioritization was also used (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008). The confidence interval from the bootstrapping estimate excludes zero (-4.13, 
-0.36), which supports the mediation. This suggests that, as indicated in Figure 3.2, 
the effect of power on the number of switches was mediated by the tendency to 
prioritize. Powerful participants were more likely to prioritize one task over the 
other, and they therefore switched less than powerless participants, who showed 
lower prioritization tendency. 
  
 
Power 
Prioritization 
Number of 
switches 
.31* -.46*** 
-.201 (-.34*) 
Figure 3.2: The effect of power on number of switches mediated by prioritization in 
Experiment 4; all entries are standardized coefficients. The association between the 
mediator and number of switches is represented by a coefficient from a model where 
power is also a predictor of number of switches. The number in the parenthesis 
refers to the total effect of power on number of switches.  
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Performance 
Additional analyses were conducted to investigate whether power affected 
performance on the primary (i.e., task 1) compared to secondary (i.e., task 2) and 
tertiary tasks (i.e., task 3). Performance was calculated by dividing the total number 
of seconds participants spent on each task by the total number of questions answered 
from that task. This yielded an efficiency-score (ES) of how many seconds 
participants spent per question, with lower scores representing higher efficiencies. 
Subjecting these ESs to a 3(power: powerful, control, powerless) x 3(task 1 type: 
arithmetic, geometric, picture) x 3 (task: task 1, task 2, task 3) mixed ANOVA with 
within-subjects measure on the last factor yielded a main effect of task type, F(2, 
46)=5.25, p=.007, ηp
2
=.102. All participants were more efficient for task 1 (M=8.74, 
SD=0.63), compared to task 2 (M=10.7, SD=0.87) and compared to task 3 (M=12.9, 
SD=1.40), ps<.005. Task 2 and task 3 did not differ significantly, p=.17. There was 
also a marginal power x ES linear contrast interaction, F(2, 46)=2.90, p=.065, 
ηp
2
=.112. No other effects were significant, F<1, indicating that the results were not 
confounded by the type of task that was prioritized. 
Linear contrast analysis indicated that the relationship between ESs of the three 
tasks was not significant for powerless participants, F(1, 16)=.212, p=.65, ηp
2
=.013. 
However, the linear contrast was significant for control, F(1, 14)=11.0, p=.005, 
ηp
2
=.441, and powerful participants, F(1, 16)=5.67, p=.030, ηp
2
=.262. As shown in 
Figure 3.3, ESs for control and powerful participants increased according to task 
importance. That is, ESs for task 1 was lower (representing higher efficiency) than 
task 2, which was lower than task 3. There were no between-subjects differences for 
the efficiencies of the three tasks across power conditions, ps>.05. 
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Figure 3.3: Mean RTs (seconds per question) for the three tasks as a function of power in 
Experiment 4; error bars represent 1 standard error above and below the mean. 
 
Lastly, further analysis was conducted to investigate if performance was 
affected by whether participants switched from another task (switch trial) or 
continued on the same task (repeat trial). Response times to the questions were 
subjected to a 3 (power: powerless, control, powerful) x 2 (trials: switch, repeat) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. There was a main effect of trials, 
F(1, 46)=2.09, p=.013, ηp
2
=.126, where response times (in seconds) on repeat trials 
(M=9.27, SD=0.53) were faster than switch trials (M=10.2, SD=0.51). No other 
effects were significant. These results suggest that, consistent with previous 
literature, switching between tasks is more costly than continuing on the same task. 
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However, powerless participants did not have lower overall performance compared 
to powerful participants, even though they switched more between the tasks 
compared to powerful participants. This could be because the costs of switching are 
not apparent with limited numbers of switching. Although, as shown in Table 3.1, 
there was a tendency for powerless participants to answer fewer questions than 
control participants, who answered fewer questions than powerful participants, but 
these differences were not significant. However, since switching is costly in terms of 
task efficiency, then a difference in performance may appear in the long-term, when 
the differences in the number of switches and the associated cumulative time lost 
from switching between powerless and powerful individuals become larger.  
In sum, power affected performance and efficiency on the task that they 
prioritized but this did not translate to differences in overall performance (i.e., total 
number of questions answered from all three tasks). Moreover, this study showed 
that even for very simple tasks with self-generated discretionary switching, 
participants perform worse on switch compared to repeat trials. Therefore in the 
current paradigm, powerful participant’s single-tasking approach seems to be more 
effective than the multitasking strategy of powerless participants.   
Goal Accessibility 
Reaction times (RTs) that were three standard deviations above and below 
the mean (2.7% of the responses) and those that were incorrect (3.8% of the 
responses) were eliminated from the analysis. Power did not affect the number of 
incorrect responses (F<1). Instead of grouping the RTs into type of task (i.e., 
arithmetic, picture, and geometric), RTs for each of the goal-related words were 
separated into task 1, task 2, and task 3. This is because different participants may 
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have prioritized different types of tasks. The RTs were then submitted to a 3 (power: 
powerless, control, powerful) x 3 (task 1 type: arithmetic, geometric, picture) x 3 
(task: task 1, task 2, task 3) x 2 (word type: goal-relevant, neutral) mixed ANOVA, 
with repeated measures on the last two factors. This analysis revealed an expected 
significant main effect of word type, F(1, 38)=7.61, p=.009, ηp
2
=.167. As can be 
seen in Figure 3.4, goal-relevant words (M=569, SD=8.98) were responded to faster 
than neutral words (M=587, SD=11.2). No other effects were significant in the 
ANOVA. However, a linear contrast analysis revealed that overall, powerless 
participants had slower RTs (M=603, SD=15.3) compared to control participants 
(M=576, SD=17.7), who were slower than powerful participants (M=554, SD=17), 
F(1, 38)=4.59, p=.039, ηp
2
=.108. Moreover, the differences between goal-relevant 
and neutral words were marginally significant for powerless participants (Ms=593 vs 
614, SDs=14.3 vs 17.8), F(1, 15)=3.11, p=.098, ηp
2
=.172, and significant for control 
participants (Ms=562 vs 590, SDs=16.5 vs 20.6), F(1, 11)=5.32, p=.042, ηp
2
=.326, 
but were not significant for powerful participants (Ms=552 vs 556, SDs=15.8 vs 
19.8), F(1, 12)=0.262, p=.618, ηp
2
=.021. No other effects were significant, F<1, 
indicating that the results were not confounded by the type of task that was 
prioritized. 
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Figure 3.4: Mean RTs across word-type as a function of power in Experiment 4; 
higher RTs represent more time taken to respond; error bars represent 1 standard 
error above and below the mean. 
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accessibility of the previous three goals in order to focus primarily on the LDT. 
Especially since the current tasks were brief and self-contained, then they did not 
require participants to keep goal-related information activated in WM in order to 
find a solution or to complete the tasks later. Decreased accessibility of all goal-
relevant words may have facilitated performance on the LDT, which explains why 
powerful participants had faster overall RTs compared to control and powerless 
participants.  
As a result, even though the current findings did not indicate that powerful 
participants had one of the three tasks more accessible compared to the other two 
tasks, but the null effect could be due to the fact that powerholders were successful 
at decreasing accessibility of all goal-related constructs once they were stopped. In 
order to test for this possibility, goal accessibility should be assessed whilst 
participants are performing the three tasks. Also, instead of using discrete tasks, one 
can employ continuous tasks that are contingent on previous performance (i.e., tasks 
requiring problem solving and creativity (Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995; 
Dijksterhuis, 2004).   
Mood, Confidence, and Motivation 
A One-Way ANOVA revealed that power affected participants’ confidence 
in their ability to perform well on the three tasks, F(2, 46)=4.11, p=.023, ηp
2
=.15. 
Unexpectedly, powerless participants were more confident (M=6.10, SD=0.77) than 
powerful participants (M=5.23, SD=0.97), p=.02. The control condition (M=5.77, 
SD=0.88) did not differ from the other two conditions, ps>.2. However, level of 
confidence was not related to the number of times participants switched across tasks, 
t(48)=0.15, p=.88, β=.022, nor was it related to prioritization, t(48)=1.00, p=.32, β=-
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.15. Therefore confidence did not mediate the effects of power on number of 
switches and task prioritization.  
This increase in confidence levels of powerless participants is inconsistent 
with past literature (e.g., Min & Kim, 2013; Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011), but 
it may be due to the fact that participants were given a choice on how to approach 
the three tasks. Past studies have shown how choosing is the central means by which 
individuals exert control over their surroundings and can increase personal control, 
which is a vital and adaptively advantageous human motive that is lacking in 
powerless individuals (Bandura, 1986; Deci & Ryan, 2002; Inesi, Botti, Dubois, 
Rucker, & Galinsky, 2011; Shapiro, Schwartz, & Astin, 1996; Thompson & 
Schlehofer, 2008). For example, research connects choice with increases in various 
forms of control including self-efficacy, illusions of control, and self-determination 
(Ariely & Norton, 2008; Leotti, Iyengar, & Ochsner, 2010). Hence having 
opportunities for choice via multitasking allows powerless individuals to regain 
control, which can in turn increase their confidence levels. However, powerful 
individuals, who have recently experienced control, may be less affected by task 
choice.  
Lastly, some may argue that the reason why powerholders did not switch as 
much to the other tasks was because of the task characteristics. For example, 
powerholders might have disdained one of the tasks. As shown by previous studies, 
powerholders will put less effort in certain tasks that they do not view as suitable for 
people in positions of power to undertake, such as solving arithmetic problems (see 
DeWall et al., 2011). However, this is unlikely as the tasks were piloted and they 
were perceived as equally suited for managers and subordinates to undertake. The 
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tasks were also matched for interest and difficulty level. The post-experimental 
questions also did not reveal any differences between the power conditions in how 
interesting and difficult the tasks were, how much attention and time participants 
devoted to the tasks, the flow of time, and how suitable the tasks were for a person 
with influence over others would complete, ps>.1. There was also no effect of power 
on the combined score of the mood rating (α=.81), F(2, 46)=0.75, p=.48, ηp
2
=.032.  
Similar to the previous experiments, and in line with the hypotheses, 
powerless individuals were more likely to switch and multitask whereas powerful 
individuals employed a single-tasking strategy during multiple-goal striving. 
Moreover, power was found to affect prioritization, where the tendency to prioritize 
one task over another increased as a function of power. This prioritization tendency 
mediated the relationship between power and number of switches made, which 
suggests that multitasking behavior is related to prioritization tendency. Moreover, 
powerless individuals engaged more in multitasking, even though switching between 
tasks may undermine their performance in the long-run. Differences in motivation, 
confidence, perceived task difficulty, and mood did not influence the effect of power 
on number of switches.  
3.3 Experiment 5: Multitasking behavior with varied task difficulties 
To establish the effects of power on behavior strategies, Experiment 4 
focused on goals of similar difficulty. However, in everyday life, concomitant goals 
often vary in difficulty such that more effort, time, and attention are required for 
some goals compared to others (Brandstätter & Gollwitzer, 1997). In multiple-goal 
scenarios, task valence and goal expectancies have been found to exert a substantial 
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influence on self-regulation (Kernan & Lord, 1990), such that individuals place 
greater goal priority on tasks that have smaller discrepancy between the goal and 
current performance. For example, control theory models (Carver & Scheier, 1981; 
Hyland, 1988) argue that when individuals deal with multiple goals and attempt to 
divide their resources among these goals, a large goal-performance discrepancy is 
likely to lead individuals to direct their resources to other tasks in the environment. 
This processes, termed ‘disengagement from a control system’ (Hyland, 1988), is 
seen as a functional response that protects individuals from the consequences (e.g., 
dissatisfaction and negative affect) that are associated with the pursuit of difficult, 
and perhaps unattainable, discrepancies. As a consequence, individuals focus their 
attention and resources on the smaller discrepancy (i.e., the easier goal) in an 
attempt to minimize the negative consequences associated with effortful pursuit of 
the larger discrepancy. Thus when goals vary in difficulty in a multiple-goal 
environment, people often orient their effort towards the easier goals (Buckert, 
Meyer, & Schmalt, 1979). Introducing goals with different difficulty levels could 
therefore decrease multitasking behavior in powerless individuals. However, if 
powerlessness induces a strong tendency to multitask, then powerless individuals 
may continue their multitasking behavior even in the presence of a difficult goal.  
Experiment 5 expanded the previous findings in three ways. First, instead of 
presenting three tasks of equal difficulties, participants were given two easy tasks 
and one difficult task to work on. The presence of a difficult goal provides a strong 
test for the link between powerlessness and multitasking. Second, compared to 
Experiment 4, it employed an ecologically more valid method of task selection and 
execution. Whereas in Experiment 4 participants selected the tasks using the 
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computer, in Experiment 5 the tasks were presented physically and were selected 
and completed manually, which simulate many daily tasks and activities.  
Lastly, to ensure the validity of the findings, Experiment 5 employed a 
different power manipulation that gave powerholders actual control over powerless 
participants. A different power manipulation was used to create power dynamics that 
are more experientially real and significant to the perceiver (Stevens & Fiske, 1993). 
In the current experiment, participants expected to work together with another 
participant, and were either dependent on or in control of the allocation of valuable 
resources (i.e., performance evaluation and money). Moreover, following 
established experimental procedures, the power manipulation using role assignments 
were allegedly based on individual skills on a leadership questionnaire (Anderson & 
Berdahl, 2002; DeWall et al., 2011; Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote et al., 2002; 
Guinote, 2007a; Overbeck & Park, 2001). This procedure maximizes credibility of 
the manipulation, as power positions in real life are often occupied due to superior 
competence or knowledge (French & Raven, 1959; Overbeck & Park, 2001).  
Similar to the previous experiment, number of switches was predicted to 
decrease with increasing power. Powerholders were also predicted to prioritize one 
task over the other, such that the differences in the number of questions answered 
between the three tasks would be larger for powerful, than control, than powerless 
participants. Lastly, switching between multiple tasks may decrease productivity 
compared to focusing on just one task. Hence the third hypothesis predicted a 
positive relationship between power and performance, such that powerful 
participants will perform better than control participants, who will perform better 
than powerless participants.  
  
146 
 
Methods 
Participants and Design 
Fifty-two participants (27 women) were recruited from UCL. Participants 
took part for £3. Three participants were outliers and were excluded from the 
analyses (switching 3 SDs above the mean). Thus, 49 participants (25 females) with 
a mean age of 24.2 (SD=5.87) were included in the final analysis. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three between subjects conditions: powerful 
(N=17), control (N=16), and powerless (N=16).  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants believed that they were taking part in two unrelated studies: one on 
group-work and creativity and one was a pre-test for a future study (Anderson & 
Berdahl, 2002). Before coming to the laboratory, all participants filled in an on-line 
“Leadership Questionnaire”, which ostensibly measured their leadership abilities 
and creativity. Participants then arrived at the laboratory individually. For the group-
work experiment, they were told that they will be building something called a 
Tanagram out of Lego’s with one or two other participants (adapted from Galinsky 
et al., 2003). In reality, participants completed the entire experiment alone. 
Participants in powerful and powerless conditions were informed that their 
responses on the Leadership Questionnaire were used for role assignments. In 
actuality, participants were randomly assigned to one of three roles that connoted 
different levels of power: manager (high-power), general worker (control), and 
subordinate (low-power). Managers and subordinates were then informed that only 
the manager could (1) decide how to structure the building process, (2) evaluate 
subordinate’s performances, and (3) determine how to divide a bonus monetary 
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payment between each participant (Appendix 6). This manipulation corresponds to 
the definition of power as managers had control over subordinate’s access to 
valuable resources (see Fiske, 1993). Participants in the control condition were not 
informed of their relative roles. They were told instead that they will be working 
independently on the Tanagram, but with the presence of one or two other 
participants in order to simulate real-life work environments. After delivering the 
appropriate information, participants were told that they will first complete a 
separate pilot study looking a problem solving.  
For the second part of the experiment, participants were given three different 
tasks to work on, with the goal of answering as many questions as possible. The 
three tasks consisted of an arithmetic task (additions and subtractions), a picture 
naming task (writing definitions of objects), and a geometric task (copying 
geometric figures). These tasks were adopted from previous multitasking 
experiments (e.g., Gouveia et al., 2007). The tasks were similar to those of 
Experiment 4, but with two important alterations. To investigate the effect of task 
difficulty on multitasking tendency, one task was modified. A pilot study was 
conducted (N=18) to ensure that the geometric task was perceived as more difficult 
(M=4.00, SD=2.45) than the arithmetic task (M=2.56, SD=2.04) and the picture 
naming task, (M=2.33, SD=1.46), ps<.04. The two easy tasks did not differ in 
difficulty level, p=.69. The three tasks did not differ in how interesting they were 
perceived to be and how appropriate they were for a person with influence over 
others to complete, ps>.30.  
The questions from each task were separately cut and inserted into three 
different envelopes (150 questions per envelope). Participants could only take out 
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one question at a time. This ensured that participants selected the questions 
randomly. These three envelopes were placed on a table in front of the participant, 
one next to the other. The envelopes were labeled according to which task it 
contained, and their placement order was counterbalanced. Participants were given 
written instructions for the experiment. They were told that they could work on the 
three tasks in any order that they prefer and that they could return to each task as 
often as they liked. The only restriction is that they will need to answer at least one 
question from each of the three tasks within 20 min. In order to disguise the fact that 
one task was more difficult than the other, participants were told that the three types 
of tasks are judged, (on average) of equal difficulty by most people, although the 
questions within each task can vary in their respective difficulties. They will receive 
more points for more difficult questions within each task, but they will not know 
beforehand which questions are more difficult as the question’s difficulty levels are 
not labelled and the questions are selected randomly from the envelope. After a few 
practice questions, participants started the actual experiment and were stopped when 
12 min have passed. Number of switches and time of switch were recorded 
manually. 
Participants were then given post-experimental questions to answer. To 
verify that managers were perceived as having more power than subordinates, 
participants in the powerless and powerful conditions were asked, to indicate on two 
9-point scales how much they thought managers and subordinates were in charge of 
the situation. Subsequently, participant’s mood, task interest, task difficulty, 
attention and time devoted to each task, and suitability of each task for a person with 
influence over others to complete were assessed similarly to Experiment 4. In 
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addition, participants were asked to indicate how long they thought they had worked 
on the tasks to measure the flow of time. This was included because the perception 
of time can affect multitasking (Kushleyeva, Salvucci, & Lee, 2005; Schmidt & 
DeShon, 2007; Schmidt et al., 2009). Demographic information was then taken and 
participants were debriefed and probed for suspicion.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Checks 
To verify that managers were perceived as having more power than 
subordinates, participants were asked at the end to indicate on two 9-point scales 
how much they thought managers and subordinates were in charge of the situation. 
This was subjected to a 2(power: powerful vs. powerless) x 2(manipulation: 
manager vs. subordinate) mixed ANOVA, with repeated measures on the second 
factor. Only a significant main effect of manipulation emerged, with managers being 
perceived as having more control (M=6.84, SD=1.16) than subordinates (M=4.34, 
SD=1.80), F(1, 29)=41.5, p<.001, ηp
2
=.59, suggesting that the power manipulation 
was successful.   
Behavioral Strategies 
A linear contrast analysis (powerless=-1; control=0; powerful=+1) on the 
total number of switches across the tasks revealed a significant Levene’s test 
indicating unequal variances, F(2, 47), p=.01, so degrees of freedom were adjusted 
from 47 to 23.0. As expected, the adjusted linear trend analysis showed that number 
of switches increased as power decreased, t(23.0)=2.98, p=.007, ηp
2
=.16. The 
quadratic contrast analysis (powerless=+1; control=-2; powerful=+1) was not 
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significant, t(32.7)=1.34, p=.19, ηp
2
=.034, showing no deviation from linearity. As 
shown in Table 3.3, number of switches decreased from powerless (M=12.3, 
SD=7.09) to control (M=7.35, SD=5.10), to powerful (M=6.60, SD=3.25) 
participants. Again, these results support the hypothesis that the less power 
participants have, the more they switch across tasks, even in the presence of a 
difficult task.  
Further analysis was conducted to investigate whether task difficulty affected 
number of switches, and could be a way to reduce switching, particularly in 
powerless individuals. To do so, the proportion of switches to the difficult task was 
calculated. This was done by dividing the number of switches that participants made 
from one of the easy tasks (i.e., picture naming or arithmetic task) to the difficult 
task (i.e., geometric task) by the total number of switches. This proportion was then 
subjected to a One-Way ANOVA with power as the independent factor. A marginal 
main effect of power was found, F(2, 46)=2.92, p=.064, ηp
2
=.11. As shown in Table 
3.2, the proportion of switches to the difficult task was significantly higher for 
powerless participants (M=0.27, SD=0.16) compared to control participants 
(M=0.16, SD=0.17), p=.028, and marginally higher compared to powerful 
participants (M=0.18, SD=0.094), p=.074. There was no difference between control 
and powerful participants, p=.72. These results show that the proportion of switches 
into the difficult task was higher for powerless participants compared to powerful 
and control participants.  
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Table 3.2. Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Switches in Experiment 5 
  Number of Switches Proportion of Switches to 
Difficult Task 
Power M SD M SD 
Powerless 12.3 7.09 0.27 0.16 
Control 7.31 5.17 0.16 0.17 
Powerful 6.60 3.20 0.18 0.094 
 
Note. Higher number of switches indicate a higher a tendency to multitask.  
 
Additional analyses inspected whether within each power group, the 
proportion of switches to the difficult task deviated from the expected proportion of 
switches if task difficulty would not affect switching behavior (i.e., deviated from 
.33). For powerless participants, this difference was not significant, t(16)=1.65, 
p=.12. Task difficulty therefore did not affect powerless participants’ switching 
behavior. In contrast, both control and powerful participants switched less to the 
difficult task than what would have been expected if task difficulty would have no 
effect on behavior (t(16)=4.33, p=.001 and t(15)=6.44, p<.001, respectively). These 
results indicate that control and powerful participants switched more among the easy 
tasks than into the difficult task. Together, these findings show that asymmetric task 
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difficulty decreased multitasking for powerful and control participants, but not for 
powerless participants. 
Prioritization 
Next, task prioritization was measured. Error rates were not analysed 
because of task simplicity (ERs: M=0.016, SD=0.023). The arithmetic, picture, and 
geometric tasks were again converted into task 1, task 2, and task 3, using the same 
method as in Experiment 4. These variables were subjected to a 3(power: powerful, 
control, powerless) x 3(task 1 type: arithmetic, geometric, picture) x 3(tasks: task 1, 
task 2, task 3) mixed ANOVA with within-subject measure on the last factor. The 
ANOVA yielded a significant Mauchly’s test, indicating that the assumption of 
sphericity was violated, chi-square=33.7, p<.001. Therefore degrees of freedom 
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (epsilon=.644). 
The results showed a main effect of task, F(1.28, 55.4)=31.4.4, p<.001, ηp
2
=.422. 
Post-hoc analysis revealed that participants answered more questions from task 1 
(M=35.9, SD=19.5) compared to task 2 (M=12.1, SD=8.58) and task 3 (M=6.26, 
SD=4.87), ps<.02. Task 2 and task 3 were marginally different from each other, 
p=.08. This indicates that overall, all participants prioritized one of the tasks instead 
of balancing their time and effort across the tasks. More importantly, there was a 
marginal power x task interaction, F(2.54, 59.6)=2.66, p=.066, ηp
2
=.102. No other 
effects were significant, F<1, indicating that the results were not confounded by the 
type of task that was prioritized.  
Further analysis showed that there was a significant effect of power on the 
number of questions answered for task 1, F(1, 47)=4.65, p=.036, ηp
2
=.09. As shown 
in Figure 3.5, powerful participants (M=56.9, SD=28.5) answered more questions 
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from task 1 compared to control participants (M=44.5, SD=14.6), who answered 
more than powerless participants (M=41.5, SD=15.9). There was also a significant 
effect of power on the number of questions answered for task 3, F(1, 47)=4.75, 
p=.034, ηp
2
=.092. However, this effect was in the opposite direction where powerful 
participants (M=7.06, SD=5.80) answered fewer questions from task 3 compared to 
control participants (M=7.23, SD=7.22), who answered fewer questions than 
powerless participants (M=12.6, SD=8.67). There was no significant effect of power 
for task 2, F(1, 47)=2.34, p=.13 ηp
2
=.048.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Mean number of questions answered for the three tasks as a function of power 
in Experiment 5; error bars represent 1 standard error above and below the mean. 
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Moreover, the differences in number of questions answered between task 1 and 
task 2 increased as a function of power, F(1, 47)=5.45, p=.024, ηp
2
=.104. 
Specifically, the differences between task 1 and task 2 were smaller for powerless 
(M=19.9, SD=21.1), compared to control (M=23.6, SD=19.4), which was smaller 
compared to powerful (M=40.6, SD=33.7) participants. Similar pattern was found 
for the differences between task 1 and task 3, such that the differences in number of 
questions answered between task 1 and task 3 increased as a function of power, F(1, 
47)=4.97, p=.031, ηp
2
=.096. The differences were smaller for powerless (M=34.1, 
SD=19.3) than control (M=35.4, SD=18.1), than powerful (M=52.4, SD=31.7) 
participants. Lastly, the differences in the number of questions answered between 
task 2 and task 3 did not vary across the three power conditions, F(1, 47)=0.331, 
p=.568, ηp
2
=.007. Hence, in line with the second hypothesis and with the results of 
Experiment 4, power promoted prioritization of one of the tasks.  
A mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) was again conducted, to 
investigate whether task prioritization (measured by the difference in the number of 
questions answered between task 1 and task 3) mediated the relationship between 
power and number of switches. As noted above, power was related to prioritization 
and number of switches. When prioritization was regressed on power and number of 
switches, the relationship between power and number of switches was reduced but 
was still significant, t(47)=2.16, p=.036, β=-.28. Prioritization remained significant, 
t(47)=-3.23, p=.002, β=-.42. A further Sobel test using raw coefficients indicated 
that this reduction in the effect of the independent variable, after including the 
mediator in the model, was marginally significant (z=1.84, p=.066). A more 
sensitive and robust bootstrapping estimate of the 95% confidence interval around 
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the indirect effect of power on number of switches via difference in prioritization 
was also used (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The confidence interval from the 
bootstrapping estimate excludes zero (-2.06, -0.017), which supports the mediation. 
This replicates the results of Experiment 4, and suggests that, as indicated in Figure 
3.6, the effect of power on task switching behavior was mediated by differences in 
prioritization. Again, powerful participants were more likely to prioritize one task 
over the other, and they therefore switched less than powerless participants, who 
showed lower prioritization tendency.  
 
 
Power 
Prioritization 
Number of 
switches 
.30* -.42** 
-.27* (-.40**) 
Figure 3.6: The effect of power on number of switches mediated by prioritization 
in Experiment 5; all entries are standardized coefficients. The association between 
the mediator and number of switches is represented by a coefficient from a model 
where power is also a predictor of number of switches. The number in the 
parenthesis refers to the total effect of power on number of switches.  
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Performance 
In order to measure overall task-efficiency, on the primary (i.e., task 1) 
compared to secondary (i.e., task 2) and tertiary tasks (i.e., task 3), an efficiency-
score (ES) was again computed. The ES represents how many seconds participants 
spent on each question, with lower scores representing higher efficiencies. 
Subjecting these ESs to a 3(power: powerful, control, powerless) x 3(task 1 type: 
arithmetic, geometric, picture) x 3(ES: task 1, task 2, task 3) mixed ANOVA with 
within-subjects measure on the last factor yielded a significant power x ES linear 
contrast interaction, F(2, 40)=5.46, p=.015, ηp
2
=.19. No other effects were 
significant, F<1, indicating that the results were not confounded by the type of task 
that was prioritized. 
Linear contrast analysis showed that there was no significant relationship 
between the ESs of the three tasks for powerless, F(1, 16)=.038, p=.847, ηp
2
=.002 or 
control participants, F(1, 16)=.804, p=.384, ηp
2
=.051. However, there was a 
significant relationship in ESs for powerful participants, F(1, 15)=7.851, p=.013, 
ηp
2
=.329. As shown in Figure 3.7, ESs of powerful participants increased according 
to task importance. That is, ESs for task 1 (M=8.67, SD=3.28) was better than task 2 
(M=11.0, SD=3.69), which was better than task 3 (M=12.3, SD=4.81). There were 
no between-subjects differences for the efficiencies of the three tasks across power 
conditions, ps>.05. 
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Figure 3.7. Mean RTs (seconds per question) for the three tasks as a function of 
power in Experiment 5; error bars represent 1 standard error above and below the 
mean. 
 
Even though power did not affect overall performance, powerful participants 
were more efficient on the task that they prioritized than the ones that they did not. 
In contrast, powerless and control participants exhibited the same efficiencies on all 
task, regardless of prioritization. This efficiency was reflected in how many 
questions they answered, as powerful participants answered more questions than 
powerless participants on the task that they prioritized (task 1), but answered fewer 
questions than powerless participants on the task that they focused on the least (task 
3).  
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Mood, Confidence, and Motivation 
There were no differences between the power conditions on task interest, 
task difficulty, how much attention and time they devoted to the tasks, the flow of 
time, and suitability of the task for a person with influence over others to complete, 
ps>.2. The different power groups also did not differ in mood (α=.73), ps>.2.  
Consistent with Experiment 4, the present experiment found that power 
affected strategies of multiple-goal pursuit. Powerful participants focused on one 
task at a time, following a single-tasking or monochronic strategy of multiple-goal 
pursuit, whereas powerless participants preferred to switch across tasks, following a 
multitasking or polychronic strategy. Participants in the control condition were in 
between these two groups. Importantly, task difficulty did not affect the switching 
behavior of powerless individuals, which speaks for the strong links between 
powerlessness and parallel goal pursuit strategies. Moreover, both experiments 
showed how power increases task prioritization and performance on the prioritized 
task. The tendency for powerholders to prioritize mediated the relationship between 
power and number of switches, which supports the idea that powerholder’s higher 
tendency to prioritize and to inhibit secondary and irrelevant information decrease 
multitasking behavior, whereas powerless individual’s lack of priority increases 
multitasking behavior. 
3.4 Experiment 6: Goal prioritization using hypothetical scenarios 
Experiments 4-5 showed a relationship between power and multitasking 
behavior, where low power generally increases, and high power decreases, 
multitasking. It was also found that low power decreases, whereas high power 
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increases, prioritization tendency during the actional phase of goal pursuit. Since the 
cognitive processes and attentional orientations differ depending on whether 
participants are in the actional or preactional phase (Gollwitzer, 1996; Heckhausen 
& Gollwitzer, 1987), then Experiment 6 aimed to investigate the relationship 
between power and prioritization tendency during the preactional phase.  
As mentioned earlier in the thesis, the preactional phase is divided into a 
predecisional phase and a postdecisional phase. That is, individuals in the 
predicisional phase are concerned with the expected value of available goal options, 
whereas those in the postdecisional phase focus on how to direct behaviors towards 
existing goals (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). Thus the second aim of 
Experiment 6 was to investigate whether powerholder’s prioritization tendency leads 
them to choose fewer goals and to engage in fewer activities during the 
predecisional phase of goal pursuit (i.e., lower goal engagement). This is an 
important issue because if powerholders multitask less than powerless individuals, 
then this tendency could affect choices made during the predecisional phase by 
decreasing the overall number of goals that participants are willing to pursue. When 
faced with multiple goals, individuals must manage their effort and resource 
allocation in order to take advantage of the opportunities that are available to pursue 
their goals. Due to limited resources, participants need to prioritize their goals, and 
sometimes focusing all attention on a top-priority goal may create problems for 
other goals that may, at that particular time, have lower priority (Ferguson, 2006;  
Kruglanski & Higgins, 2007). As a consequence, powerful individuals, who focus 
solely on a single task, may forgo opportunities to pursue an additional goal. On the 
other hand, powerless participants are expected to have a broader focus of attention 
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and higher degrees of distractibility compared to powerful participants (Fiske, 1993; 
Guinote, 2007b; Weick & Guinote, 2010), which should facilitate detection of 
unexpected opportunities and render them more susceptible to opportunities that lie 
outside the framework of their current goal pursuit. 
According to previous studies on power and goal pursuit, high power does not 
necessarily decrease the number of goals that participants choose to pursue; in fact, 
it actually promotes approach related behaviors towards rewards and encourages one 
to initiate action and seize opportunities for goal pursuit (Galinsky et al., 2003; 
Guinote, 2007c). Likewise, the results of Experiment 2 showed that powerholders 
were not less likely to plan fewer activities and to pursue fewer goals compared to 
control and powerless participants. Moreover, the predecisional stage involves a 
“motivational” state of mind, which encompasses careful deliberation and proper 
estimates of success and failures. Choices made during the predecisional phase are 
based on feasibility, such as whether individuals believe they have enough resources 
to attain the goal, as well as goal desirability. This is qualitatively different than the 
“volitional” state of mind during the postdecisional phase, where individuals often 
disregard deliberative issues related to the goal’s worthiness and whether goal 
achievement can bring about desired outcomes. Instead, individuals in this stage are 
more concerned with how to properly implement their goals. This suggests that even 
though powerful individuals prefer to prioritize and focus on one goal during the 
postdecisional phase, but power should not affect the number of tasks that 
individuals choose to undertake during the predecisional phase.   
The current experiment tested these questions by asking participants to report 
their preferred choices and actions during a hypothetical multiple-goal scenario. It 
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was hypothesized that there should be no difference between powerful and 
powerless participants in their tendency to engage in additional goals during the 
predecisional phase. However, power should affect how participants approach the 
multiple goals that they have during the postdecisional phase. Based on the 
relationship between power, multitasking, and prioritization found in Experiments 1-
5, it was predicted that prioritization (an indication of monochronic tendency) will 
increase as a function of power such that powerful participants will be more likely to 
focus and prioritize one of the goals compared to control participants, who will 
prioritize more than powerless participants.  
In addition, the current study also measured other factors that may determine 
resource allocation. These include mood, confidence, as well as 
promotion/prevention orientation. First, according to the approach/inhibition theory 
of power (Keltner et al., 2003; Min & Kim, 2013), powerholders are more likely to 
focus on positive information. For example, power leads to positive biases regarding 
outcomes and better well-being than their powerless counterparts (Fiske & Berdahl, 
2007; Lachman & Weaver, 1998). This may affect goal pursuit because positive 
experiences and self-beliefs represent psychological resources that permit people to 
confront problematic situations such as health threats (Pomerantz, 1998). Powerful 
participants may therefore pursue more goals than powerless participants because of 
positive affect.  
Second, powerful individuals might be generally more optimistic about the 
future and have greater confidence in their abilities to overcome difficulties and to 
complete tasks successfully (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). Individual’s beliefs 
concerning whether both goals can be attained within the available time, a construct 
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referred to as dual-goal expectancy (Schmidt & Dolis, 2009), can also affect goal 
engagement. As long as individuals believe both goals can be achieved, then they 
will allocate time and attention to additional goals. Therefore confidence levels were 
also measured in the current experiment, as power may induce individuals to feel 
more confident about their abilities or their current situation, which increases the 
likelihood of taking on additional tasks from another domain. Lastly, whether 
participants viewed the goals as promoting a positive outcome or preventing a 
negative outcome (i.e., promotion vs. prevention goal orientation) was also 
measured. Goal orientation could be affected by power (Keltner et al., 2003), and 
individuals tend to persist longer on prevention-focused tasks and hesitate to pursue 
alternative activities (Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999; Shah & Higgins, 
1997).  
Methods 
Participants and Design 
Participants (N=67, 49 women) were recruited from UCL. Participants were 
entered into a raffle to win £30. The average age was 25.8 (SD=10.5). Two 
participants were excluded from the analyses for not following directions regarding 
the essay topic. Thus, 65 participants (48 females, mean age = 25.7, SD=9.09) 
remained in the final analysis. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
between subjects conditions: powerful (N=21), control (N=22), or powerless (N=22).  
Materials and Procedure 
 Power was manipulated similarly to Experiment 3. Participants then read a 
scenario (adapted from Louro et al., 2007) in which they had to decide how to 
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allocate their time between pursuing two goals that competed for limited time 
(Appendix 7). One was an athletic goal, where participants were trying to win the 
current season’s 100-m sprint race. Participants were asked to imagine that, given 
their running talents, they are part of the University’s track and field team and will 
compete in a 100-m sprint race. They were then told that an opportunity has arisen 
for them to earn extra money by working part-time as a museum tour guide. 
Participants were made aware that accepting the job meant less training hours for the 
race. They could either forgo this work opportunity and focus on the race, or take up 
this opportunity and choose to work between 6 to 18 hours each week. 
 After reading the scenario, participants answered several questions about 
their preferences and behaviors on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
There were two questions asking how much effort they will devote to the athletic 
goal and how much effort they will devote to the financial goal. The absolute 
differences between these two questions were used to measure whether or not 
participants will prioritize one goal over the other. Higher difference indicates 
higher monochronic behaviors, where participants will focus more on one goal vs. 
the other. To measure participant’s preference for pursuing only one of the two goals 
vs. their preference for engaging in an additional goal, participants were asked to 
what extent they will prefer to only engage themselves with one of the two goals. 
The order of which goal was asked first was counterbalanced between participants.  
 Next, participants’ confidence and goal orientation was measured using 7-
point scales. Confidence was measured by asking participants how good they think 
they are in the 100-m sprint race and in being a museum tour guide (1= not good at 
all, 7 = very good), how confident they are in their ability to win the 100-m sprint 
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race and in getting hired permanently as a tour guide (1 = not confident at all, 7 = 
very confident), and how optimistic they are about attaining each goal (1 = not at all 
optimistic, 7 = very optimistic). Goal orientation was measured by asking 
participants whether they see achieving the financial and athletic goals as pursuing 
something they want or avoiding something they don’t want (1 = avoiding, 7 = 
pursuing). Participants were also asked to indicate which goal is more important (1 
= athletic more important, 7 = financial more important).  
Lastly, participant’s mood was measured and the manipulation check of power 
was administered (similarly to Experiment 3). Demographic information was then 
recorded and participants were debriefed and probed for suspicion.   
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
An independent t-test revealed that the power manipulation was effective as 
powerful participants felt more control (M=7.17, SD=0.70) than powerless 
participants (M=3.48, SD=1.79), t(44)=9.06, p<.001, ηp
2
<.001.  
Goal Prioritization and Goal Engagement  
Preliminary analyses indicated that gender did not affect the results; 
therefore gender was excluded from further analyses.  
Goal prioritization was first assessed by taking the absolute value of the 
difference between participants’ ratings of how much effort they will devote to the 
athletic goal and how much effort they will devote to the financial goal. Larger 
differences indicate that participants were more likely to engage in one goal vs. the 
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other; in other words, higher difference scores translate to higher goal prioritization. 
Goal prioritization was subjected to a linear contrast analysis (powerless=-1; 
control=0; powerful=+1). In order to test for deviation from linearity, a quadratic 
contrast analysis was also used (powerless=+1; control=-2; powerful=+1). This 
yielded a significant linear contrast effect of power, F(2, 62) = 4.64, p=.035, 
ηp
2
=.070. Powerful participants had higher difference scores (M=1.91, SD=1.34) 
than control participants (M=1.47, SD=1.47), who had higher difference scores than 
powerless participants (M=1.04, SD=1.30). The quadratic contrast analysis was not 
significant, F(1, 62)<.001, p=.99, ηp
2
<.001, showing no deviation from linearity. 
This supports the hypothesis that high power increases, whereas low power 
decreases, goal prioritization (see Table 3.4).  
 Next, participants’ preference for only engaging in one of the goals was 
analyzed. To facilitate interpretation, this rating scale was reverse coded such that 
higher ratings indicate a higher preference for engaging in additional goals. Since no 
specific directional predictions were made regarding the relationship between power 
and goal engagement, a one-way ANOVA was employed. This yielded a main effect 
of power, F(2, 62)=7.32, p=.001, ηp
2
=.19. Further post-hoc analysis showed that 
powerful participants had marginally higher ratings (M=4.55, SD=1.44) compared to 
powerless participants (M=3.54, SD=1.44), p=.073, and significantly higher ratings 
compared to control participants (M=2.74, SD=1.69), p=.001. Powerless and control 
participants did not differ, p=.20. This supports the hypothesis showing that 
powerful individuals are more likely to seize opportunities for goal pursuit and are 
more likely to engage in additional goals compared to powerless participants.  
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Table 3.3. Means and Standard Deviations for Prioritization and Engagement in 
Experiment 6 
  Goal Prioritization Goal Engagement  
Power M SD M SD 
Powerless 1.04 1.30 3.54 1.44 
Control 1.47 1.47 2.74 1.69 
Powerful 1.91 1.34 4.55 1.44 
 
Note. Higher scores on goal prioritization indicate a higher a tendency to focus 
attention on effort on one goal instead of devoting equal attention to both goals. 
Higher scores on goal engagement indicate a higher tendency to pursue additional 
goals.  
 
These results indicate that although powerful participants prioritize one goal 
over the other, they are unwilling to entirely forgo any additional opportunities for 
goal pursuit. As a result of being more goal-oriented and more likely to seek 
opportunities for goal pursuit (Galinsky et al., 2003; Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Guinote, 
2007c), powerful individuals might not necessarily pursue fewer goals than 
powerless individuals. Although power may increase the willingness to pursue both 
goals compared to powerless and control participants, but they still employ a single-
tasking strategy whilst pursuing these multiple goals, as they are more likely to 
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prioritize one goal over the other. In contrast, powerless participants prefer to pursue 
fewer goals than their powerful counterparts, but they have a higher tendency to 
multitask when faced with multiple goals.  
Confidence Level 
Belief about ability, confidence, and optimism were combined into an overall 
confidence score for the athletic goal (α=.851) and an overall confidence score for 
the financial goal (α=.841). A 3 (power: powerful, control, powerless) x 2 (goal: 
athletic, financial) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was 
conducted on the overall confidence score. This analysis revealed a marginal effect 
of goal, where participants were overall more confident in the financial goal 
(M=5.57, SD=0.13) than the athletic goal (M=5.21, SD=0.14), F(1, 61)=3.66, p=.06, 
ηp
2
=.057.  There was also a significant power x goal interaction, F(2, 61)=3.35, 
p=.041, ηp
2
=.099. Further analysis showed that, as shown in Figure 3.8, both 
powerless and control participants were more confident in the financial (M=5.74, 
SD=0.87; M=6.00, SD=0.74) compared to the athletic goal (M=5.32, SD=0.96; 
M=5.07, SD=1.29), Fs > 4, ps<.04, ηp
2
s>.18. However, there was no difference in 
confidence level for powerful participants between financial (M=4.95, SD=1.29) and 
athletic goals (M=5.23, SD=0.99), F(1, 21)=0.46, p=.51, ηp
2
=.021.  
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Figure 3.8: Mean confidence score for athletic and financial as a function of power 
in Experiment 6; error bars represent 1 standard error above and below the mean. 
 
There was also a marginal effect of power on the overall confidence score for 
the two goals, F(2, 61)=2.67, p=.077, ηp
2
=.08. Further post-hoc analysis showed that 
powerless and control participants had higher confidence scores compared to 
powerful participants, ps <.06. This pattern indicates that confidence could mediate 
task prioritization. A mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) was conducted 
with power as the independent variable, goal prioritization as the outcome variable, 
and overall confidence as the mediator. As noted above, power was related to 
difference in overall confidence score and task prioritization. However, when goal 
prioritization was regressed on power and overall confidence, the originally 
significant relationship between power and goal prioritization became non-
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significant, t(62)=1.43, p=.16, β=.28, but overall confidence remained significant, 
t(62)=-3.12, p=.003, β=.-70. These results, as well as a marginally significant Sobel 
test using raw coefficients (z=1.69, p=.09), suggest that the effect of power on goal 
prioritization was also mediated by differences in overall confidence. A more 
sensitive and robust bootstrapping estimate of the 95% confidence interval around 
the indirect effect of power on goal prioritization via difference in confidence was 
also used (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The confidence interval from the bootstrapping 
estimate excludes zero (0.016, 0.39), which supports the mediation. This suggests 
that the effect of power on goal prioritization was mediated by overall task 
confidence. Powerful participants were less confident in general, and they therefore 
prioritized one task over the other. The overall confidence was not related to one’s 
tendency to engage in additional goals, F(1, 62)=0.375, p=.542.  
Furthermore, even though powerful participant’s level of confidence was 
independent of goal content (financial vs. athletic), but they may have displayed 
higher differences in confidence levels between the two goals. In order to test for 
this possibility, the absolute values of the differences in confidence scores between 
the two goals were obtained. This difference in confidence score was subjected to a 
one-way ANOVA, which yielded a marginal main effect of power, F(2, 61)=3.13, 
p=.051, ηp
2
=.093. Post-hoc Bonferroni analysis
3
 showed that powerful participants 
had marginally higher difference scores (M=1.45, SD=1.19) than powerless 
participants (M=0.77, SD=0.63), p=.078. Control participants (M=1.39, SD=1.15) 
did not differ between the two power conditions, p>.1. Since powerful participants 
were more confident in one task compared to the other, then this difference in 
                                                 
3
 A Bonferroni correction was used because the result was unexpected. 
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confidence may have mediated the relationship between power and prioritization. A 
second mediation analysis was conducted with power as the independent variable, 
goal prioritization as the outcome variable, and difference in confidence as the 
mediator. As noted above, power was related to difference in confidence score and 
task prioritization. However, when goal prioritization was regressed on power and 
difference in confidence, the originally significant relationship between power and 
goal prioritization became non-significant, t(62)=1.28, p=.205, β=.252, but 
difference in confidence remained significant, t(62)=3.27, p=.002, β=.523. These 
results, as well as a Sobel test using raw coefficients (z=1.87, p=.061), suggest that 
the effect of power on goal prioritization was mediated by differences in task 
confidence. The confidence interval from the bootstrapping estimate (0.03, 0.45) 
excludes zero, which supports the mediation. Therefore powerful participants are 
more confident in one task than the other, which explains why they prioritize one 
task over the other. The mediation results are illustrated in Figure 3.9. Difference in 
confidence was not related to one’s tendency to engage in secondary goals, F(1, 
62)=0.841, p=.363.  
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Goal Importance, Goal Perception, and Mood 
Goal importance was also analyzed in order to assess whether power affected 
how important participants perceived the goals to be, and whether they perceived 
one goal as more important than another. Goal importance may have decreased 
multitasking behavior if powerful participants perceived one goal to be more 
important than the other. A bipolar scale was used, where participants rated the 
Power 
Difference in Confidence 
Prioritization 
.35* .52** 
.25 (.43*) 
Figure 3.9: The effect of power on goal prioritization mediated by difference in 
confidence (Panel A) and overall confidence (Panel B) in Experiment 6; all 
entries are standardized coefficients. The association between the mediator and 
the goal prioritization is represented by a coefficient from a model where power 
is also a predictor of goal prioritization. Numbers in parentheses refer to the total 
A 
Power 
Overall Confidence 
Prioritization 
-.22* -.70** 
.28 (.43*) 
B 
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relative importance of the two goals. Higher values on the goal importance scale 
represent higher importance for the financial goal, and lower values represent higher 
importance for the athletic goal. The median score (4) represent equal task 
importance. This importance score was subjected to a one-way ANOVA, which 
yielded a main effect of power, F(2, 62)=3.65, p=.032, ηp
2
=.105. Post-hoc 
(Bonferroni corrected) analyses showed that control participants perceived the 
financial goal as more important (M=5.29, SD=1.79) compared to powerful 
participants (M=3.80, SD=1.49), p=.027. The differences between the powerless 
(M=4.56, SD=1.55) and control, and powerless and powerful conditions were not 
significant, ps>.4. Although there was a difference in goal importance between 
powerful and control participants, goal importance was not correlated with goal 
prioritization, r=.107, p=.398, nor with additional goal engagement, r=.082, p=.518.  
Since the median of the scale was 4, then any deviation from 4 meant that 
participants viewed one goal as more important than the other. A difference score 
for goal importance was also calculated by subtracting goal importance by 4 and 
taking the absolute value of the answer. Power did not affect the difference score in 
goal importance, F(1, 63)<.001, p=.996. Unsurprisingly, the difference in goal 
importance did yield a significant effect on goal prioritization, p=.022, β=.410, and 
on preference for additional goal engagement, p=.001, β=.513. When participants 
saw one goal as more important than the other, then they had higher goal 
prioritization and lower additional goal engagement. However, the effect of power 
on goal prioritization, p=.028, β=.43, and additional goal engagement, p=.03, β=-
.49, was still present after ruling out this possible confound of goal importance. Due 
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to the nature of how the question was asked, it was impossible to assess overall goal 
importance as the scale forced participants to choose one goal vs. the other. 
Finally, to see whether power affected goal orientation, the goal orientation 
ratings for both goals were subjected to a 2 (goal: athletic vs. financial) x 2 (power: 
powerless, control, powerful) mixed ANOVA with between-subjects on the last 
factor. This analysis did not yield any significant results, ps>.1. None of these 
effects were driven by mood, as a one-way ANOVA did not reveal any mood 
differences between the power conditions, F(2, 61)=1.42, p=.250, ηp
2
=.068.  
3.5 Summary and conclusions  
The thesis so far has focused on how power affects prioritization of a single 
goal and how individuals choose to pursue multiple goals. It was predicted that there 
will be a negative relationship between power and multitasking, with lower 
multitasking tendency in high-power individuals. In line with the prediction, it was 
found that both task prioritization and single-tasking strategies increase with high 
power (and decrease with low power). Chapter 2 showed that power can decrease 
multitasking through self-reports and planning. However, it also showed that 
powerholders may multitask if doing so can prevent negative consequences 
(Experiment 3).  
Chapter 3 expanded the findings of Chapter 2 by examining actual 
multitasking behavior, prioritization, and performance during multiple-goal pursuit. 
Again, a negative relationship was found between power and multitasking behavior. 
Powerless individuals preferred to multitask even when doing so may decrease 
overall performance and even in the presence of a difficult task (Experiment 5). 
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Moreover, prioritization tendency mediated this relationship between power and 
multitasking (Experiments 4 and 5). The mediations support the idea that powerless 
individuals multitask because they lack priority by constantly seeking information 
that can help them increase their control of the environment, and by attending to 
other events that can override the focal goal.  
This is similar to the attention capture associated with multitasking as high 
multitaskers have increased vulnerability to distractions by irrelevant items (Boot, 
Brockmole, & Simons, 2005; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004). 
Powerlessness may therefore be comparable, in some respects, to working on one 
task while simultaneously being distracted by another, which increases concurrent 
attention to task demands and engagement in more switches between various tasks. 
Having a multitasking mindset and constantly attending to multiple events can also 
decrease concentration and selective attention, because attending to multiple sources 
of information renders them equally important and creates less clear priorities 
(Guinote, 2008).  
On the other hand, powerful individuals have a focused mind-set. This makes 
it easy for them to shut off their multitasking tendency. Therefore powerful 
individuals may prefer to attend to new tasks only after processing the initial task to 
a sufficient degree. This pattern of resource allocation over time reflects a more 
systematic, sequential approach to dealing with competing goals, which is a luxury 
afforded by the stable, predictable nature of the powerholder’s environment. 
Although powerholders are more likely to single-task and prioritize than powerless 
participants, but there was no evidence that power decreases the total number of 
goals that participants are willing to pursue and the willingness to forgo 
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opportunities to pursue additional goals (Experiments 2 and 6). Instead, powerful 
participants were actually more likely to pursue additional goals compared to 
powerless and control participants; but once the goals are set, they will approach 
them in a more monochronic (vs. polychronic) fashion (Experiment 6).  
The studies so far also ruled out the possibility that the relationship between 
power, multitasking, and prioritization is mediated by mood, motivation, or goal 
orientation. However, Experiment 6 showed that power decreased participants’ 
confidence in their abilities, and this decrease in overall confidence level mediated 
the relationship between power and goal prioritization. The relationship between 
higher confidence and multitasking is in line with past research showing how 
increased goal expectancy leads to more multitasking (Schmidt et al., 2009). 
However, this may seem inconsistent with past research on power, which suggests 
that power increases optimistic perceptions of outcomes and confidence in one’s 
ability to deal with responsibilities and to achieve desired goals (Anderson & 
Galinsky, 2006; Briñol et al., 2007; See et al., 2011). It is thus possible that power 
may affect confidence differently depending on whether individuals only need to 
focus on one goal or on multiple goals.  
Moreover, the difference in confidence levels between the two tasks also 
mediated the relationship between power and goal prioritization. This suggests that 
powerful individuals prefer to focus more on one goal vs. another because they are 
more confident in their abilities in one goal compared to the other. They will 
therefore focus on only one of the goals in order to ensure successful attainment of 
at least the focal goal. However, powerholders are still willing to devote left over 
resources to additional goals. Powerless and control individuals, on the other hand, 
  
176 
 
believe they have the ability to meet the demands of both goals, and therefore tend 
to pursue them together and are willing to divide attention between the two goals 
more equally.  
Performance was also examined in these studies. Powerful participants may 
have answered more questions from, and were more efficient on, the prioritized task 
compared to powerless participants, but this slight benefit was not reflected in 
overall performance. Perhaps the paradigm used in Experiments 4 and 5 may not 
reliably capture the challenges of multitasking because the tasks were designed to 
measure primarily multitasking tendency (see (Gouveia et al., 2007; Rubinstein et 
al., 2001). Moreover, the tasks were simple and not demanding enough, as their 
execution did not require WM resources. Indeed, it is highly probable that powerless 
participant’s division of attention may compromise performance during more 
attentionally demanding multitasking situations, due to fewer WM capacities 
available for cognitive control compared to powerful individuals.  
In addition, past studies suggest that multitasking tendency and multitasking 
ability are conceptually and operationally distinct from each other. For example, 
previous research failed to find a relationship between polychronicity and 
multitasking ability (Delbridge, 2001; Konig et al., 2005; Poposki & Oswald, 2010), 
indicating that the tendency to multitasking is independent of multitasking ability. 
Likewise, a person may excel at one type of performance (e.g., multitasking) yet 
prefer performing tasks in a different way (e.g., single-tasking). Therefore one 
question that arises is whether power affects performance during demanding 
multitasking situations. This is investigated in Chapter 4 using paradigms designed 
to specifically measure multitasking ability under controlled conditions.   
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Chapter 4:  
Power and Multitasking Ability 
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4.1 Introduction 
Even when an individual prefers to perform only one task at a time, many 
external circumstances, such as job requirements, demand multitasking. Therefore 
an important question to address is whether individuals are able to adapt to changing 
circumstances required by their situation. Since the tendency to engage in 
multitasking does not correlate with one’s ability to multitask (Ophir et al., 2009; 
Poposki, Oswald, & Chen, 2009), then it is necessary to assess how power affects 
multitasking ability in situations where individuals are compelled to multitask. In 
order to investigate the effects of power on multitasking ability, this chapter used 
paradigms that have been designed to specifically measure multitasking ability. 
Experiment 7 used a dual-tasking paradigm, Experiments 8 and 9 used task-
switching paradigms, and Experiment 10 used self-reports.  
In order to perform well under demanding multitasking situations, individuals 
not only need to inhibit alternative goals when necessary but also need to be able to 
quickly re-focus attention on new tasks, minimize cross-talks and interferences 
between various tasks, coordinate information, and select appropriate responses to 
environmental demands (Kushleyeva et al., 2005). The executive function deficits 
previously found in powerless individuals (Guinote, 2007b; Smith et al., 2008) 
suggest that powerlessness leads to a general depletion in cognitive resources and 
abilities to effectively allocate attentional resources. As a result, low-power 
individuals are more guided by situational constraints and have difficulties inhibiting 
goal-irrelevant information (Guinote, 2007c; Overbeck & Park, 2006). For example, 
powerless individuals may dedicate more cognitive resources to processing 
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irrelevant aspects of the task that they are performing, as well as to internal 
processes such as ruminative thoughts. Processing excessive information exhausts 
WM capacity and diminishes one’s ability to willfully allocate attention between 
various tasks. Consequently, powerless individuals should have fewer resources 
available for effective multitasking, such as focusing attention and manipulating 
temporarily stored information at the service of current goals.  
On the other hand, powerholders attend to less irrelevant information, which 
will then free up limited WM resources. However, even though powerholders 
deploy attentional resources more selectively, power may not improve multitasking 
ability per se. That is, high power may not increase WM capacity beyond standard 
levels. This is likely as there have been mixed evidence regarding a power 
advantage in single executive functions tasks. In some studies, powerful participants 
were better at inhibiting interference compared to standard participant responses 
(Guinote, 2007b) or to responses of a control condition (DeWall et al., 2011), 
whereas in other studies they did not show superior performance on these tasks 
(Smith et al., 2008). Therefore the notion that power improves WM capacity is not 
supported by strong evidence. Consequently, although the prediction for 
multitasking tendency was for both powerless and powerful condition, the prediction 
regarding ability focused primarily on powerless individuals. It was predicated that 
powerlessness should decrease multitasking ability compared to control and 
powerful participants, whereas powerful participants may exhibit similar 
performance levels compared to control participants.  
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4.2 Experiment 7: Dual-task ability 
Experiment 7 investigated whether powerless individual’s tendency to multitask 
and to attend to multiple goals (Experiments 1-6) can create the ironic effect of 
decreasing their ability to manage multitasking situations, such as dual-tasking. 
Dual-task paradigms mimic one of the strategies often used by multitaskers: 
completing two tasks simultaneously. Responses during dual-task trials are often 
delayed and less accurate compared to responses during single-task trials, where the 
tasks are performed in isolation. This dual-task cost occurs because dual-tasking 
requires additional WM resources to monitor and coordinate attentional processes 
linked to the two tasks (Lavie et al., 2004; Szameitat et al., 2002). It is therefore 
demanding on the central executive (Lavie et al., 2004; Logan, 2003), and it has 
been proposed that dual-task coordination is a potential fourth factor of the central 
executive (in addition to shifting, inhibition, and updating functions; Collette & Van 
Der Linden, 2002; Miyake et al., 2000). Having sufficient WM resources can 
therefore reduce dual-task costs by enabling the individual to simultaneously store 
and process multiple sources of information. Without sufficient WM capacity, 
individuals may suffer from cross-talks and confusions between the tasks, as it will 
be difficult to maintain independent representations for two separate processes. Thus 
dual-task paradigms are similar to the OSPAN task which has been traditionally 
used to measure WM capacity. For these reasons, the difference between single and 
dual-task performance has been seen as a test of WM capacity (Baddeley, 1992), 
and is indicative of one’s ability to complete two goals simultaneously.  
In the present experiment, participants performed an auditory and a visual task 
either independently (single-tasking) or simultaneously (dual-tasking; following a 
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paradigm developed by Levy and Pashler (2001). This paradigm requires 
participants to perform two tasks with a temporal overlap, and meets the criteria for 
multitasking as it involves multiple tasks characterized by distinct goals, stimuli 
(auditory and visual), and response outputs (vocal response and manual response). 
The two tasks were chosen because they compete for attentional resources when 
performed concurrently, as both tasks need access to the same functional units of 
information processing.  
Evidence from current (Experiments 1-6) and past studies (Fiske, 1993; 
Guinote, 2007b, 2008) suggest that powerless individual’s divided attention and 
multitasking mindset should encourage one to process superfluous information, 
which will decrease WM capacity. This explains the negative impact that low power 
has on executive functions performance (Guinote, 2007b; Smith et al., 2008), which 
are dependent on WM capacity (Kane & Engle, 2003; Miyake et al., 2000). 
Therefore it is predicted that powerlessness should decrease dual-task performance 
(higher RTs and ERs) compared to control and powerful participants, because 
powerless participants have fewer WM resources available to help them overcome 
the difficulty of attending to two simultaneous stimuli that are of equal importance. 
However, power should not affect performances on single-tasks because it is not 
cognitively demanding. Mood was also measured as positive mood was found to 
enhance performance on secondary tasks (Bless, Clore, & Schwarz, 1996).  
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Methods 
Participants and Design 
Sixty participants (32 females) were recruited from UCL. Participants took 
part for £3. Four participants were excluded from the analyses: one for not following 
instructions regarding the essay topic and three for being outliers (3 SDs above the 
mean). Thus, 56 participants (30 females) were included in the final analyses. The 
average age was 24.8 (SD=7.61). The experiment was a 3(power: powerful vs. 
control vs. powerless) x 2(tasks: single vs. dual) x 2(modality: auditory vs. visual) 
design, with power as a between-subjects factor. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the power conditions: powerless (N=19), control (N=18), and powerful 
(N=19).  
Materials and Procedure 
Following Galinsky et al. (2003) and similarly to Experiment 3, participants 
wrote a narrative essay about an incident in which they had power (powerful), did 
not have power (powerless), or the last time they went to the supermarket (control). 
Power was defined as having control over the ability of someone to get something 
they wanted, or being in a position to evaluate others.  
Subsequently, participants completed the auditory and visual categorization 
tasks on a computer, with a 60-Hz color monitor. Participants sat at a viewing 
distance of 60 cm. All trials began with a warning stimulus consisting of three 
adjacent horizontal white lines (2.2 cm in length) that were displayed in the center of 
the screen against a black background. The separation between the lines was 1.2 cm. 
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Stimulus presentation began 501 ms after the onset of the warning stimulus (see 
Figure 4.1).  
For the auditory single-task, a computer-generated tone was emitted for 40 ms. 
Tone frequency was selected at random from one of three values (220, 880, and 
3520 Hz) and participants responded by saying one, two, or three, respectively. 
Vocal responses were recorded using a tape-recorder in order to detect ERs, and RTs 
were measured using a microphone located on a stand in front of the seated 
participant. The next trial began 1,500 ms after participant’s response.  
For the visual single-task, a solid white circular disk (radius 2.2 cm) replaced 
one randomly selected horizontal line. This display remained visible until 
participants responded to the circle’s location by pressing the third, fourth, or fifth 
key on the E-prime Serial Response Box using their index, middle, or ring fingers of 
their dominant hand. The three possible locations and the three response keys were 
spatially compatible. RTs and ERs were recorded. For the dual-task, both visual and 
auditory stimuli were presented simultaneously. Participants were instructed to 
respond to both. 
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Figure 4.1: Example of a sequence of events in a trial of Experiment 7. Trial onset 
was indicated by three horizontal lines. Then, for the visual trial, a circle replaced 
one of the horizontal lines. Participants pressed one of three keys to indicate the 
circle’s location. For the auditory trial, no circle appeared (the three horizontal lines 
remained on the screen) and instead, participants heard an auditory tone. The three 
horizontal lines remained on the screen until participants indicated their answer 
verbally. For the dual-task trials, the visual circle and the auditory tone appeared 
simultaneously.  
 
Participants started off with a practice of 8 trials of each of the three block types 
(auditory-single, visual-single, and dual). This was followed by the test session of 
six blocks (48 trials per block), with each block type appearing twice. Participants 
were informed what block type to expect, and block order was counterbalanced 
across participants. 
501 ms 
Until response 
1,500 ms 
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Lastly, to assess any possible mood effects on attentional capacity and dual-
tasking performance (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Seibert & Ellis, 1991), participants 
completed the same mood questionnaire as in Experiment 3. A power manipulation 
check similar to the one in Experiment 3 was also administered. Demographic 
information was then recorded and participants were probed for suspicion, thanked, 
and debriefed.   
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
An independent samples t-test revealed that the power manipulation was 
effective as powerful participants felt more control (M=7.37, SD=1.01) than 
powerless participants (M=3.23, SD=2.20), t(31)=7.16, p<.001, ηp
2
=.62.  
Reaction-Times  
Following (Levy & Pashler, 2001), trials on which any response was incorrect 
(3.3% of all responses), faster than 150 ms, or slower than 3,000 ms (4.7% of all 
responses) were excluded. Trimmed RTs were then analysed using a 3 (power: 
powerful, control, powerless) x 2 (task: single, dual) x 2 (modality: auditory, visual) 
mixed ANOVA with power as a between-subjects factor.  
This yielded a main effect of modality F(1, 53)=401, p<.001, ηp
2
=.88, where 
auditory RTs (M=768, SD=151) were slower than visual RTs (M=475, SD=142), 
and a main effect of task, F(1, 53)=134, p<.001, ηp
2
=.72, where dual-task RTs 
(M=726, SD=213) were slower than single-task RTs (M=516, SD=81). These results 
replicate previous findings by Levy and Pashler (2001), and show how dual-tasking 
and the auditory task was attentionally more demanding than single-tasking and the 
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visual task, respectively. There was also a modality x power interaction, F(2, 
53)=3.62, p=.034, ηp
2
=.12, and, as expected, a task x power interaction, F(2, 
53)=4.12, p=.022, ηp
2
=.14. No other effects were significant, Fs<1.  
The task x power interaction showed that the difference in RTs between single 
and dual-task performance (i.e., dual-task cost) was higher for powerless (M=272, 
SD=177) than control (M=157, SD=121), t(35)=2.31, p=.027, and powerful (M=174, 
SD=75.4) participants, t(35)=2.20, p=.035 (see Figure 4.2). There was no difference 
between control and powerful participants, t(36)=0.53, p=.69. This 
underperformance suggests that powerless individuals had less WM capacity 
available for dual-task coordination (see Baddeley, 1996, 2000) than control and 
powerful participants.  
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Figure 4.2: Mean RTs across tasks and modalities as a function of power in 
Experiment 7; error bars represent 1 standard error above and below the mean. 
 
Furthermore, the modality x power interaction revealed that the differences 
between auditory and visual RTs were smaller for powerless participants (M=235, 
SD=89.1) compared to control (M=320, SD=115), p=.021, and powerful participants 
(M=317, SD=118), p=.021. There was no difference between powerful and control 
participants, p=.93. Hence powerful and control participants were faster at the visual 
than the auditory task, whereas powerless participants’ RTs were more similar 
between the two tasks.  
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Error-Rates  
Participants’ ERs were subjected to a 3(power: powerful, control, powerless) x 
2(task: single, dual) x 2 (modality: auditory, visual) mixed ANOVA with power as a 
between-subjects factor. This revealed a main effect of task, F(1, 53)=16.3, p<.001, 
ηp
2
=.24, with higher dual-task ERs (M=3.87, SD=0.29) than single-task ERs 
(M=2.66, SD=0.26). There was also a main effect of modality F(1, 53)=93.2, 
p<.001, ηp
2
=.64, with higher auditory (M=5.49, SD=0.45) than visual ERs (M=1.04, 
SD=0.13). In addition, there was a modality x task interaction, F(1, 53)=9.15, 
p=.004, ηp
2
=.15, with higher dual-task costs for the auditory modality (M=2.05, 
SD=4.08) than the visual modality (M=0.35, SD=1.31). This, again, replicates 
previous findings of Levy and Pashler (2001) and shows how dual-tasking and the 
auditory task were attentionally more demanding than single-tasking and the visual 
task, respectively. The main effect of power was also significant, F(2, 53)=3.99, p = 
.024, ηp
2
=.13. Nothing else was significant, Fs<1.  
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Figure 4.3: Mean ERs across tasks and modality as a function of power in 
Experiment 7; error bars represent 1 standard error above and below the mean. 
 
As shown in Figure 4.3, powerless participants had higher ERs (M=4.14, 
SD=0.41) than powerful participants (M=2.54, SD=0.40), p=.007, and marginally 
higher ERs than control participants (M=3.13, SD=0.40), p=0.083. Participants in 
the control group did not differ from participants in the powerful condition, p=.30. 
These results indicate that there was no trade-off between speed and accuracy, and 
that the increased dual-task cost in the RTs of powerless individuals was not a 
byproduct of providing more accurate answers. Instead, differences in dual-task cost 
in RTs are due to differences in one’s basic ability to share attention between two 
tasks. 
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Overall, the results supported the hypothesis that powerless individuals had 
higher dual-task costs than control and powerful participants. This suggests that 
powerlessness decreases one’s ability to manage two tasks simultaneously by 
decreasing WM capacity needed for dual-task coordination (see Baddeley, 1996; 
2000). These findings were not task specific and occurred for both auditory and 
visual tasks. In addition, power led to faster RTs for the visual compared to the 
auditory task, showing perhaps that powerholders prioritized the visual over the 
auditory task. Lastly, powerlessness decreased ERs in general, suggesting that 
power can enhance performance even in undemanding, single-task situations. None 
of these effects were mediated by mood, as a one-way ANOVA did not reveal any 
mood differences between the three power conditions (α=.94), F(2, 56)=.929, 
p=.404, ηp
2
=.029. 
4.3 Experiment 8: Task-switching ability 
Experiment 7 examined how power affects the ability to pursue two 
attentionally demanding goals simultaneously. In addition to dual-tasking, another 
type of multitasking consists of constantly switching between goals (Oberlander, 
Oswald, Hambrick, & Jones, 2007). Task-switching paradigms involve comparing 
performance on repeat trials (answering consecutive questions from the same task-
set) with performance on switch trials (answering consecutive questions from 
different task-sets). Switch trials have been consistently found to incur higher costs 
(switch costs) compared to repeat trials (Monsell, 2003). This is because switch 
trials require individuals to use the shifting function (Miyake et al., 2000), which 
places high demands on WM resources linked to attentional-refocusing between 
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tasks, retrieving task-related intentions and rules, reconfiguring task-sets, and 
inhibiting interfering activations from the previous task-set (Meyer & Kieras, 1997). 
Therefore Experiment 8 examined whether power affects one’s ability to deal with 
the challenges that arise when people switch from one goal to another.  
Experiment 8 employed a number-letter task-switching paradigm, where 
participants were simultaneously presented with a number-letter pair and had to 
switch between the classification of one or the other stimulus (following Ophir et al., 
2009). They were asked to either classify the number (even or odd) or the letter 
(consonant or vowel). A cue informing participants about which classification to 
perform was presented just before the stimuli appeared on each trial. In repeat trials, 
the classification required was identical to the previous trial and in switch trials the 
classification was different from the previous trial. This paradigm can be used to 
measure switching abilities, as people generally take longer to perform the 
classification for switch trials than repeat trials, which shows that switch trials 
require additional resources to mentally reconfigure the task sets involved (Monsell, 
2003).  
Since switch costs are mainly associated with an insufficient use of WM 
resources to overcome the difficulty of inhibiting rules and responses from the prior 
task-set and of refocusing attention on the new task (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), then 
the lower WM capacity in powerless compared to powerful individuals (Experiment 
7) should decrease their ability to respond to the challenges associated with task-
switching. It was expected that powerless participants will exhibit greater switch 
costs compared to control and powerful individuals. In addition, powerlessness may 
activate the behavioral inhibition system associated with negative mood and anxiety 
  
192 
 
(Keltner et al., 2003), and anxiety was also found in previous literature to increase 
switch costs (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). Therefore the role of state anxiety and 
the role of mood were examined in this experiment.  
Methods 
Participants and Design 
Fifty-seven participants from UCL (44 females; mean age=23.3, SD=2.59) 
took part in exchange for a £3 payment. The study was a 3(power: powerful, control, 
powerless) x 2(switch: switch, repeat) x 2(congruency: congruent, incongruent) 
mixed design, with power as a between-subjects factor. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the power conditions: powerless (N=18), control (N=18), and powerful 
(N=21). 
Materials and Procedure 
Power was manipulated similarly to Experiment 2. Subsequently, participants 
completed the task-switching paradigm on a computer (see Figure 4.4). In this task, 
a cue was presented at the beginning of each trial, which indicated whether 
participants had to categorize the number or the letter of a compound stimulus. The 
cue, either “NUMBER” or “LETTER”, was presented for 200 ms and was followed 
by a stimulus consisting of a digit and a letter (e.g., “2 b” or “b 2”). Participants 
were asked to classify the stimulus by pressing one of two buttons with their left and 
right index fingers. If shown the “NUMBER” cue, participants were asked to press 
the left button for an odd number and the right button for an even number. If the 
“LETTER” cue was shown, participants were instructed to press the left button for a 
vowel and the right button for a consonant. The response mapping was 
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counterbalanced across participants. Half of the trials were congruent, such that 
participants could respond to either cue by pressing the same button regardless of 
the cue (e.g., 1 a). Half of the responses were incongruent, where participants had to 
respond using different buttons depending on whether the cue was “NUMBER” or 
“LETTER” (e.g., 1 p). Incongruent responses are more difficult than congruent 
responses, and should therefore yield higher switch costs (Kiesel, Wendt, & Peters, 
2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Example of a sequence of events in a trial of Experiment 8. Trial onset 
was indicated by a classification cue which was either “NUMBER” or “LETTER”. 
This was followed by a blank screen and then the target letter-digit combination. The 
target letter-digit combination remained on the screen until participants indicated 
their answers (either a letter classification or a digit classification task) by pressing 
one of the two corresponding keys on the keyboard.  
 
NUMBER 
200 ms 
 
226 ms 
2 a 
Until 
response 
 
950 ms 
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The vowels used consisted of the letters a, e, i, and u, and the consonants 
consisted of p, k, n, and s. The set of even numbers consisted of 2, 4, 6, 8, and the 
set of odd numbers consisted of 3, 5, 7, and 9. The position of the number and letter 
was counterbalanced across participants. The interval between cue offset and 
stimulus onset was 226 ms and the intertrial interval was 950 ms. Participants first 
performed 20 practice trials. They then completed 80 experimental trials, with an 
equal frequency of 1, 2, 3, and 4 same-trial sequences, yielding 40% switch trials 
and 60% repeat trials. A repeat trial was preceded by the same cue (e.g., a 
“NUMBER” trial followed by another “NUMBER” trial), whereas a switch trial was 
preceded by a trial with a different cue (e.g., a “NUMBER” trial followed by a 
“LETTER” trial). The difference in RTs and ERs between repeat and switch trials 
represented switch costs.  
After completing the task-switching paradigm, mood ratings (similar to 
Experiments 3) and the State-Trait-Anxiety-Inventory (Marteau & Bekker, 1992) 
were then administered. Participants also completed the power manipulation check 
(similar to Experiment 3). Finally, participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed, 
and thanked for their participation.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
An independent-samples t-test revealed that powerful participants felt more 
control (M=5.44, SD=2.41) than powerless participants (M=3.39, SD=1.82), 
t(34)=2.89, p=.007, ηp
2
=.20. The manipulation of power was therefore effective. 
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Reaction-Times  
Following (Ophir et al., 2009), trials that were incorrect (1.2% of all 
responses) and trials that were faster than 150 ms or slower than 3,500 ms (2.6% of 
all responses) were excluded. In addition, participants whose ERs were higher than 3 
SDs above the mean were excluded (N=5). Trimmed RTs were then analyzed using 
a 3 (power: powerful, control, powerless) x 2 (trial: repeat, switch) x 2 (congruency: 
congruent, incongruent) mixed ANOVA with power as a between-subjects factor.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Mean RTs for repeat and switch trials as a function of power in 
Experiment 8; error bars represent 1 standard error above and below the mean. 
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This analysis yielded an expected main effect of trial, F(1, 54)=85.8, p<.001, 
ηp
2
=.61. As shown in Figure 4.5, RTs during repeat trials were faster (M=1138.42, 
SD=310.47) than during switch trials (M=1349.24, SD=374.63). This result indicates 
that all participants experienced task-switch interference. No other effects were 
significant. 
Error-Rates 
ERs were then subjected to a 3 (power: powerful, control, powerless) x 2 
(trial: repeat, switch) x 2 (congruency: congruent, incongruent) mixed ANOVA with 
power as a between-subjects factor. This analysis yielded a main effect of trial, F(1, 
54)=8.71, p=.005, ηp
2
=.14, with higher ERs for switch (M=1.44, SD=1.54) 
compared to repeat (M=0.99, SD=1.13) trials. Switching across tasks was therefore 
more costly than repeating the same task. More importantly, there was a significant 
power x trial interaction, F(1, 54)=6.96, p=.002, ηp
2
=.21. As shown in Figure 4.6, 
powerless participants had significantly higher ERs in switch (M=2.12, SD=1.61) 
compared to repeat trials (M=0.87, SD=0.81), F(1, 17)=10.9, p=.004, ηp
2
=.39. For 
control and powerful participants, the difference in ERs between switch 
(Mcontrol=0.90, SDcontrol=0.72, Mpowerful=1.31, SDpowerful=1.10) and repeat trials 
(Mcontrol=1.08, SDcontrol=0.91, Mpowerful=1.01, SDpowerful=0.96) was not significant, 
ps>.2.  
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Figure 4.6: Mean ERs for repeat and switch trials as a function of power in 
Experiment 8; error bars represent 1 standard error above and below the mean. 
 
Furthermore, ERs during repeat trials did not differ significantly between the 
three power conditions, F(2, 54)=0.25, p=.78, ηp
2
=.009. However, this was not the 
case for switch trials, F(2, 54)=4.67, p=.013, ηp
2
=.15. As expected, powerless 
participants had higher ERs for switch trials compared to control and powerful 
participants, ps<.05. Control and powerful participants did not differ from each 
other, p=.30. These results indicate that powerlessness decreased performance when 
participants had to switch between task-sets (i.e., increased switch costs).  
The ANOVA also yielded a significant main effect of congruency, F(1, 
54)=22.2, p<.001, ηp
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compared to incongruent (M=1.28, SD=1.27) trials. There was also a significant 
congruency x trial interaction, F(1, 54)=9.60, p=.003, ηp
2
=.15. For congruent trials, 
ERs did not differ between switch (M=0.85, SD=1.14) and repeat trials (M=0.79, 
SD=1.03), t(56)=0.38, p=.70. However, for incongruent trials, ERs were 
significantly higher for switch (M=2.01, SD=1.93) compared to repeat trials 
(M=0.95, SD=0.99), t(56)=3.32, p=.002. No other effects were significant.  
Overall, the results supported the hypothesis. Powerlessness increased ERs 
associated with switching across different tasks. The fact that having or lacking 
power did not affect RTs but only ERs indicates that there was no speed vs. 
accuracy trade-off in performance. Even though, as Experiments 1-6 demonstrated, 
powerless individuals switched more between tasks compared to powerful 
individuals, switching was particularly taxing for those with low power. None of 
these effects were triggered by mood (α=.90) and state anxiety (α=.89), ps>.1.  
4.4 Experiment 9: Backward inhibition 
The goal of Experiment 9 was to replicate the effects of power on task-
switching performance and to determine if powerless individual’s higher switch 
costs found in Experiment 8 are due to difficulties with inhibiting previously 
relevant information. As was mentioned in the introduction, task-switching 
decrements can result from the inability to disengage from a previous task-set or 
difficulties with engaging in a new task-set, or both (Monsell, 2003). Some propose 
that flexible switching between various task-sets relies on noninhibitory switching 
processes (NISPs), which involve activating the mental representations of, and 
retrieving information relevant to, the demands of the new task and to reconfigure 
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information in WM. Others suggest switch costs result not only from an inability to 
actively maintain a new task-set, but also from an insufficient inhibition or 
deactivation of an old task-set. Therefore in order to allow a faster and smoother 
transition between different tasks, one needs to be able to prevent the previously 
activate task-set from further influencing action by disengaging from, or inhibiting, 
this previous task-set (Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010; Mayr & Keele, 2000; 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Vandierendonck et al., 2010).  
The idea that inhibition is essential in task-switching is supported by findings 
showing how shifting back to a task that has been recently abandoned yields higher 
switch costs compared to shifting to a task-set that has been abandoned earlier on in 
the sequence (Mayr & Keele, 2000). This is because the recently abandoned task 
may not yet be fully recovered from inhibition, whereas more time was available for 
individuals to recover from residual inhibition of a task that was abandoned earlier. 
For example, switching from task B to A in an ABA task sequence will take more 
time than switching to an earlier abandoned task, such as from B to A in a CBA task 
sequence (Mayr & Keele, 2000). The higher performance impairment during ABA 
compared to CBA sequence is known as backward inhibition (BI). BI was taken as 
evidence that extra time and effort are needed to overcome the persisting inhibition 
of a task that was abandoned two trials ago (n – 2) (Mayr & Keele, 2000).  
The current experiment uses a BI task-switching paradigm to assess the effects 
of power on task-switching performance and to investigate whether inhibitory 
processes, NISPs, or both, are impaired by power by measuring how successful 
participants were at inhibiting a previously relevant task-set (Mayr & Keele, 2000; 
Whitmer & Banich, 2007). Participants switched between three different task sets 
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with four different types of trial sequences: repeat trial (AA sequence), BI switch 
trial (ABA sequence), control switch trial (CBA sequence), and unclassified switch 
trial (BBA sequence). If switch cost in powerless participants is due to their inability 
to effectively inhibit prior task-sets, then they should also require fewer resources 
than powerful participants to reactivate and overcome the inhibition during an ABA 
sequence. On the other hand, powerholders do not exhibit high switch costs because 
they are able to quickly and successfully inhibit task-irrelevant information from a 
previous task-set (Guinote, 2007b; Slabu & Guinote, 2010; Smith et al., 2008). 
Successful inhibition may then render it more difficult for powerful participants to 
re-activate the task-set again when it appears immediately after it has been inhibited. 
Based on power’s effect on inhibitory processes (DeWall et al., 2011; Guinote, 
2007b; Smith et al., 2008), it was first predicted that powerless participants will have 
smaller BI effect when reusing those representations than control and powerful 
participants. Second, based on the results of Experiment 8, it was predicated that 
powerless participants will have higher switch costs than control and powerful 
participants, but this difference in switch costs should decrease for ABA sequence 
compared to CBA and BBA sequences. Since power did not decrease switch cost 
when compared to control participants in Experiment 8, then it was predicted that 
powerful participants should display similar effects as control participants. 
Other possible effects of switch costs include arousal level (e.g., energy), 
anxiety, and rumination. For example, the more aroused we are, the more attentional 
resources are available to deal with task-switching. Worrisome thoughts and anxiety 
are also assumed to impair processing efficiency because task-irrelevant thoughts 
and emotional regulation use up attentional resources necessary for current task 
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demands, and leave fewer resources available for task-switching (Whitmer & 
Banich, 2007; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012). Since these factors may also be affected by 
power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003), then 
they could mediate the relationship between power and switch costs and were 
therefore measured in the current study.  
Methods 
Participants and Design 
Eighty-two participants (46 females) were recruited from UCL. Participants 
took part for £3. One participant was excluded from the analysis for not following 
instructions regarding the essay topic. Thus, 81 participants (45 females) were 
included in the final analysis. The average age was 23.4 (SD=5.64). The study was a 
3(power: powerful, control, powerless) x 2(switch: repeat, control switch, backward 
inhibition switch) mixed design, with power as a between-subjects factor. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the power conditions: powerless (N=27), 
control (N=28), and powerful (N=27). 
Materials and Procedure 
Power was manipulated similarly to Experiment 3. Subsequently, 
participants completed the task-switching paradigm on a computer (see Figure 4.7). 
The task-switching, (adapted from Mayr & Keele, 2000), allowed one to measure set 
shifting as well as inhibition of previously relevant information. Each stimulus 
display contained four rectangles arranged into a 2 x 2 matrix. The rectangles varied 
from each other on one of three dimensions: size, motion, or orientation. Shortly 
before the rectangles appeared, a centrally presented cue indicated the dimension 
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that should be used to identify the rectangle that differs from the others. The position 
of the deviant rectangle was randomly selected. Responses were made on keys that 
have the same spatial position on the number pad as the rectangles on the screen 
(i.e., keys “1”, “2”, “4”, and “5”). Participants had 20 practice trials, followed by 
two blocks of experimental trials (each block consisting of 504 trials). For each trial, 
a central cue indicated the relevant dimension was presented for 100 ms before the 
presentation of the stimulus display. Participants had unlimited time to respond. 
After a correct response, a blank screen was presented for 100 ms before the cue for 
the next trial appeared. After an incorrect response, an error sign appeared for 500 
ms before the 100 ms blank screen.  
The experiment contained four types of trials. First were repeat trials, where 
participants focused consecutively on the same dimension (i.e., AA trials). Second 
were BI trials, where the cue on the current trial was different from the cue on the 
immediately preceding trial (n – 1), but was the same as the cue of two trials back (n 
– 2). These trials have an ABA sequence and can be referred to as ABA trials. Third 
were control trials, where the cue was different from the cue on the preceding two 
trials. In addition, the preceding two trials also had to have different cues from each 
other (i.e., CBA trials). Both CBA and ABA trials were preceded by at least two 
task switches; the only difference was that the BI trial required participants to switch 
back to a recently abandoned task, which allowed one to measure the effects of BI. 
Higher ABA switch costs compared to CBA switch costs indicate stronger BI 
effects, as more resources (i.e., time) were required to overcome the recently 
inhibited representation of task A (see Figure 4.8). Lastly, participants also had 
unclassified switch trials, where a switch trial was preceded by a repeat trial (i.e., 
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BBA trials). The cued dimension was pseudo random, with the constraint that CBA 
and ABA trials occurred equally often (22% of the time). AA trials occurred 33% of 
the time. The remaining 23% of trials were BBA trials.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Example of a sequence of events in a trial of Experiment 9. Trial onset 
was indicated by a classification cue which was either “orientation”, “color”, or 
“motion”. This was followed by the target screen, which remained on the screen 
until participants indicated their answers. 
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Figure 4.8: Example of a possible control (CBA) sequence and a possible inhibition 
(ABA) sequence in Experiment 9. Small horizontal or vertical arrows indicate small 
back-and-forth horizontal or vertical movement of the object. The figure does not 
represent the exact scaling of the stimuli.  
 
After the task-switching paradigm, participants completed the power 
manipulation check (similar to Experiment 3) and rated their mood and state anxiety 
(similar to Experiment 8). Arousal level was also measured by asking participants to 
indicate how they felt by placing any number ranging from -10 (corresponding to 
motion Trial N – 2 
orientation Trial N – 1 
size motion Trial N 
Control (CBA) 
Trial 
Inhibition (ABA) 
Trial 
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extreme tiredness, boredom, or fatigue) to +10 (corresponding to extreme alertness, 
hypersensitivity, or excitement) (Dermer & Berscheid, 1972). Questions from the 
worry domain of the Short Stress State Questionnaire were also administered on a 5-
point scale (1 = never, 5 = very often) to assess the extent of task-irrelevant thoughts 
(e.g., I feel concerned about the impression I am making) (Helton, 2004).  
Results 
Manipulation Check 
An independent-samples t-test revealed that powerful participants felt more 
control (M=5.44, SD=2.41) than powerless participants (M=3.39, SD=1.82), 
t(34)=2.89, p=.007, ηp
2
=.20. The manipulation of power was therefore effective. 
Reaction-Times 
In accordance to the methods used by Mayr and Keele (2000), trials in which 
RTs exceeded 3 standard deviations from each participant’s mean RT, incorrect 
trials, and the two trials after each incorrect trial, were excluded from the analysis. 
First, to determine whether power affects task-switching performance, a 3 (power: 
powerless, control, powerful) x 4 (trial: AA, ABA, CBA, BBA) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted on RTs, with repeated measures on the second factor. This analysis, 
yielded a significant main effect of trial F(3, 78)=8.58, p<.001, ηp
2
=.098. As shown 
in Figure 4.9, the RTs on repeat trials (M=976.8, SD=15.7) were faster than the 
average RTs of all three types of switch trials (M=1127, SD=18.0), F(1, 78)=195.6, 
p<.001, ηp
2
=.712. Neither the main effect of power, F(2, 78)=0.425, p=.655, 
ηp
2
=.011, nor the power x trial interaction, F(2, 78)=0.188, p=.829, ηp
2
=.005, were 
significant.  
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Figure 4.9: Mean RTs for repeat trials (AA) and the three types of switch trials 
(ABA, CBA, BBA) as a function of power in Experiment 9; error bars represent 1 
standard error above and below the mean. 
 
To examine how different types of switch trials affected switch costs, further 
analyses were conducted. It was found that all of the three switch trials—ABA 
(M=1181, SD=169), CBA (M=1116, SD=166), and BBA (M=1086, SD=158)—
yielded longer RTs compared to AA trials (M=977, SD=142), Fs(1, 78)>144, 
ps<.001, ηp
2
s>.60. Furthermore, RTs on CBA trials were significantly longer than 
RTs on BBA trials, F(1, 78)=23.9, p<.001, ηp
2
=.235. Lastly, RTs on ABA trials 
were longer than RTs on both CBA and BBA trials Fs(1, 78)>81, ps<.001, ηp
2
s>.5. 
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This replicates the classic BI effect. None of these effects interacted with power, 
Fs(2, 78)>1, ps<.6, ηp
2
<.01.  
Error-Rates 
Participants whose ERs were higher than 3 SDs above the mean were 
excluded (N=3). ERs were then subjected to a 3 (power: powerful, control, 
powerless) x 4 (trial: AA, ABA, CBA, BBA) mixed ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor. Again, there was a significant effect of trial F(3, 
78)=7.82, p<.001, ηp
2
=.091. Neither the main effect of power, F(2, 78)=0.12, p=.88, 
ηp
2
=.003, nor the interaction of trial and power, F(2, 78)=0.41, p=.67, ηp
2
=.010, 
were significant.  
To examine how different types of switch trials affected switch costs, further 
analyses were conducted. It was found that both ABA (M=4.00, SD=4.28) and BBA 
(M=3.39, SD=3.58) trials yielded higher ERs compared to AA trials (M=2.54, 
SD=2.61), Fs(1, 78)>9, ps<.004, ηp
2
s>.10 (see Figure 4.10). However, CBA trials 
(M=2.96, SD=3.60) had only marginally higher ERs than AA trials, F(1, 78)=2.78, 
p=.099, ηp
2
=.034. Furthermore, ERs on ABA trials were higher than ERs on both 
CBA and BBA trials Fs(1, 78)>3, ps<.005, ηp
2
s>.04. This again replicates the 
classic BI effect, as switch costs were higher for inhibitory trials compared to 
control trials. The difference in ERs between BBA and CBA trials was not 
significant, F(1, 78)=2.39, p=.13, ηp
2
=.029.  
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Figure 4.10: Mean ERs for repeat trials (AA) and the three types of switch trials 
(ABA, CBA, BBA) as a function of power in Experiment 10; error bars represent 1 
standard error above and below the mean. 
 
Although the power x trial interaction was not significant for the 3 (power: 
powerful, control, powerless) x 4 (trial: AA, ABA, CBA, BBA) mixed ANOVA, the 
power x trial interaction was marginally significant for the 3 (power: powerless, 
control, powerful) x 2 (trial: ABA, CBA) mixed ANOVA, F(2, 78)=2.55, p=.084, 
ηp
2
=.06. This marginal power x trial interaction indicated that power affected BI. As 
shown in Figure 4.10, higher ERs for ABA (M=4.35, SD=4.35) compared to CBA 
(M=3.08, SD=3.57) trials were significant for powerless F(1, 26)=4.42, p=.045, 
ηp
2
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p=.005, ηp
2
=.255, but was not significant for powerful participants (M=3.33 vs 3.17, 
SD=3.07 vs 4.09), F(1, 25)=0.058, p=.812, ηp
2
=.002.  
Lastly, power did not affect mood (α=.88), state anxiety (α=.93), rumination 
(α=.81), and arousal level, ps>1.  
Discussion 
Experiment 9 showed that overall switch trials were more costly than repeat 
trials in terms of both RTs and ERs. In addition, an overall BI effect was also found 
on RTs and ERs. These results are in line with the predictions and replicate previous 
findings in the task-switching literature (Mayr & Keele, 2000; Monsell, 2003). 
These results also indicate that ABA trials are the most difficult switching sequence 
as it yielded highest ERs and longest RTs. This not surprising as switching during an 
ABA trial involves both inhibition of the current task set plus re-activation of a 
highly inhibited task-set.  
Although the BI effect was replicated in the current study, the pattern was 
opposite to what was predicted with regards to powerless and powerful conditions. 
That is, powerless participants actually showed the BI effect in both ERs and RTs, 
whereas powerful participants only showed the BI effect in RTs and not ERs. Since 
powerless participants showed the BI effect, then the extra resources required for 
ABA indicates that they were able to successfully inhibit irrelevant task-sets during 
task-switching. This suggests that the deficits in task-switching found in Experiment 
8 could be primarily due to deficiencies in executive resources required for NISPs 
(Monsell, 2003). 
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The fact that powerful participants did not display the BI effect in ERs can be 
taken as evidence for decreased inhibitory executive abilities, but it can also indicate 
that they can flexibly and rapidly refocus attention on task-relevant information and 
reactivate recently inhibited information. That is, powerful participants were able to 
successfully employ the inhibition system during task-switching, which is why they 
needed to recruit more resources (i.e., time) during an ABA sequence. The extra 
employment of resources (i.e., longer RTs) was enough for powerful participants to 
overcome the BI effect and decrease the likelihood of making an error. Therefore 
powerful participants do not exhibit the BI effect in terms of ERs. On the other 
hand, powerless and control participants also recruited more resources to overcome 
the BI effect, but having longer RTs were insufficient for decreasing ERs. Therefore 
powerless and control participants exhibited the BI effect in both RTs and ERs. This 
explanation is likely since high power has been generally associated with greater 
attentional flexibility compared to low-power individuals (Guinote, 2007b; Smith et 
al., 2008).  
However, it is important to point out that, contrary to what was predicted and 
found in Experiment 8, power did not affect overall switch cost in the current 
experiment. This inconsistency could be due to the congruency sequence effect 
(CSEs). CSE is the observation that there are smaller costs in performance after 
incongruent, than congruent, trials (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). For example, 
inhibitory performance on a Stroop task can vary depending on the proportion of 
congruent (trials that do not require inhibition) and incongruent trials (trials that 
require inhibition) in a list (Bugg, Jacoby, & Toth, 2008). Performance is usually 
higher for lists with mostly incongruent trials, as compared to lists with equally 
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occurring incongruent and congruent trials, even when the former list requires 
participants to be actively engaged in inhibitory processes.  
According to the conflict monitoring model, CSE occurs because of response 
conflicts (e.g., the need to employ executive control such as inhibition) elicited by 
previous trials (Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). That is, 
prior response conflicts increases one’s attention to task-relevant stimuli in the 
current trial. Moreover, in a context with mostly incongruent trials, participants can 
use frequencies to predict what type of trial is most likely to occur next, and can 
therefore encourage a preparatory, goal-driven control mechanism that is 
implemented in a sustained fashion across all trials (Bugg et al., 2008). This 
proactive control mechanism makes it easier to maintain the inhibition goal at the 
focus of attention. However, a context with equal congruent and incongruent trials 
demands a more flexible control mechanism because of the inability to anticipate the 
upcoming trial type and to prepare control processes accordingly.  
Since powerlessness decreases one’s ability to actively maintain a goal in WM 
and to initiate a goal (Slabu & Guinote, 2010; Smith et al., 2008), a phenomenon 
known as goal neglect, then they should be more susceptible to the CSE. Indeed, it 
has been found that powerlessness decreases one’s ability only in situations when it 
is difficult to maintain the goal within the focus of attention, such as in the absence 
of external cues (Kane & Engle, 2003). In their study, Smith et al. (2008) gave 
participants two types of Stroop tasks. In the no-congruent Stroop task, almost all 
trials were incongruent and hence participants had to employ executive functions on 
the majority of the trials in order to override their prepotent response. This type of 
Stroop task continuously prompts participants to maintain the inhibition goal. On the 
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other hand, the majority-congruent Stroop task is more demanding and relies more 
heavily on attentional control because participants are required to rely on their own 
executive ability of remembering, initiating, and acting on the task goal of inhibiting 
prepotent responses. Powerlessness only decreased inhibition ability in the majority-
congruent Stroop task and not in the no-congruent Stroop task.  
Based on these results and previous literature on CSE and power, the 
inconsistent finding in switch cost may be due to the different attentional and control 
mechanisms that were elicited by the task-switching paradigms used in Experiments 
8 and 9. Since the percentage of switch trials in the current experiment (77%) were 
higher than the percentage of switch trials in Experiment 8 (40%), it is possible that 
it was easier for participants to maintain the goals for all tasks in a state of higher 
readiness. Encountering more switch trials in Experiment 9 might have better 
prepared participants to deal with switching situations and increased attention in 
monitoring response conflicts, such as inhibiting the residual interference from a 
previous task-set. In contrast, it was more difficult to maintain and activate the 
switching goal in Experiment 8, as there were lower percentages of switch trials. It 
is therefore possible that powerless participants could have exhibited inhibitory 
deficits associated with task-switching during Experiment 8.  
In sum, the current experiment showed that there was no effect of power on 
overall switch cost and powerless participants exhibited the BI effect. This suggests 
that, at least in the context of the current task-switching paradigm, powerless 
participants were able to successfully inhibit irrelevant task-sets. The inconsistent 
effect of power on switch costs from Experiment 8 and 9 indicate that, similar to 
what was found before regarding inhibitory deficits using the Stroop paradigm 
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(Smith et al., 2008),  powerless participant’s task-switching abilities may be highly 
context dependent, such as on the proportion of switch trials. Future studies could 
test for this possibility by systematically varying the percentage and type of switch 
trials per block.  
4.5 Experiment 10: Self-reported multitasking ability 
Thus far the studies only examined power relations temporarily induced in the 
laboratory, and mostly with university students. It has not yet investigated how 
existing, real-life power roles affect performance in multitasking situations 
encountered outside the laboratory. Moreover, since students have little experience 
of power, it is important to test the ecological validity of the previous findings. The 
aim of Experiment 10 was to find further support for the claim that powerlessness 
decreases the ability to multitask, and also to provide evidence for the ecological 
validity of this hypothesis. Moreover, Experiments 7-9 focused on actual 
multitasking ability, whereas the current experiment investigated whether power 
affects perceived ability to multitask. This is important as actual multitasking 
performance may not always relate to self-conceptions of multitasking ability since 
in certain behavioral domains, beliefs about the self have been found to be only 
weakly correlated with actual abilities and traits  (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004).  
Self-reported multitasking ability was measured using the Attentional-Control-
Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 2002) and two subscales (goal planning and 
implementing) of the Self-Regulation-Questionnaire (SRQ; Brown, Miller, & 
Lawendowski, 1999). The ACS measured an individual’s ability to focus and shift 
attention between various tasks. The SRQ measured the ability to plan, implement, 
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and maintain behavior when faced with multiple demands. Participants held actual 
powerful (manager) and powerless (employee) roles in organizations. Managers had 
specific institutional power over many people’s outcomes in the workplace. It was 
predicted that individuals in a subordinate, compared to a managerial, position will 
report lower multitasking ability as they have lower WM resources available for 
controlling attention in demanding multitasking situations.  
Methods 
Participants and Design 
Forty-nine full-time employees (23 managers and 26 subordinates) 
participated voluntarily in this experiment. Managers (five females) worked in a 
variety of businesses (e.g., banking, technology, education). All managers had 
subordinates under their supervision. Eleven managers (48%) occupied middle 
management positions, and 12 (52%) occupied top management positions. Thirteen 
percent had five or fewer subordinates, 39% had 5 to 25 subordinates, and 48% were 
in charge of more than 25 subordinates. Managers were aged between 26 and 54 
years (M=42.7, SD=8.14). All employees were in subordinate positions (13 females) 
and worked under the supervision of one or more managers. Most subordinates 
(75%) were office workers in clerical positions (e.g., advisors, administrators, 
assistants). The subordinates were between 19 and 56 years old (M=32.2, SD=9.03), 
and none of them had personnel responsibilities. This experiment was a between 
subjects design with two different power conditions (managers vs. subordinates).  
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Materials and Procedure 
Participant’s self-reported multitasking ability was measured using the ACS 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002) and the SRQ (Brown et al., 1999). The ACS contains 20 
items measuring one’s ability to focus attention when faced with distracting 
opportunities to multitask (e.g., It’s very easy for me to concentrate on a difficult 
task when there are noises around), one’s ability to shift attention between different 
tasks (e.g., I can quickly shift from one task to another), and one’s ability to balance 
attention during dual-tasking (e.g., It is easy for me to read or write while I’m also 
talking on the phone).  
Two subscales of the SRQ were also administered. These subscales consist 
of 17 items measuring one’s ability to make plans and decisions when faced with 
multiple demands (e.g., I can easily make up my mind about things) and one’s 
ability to implement plans (e.g., I have so many plans that it’s hard for me to focus 
on any one of them, reverse coded). Participants rated their responses on scales 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Participants were thanked 
for their participation at the end of the questionnaire. 
Results and Discussion  
The results of the ACS and the two subscales of the SRQ were averaged into 
one score (α=.91). To ensure that differences in age and gender across managers and 
subordinates did not account for the effects of power, these factors were included in 
the analyses. Gender did not affect ACS and SRQ, p>.3, therefore this factor was not 
considered in further analyses. An ANCOVA was then conducted on the averaged 
ACS-SRQ scores, with power (subordinate vs. manager) as a between subjects 
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factor, and age as a covariate. This analysis yielded a significant effect of power 
F(1, 46)=13.59, p=.001, ηp
2
=.23. As predicted, the self-reported ability to control 
attention during multitasking and to deal with the difficulties of planning and 
implementing plans when faced with multiple goals was lower in subordinates 
(M=3.30, SD=0.41) compared to managers (M=3.88, SD=0.40). No other effects 
were significant.  
 In sum, being in a naturally occurring subordinate (vs. managerial) decreased 
reported ability to self-regulate during the pursuit of multiple goals. Subordinates 
reported lower ability than managers in various multitasking domains, including 
balancing attention between multiple goals and implementing multiple tasks and 
plans. One possible alternative explanation for the lower ability reported by 
subordinates is that managers were less likely to admit that they have problems with 
multitasking. This is likely as multitasking ability is an important and desirable 
ability to possess and it has also been suggested that these estimations of personal 
abilities are not correlated with actual multitasking ability (Sanbomatsu et al., 2013). 
In addition, one may argue that individuals who ultimately achieve senior levels of 
management differ in their abilities and motivations from those who do not.  
Therefore pure reliance on self-reports limits the conclusions that can be 
drawn. However, differences observed here were also found in Experiments 7-9, 
where actual multitasking ability was measured and power was randomly assigned 
to participants. Taken together, these results indicate that lower reported abilities by 
subordinates (vs. managers) were not due to biased sampling or reporting, but may 
reflect a direct effect of real-life power on actual multitasking ability. Experiment 10 
also showed that powerless participants’ multitasking tendency found in 
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Experiments 1-6 were not influenced by their perceptions of their ability to 
multitask. That is, even though powerless individuals realize their multitasking 
deficiency, they still displayed a higher multitasking tendency.  
4.6 Summary and conclusions 
The current chapter predicted and found that powerless individuals have lower 
actual and self-reported multitasking ability in demanding situations compared to 
control and powerful participants. This difference in multitasking ability was found 
using both experimentally manipulated power as well as naturally occurring power 
structures. Although decision theories suggest that people should multitask when 
they are good at it and expect to benefit from it (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1981; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990), but these results showed that 
multitasking behavior may not be contingent on (actual as well as perceived) 
multitasking ability and the associated consequences and outcomes. However, it is 
important for future research to consider paradigms other than the ones used in order 
to assess the generalizations of the findings, especially to situations that require high 
goal-monitoring.  
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Chapter 5:  
General Discussion 
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5.1 Overview of findings 
5.1.1 Multitasking Intention and Behavior  
The current thesis addressed the research questions of whether social power, 
which is highly malleable and easily manipulated across various contexts, can 
impact the way individuals pursue multiple goals and whether it influences 
performance during multitasking. The first empirical part of the thesis (Chapters 2 
and 3) provided an initial examination of how social power affects the strategies that 
individuals engage in when pursuing multiple goals. It was hypothesized that 
reduced power should generate more interruptions and a preparedness to multitask 
because powerlessness is associated with vigilance and attention to multiple sources 
of information (Fiske, 1993; Guinote, 2007b; Keltner et al., 2003). Thereby, 
powerless individuals have less clear priorities and should be more likely to pursue 
multiple goals either simultaneously or with frequent switches between the various 
tasks. In contrast, given that high power is associated with attentional focus and 
prioritization (Guinote, 2007a, 2007b), then high power should trigger a single-
tasking mindset, with effort and behavior geared towards the pursuit of one goal at a 
time.  
These predictions were supported in Experiments 1-6. Power was found to 
have an effect on the pursuit of multiple goals as powerless participants have a 
higher multitasking intention during the preactional phase of goal pursuit, as well as 
a higher multitasking behavior during the actional phase of goal pursuit. In contrast, 
powerful participants were more likely to single-task. Control participants were in 
between these two groups. This pertained to both self-reported multitasking 
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tendency (Experiments 1 and 3), planning between different tasks (Experiments 2 
and 3), as well as actual behaviors across multiple tasks (Experiments 4 and 5). The 
current thesis also looked at whether power affects individuals’ prioritization of a 
single goal when given multiple different goals to pursue (Experiments 4-6). It was 
found that low power decreases, whereas high power increases, prioritization in the 
context of multiple-goal pursuit. Prioritization tendency mediated the relationship 
between power and multitasking behavior (Experiments 4 and 5).  
Although powerholders were more likely to prioritize a single goal and to 
engage in monochronic (vs. polychronic) behaviors than powerless participants, but 
this tendency did not affect the number of tasks that participants chose to pursue 
during the predecisional phase of goal pursuit (Experiment 6). Instead, powerholders 
were actually more likely to take on an additional goal compared to powerless and 
control participants. This is in line with previous studies showing how high power 
increases one’s tendency to approach goals and to seize all opportunities for goal 
pursuit (Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007c; Keltner et al., 2003), and highlights 
the idea that power only affects the strategies employed to pursue multiple goals but 
does not decrease the aspiration to achieve multiple goals. This behavior can be 
beneficial for powerholders as forgoing goal opportunities may make its attainment 
less likely in the future. Especially if the second goal is important, emerging 
problems for its attainment need to be registered and taken into account instead of 
only focusing attention on a single task.  
The current thesis also addressed the moderating role of goal orientation 
(Experiment 3) and goal difficulty (Experiment 5). Goal orientation was found to 
affect multitasking tendency in powerful individuals, as they were more likely to 
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switch to an additional task if it was framed as a prevention-focused goal (where 
switching prevents negative loses) compared to when the consequence was 
unspecified. Moreover, Experiment 5 provided strong evidence for the link between 
powerlessness and multitasking behavior by manipulating task difficulty. In this 
experiment, the difficult goal was generally avoided by control and powerful 
participants, but not by powerless individuals, who continued to switch equally 
between the difficult and easy goals. Therefore, regardless of the task type, 
powerless individuals still switched to it, which reflected a strong preference for 
multitasking behavior.  
Lastly, powerless participants had higher confidence levels compared to 
control and powerful participants (Experiments 4 and 6), and also had higher 
differences in confidence between two goals (Experiment 6). Although the increased 
confidence level of powerless participants is inconsistent with past literature (Min & 
Kim, 2013; Morrison et al., 2011) , but, as mentioned earlier in the thesis, providing 
participants with choices in the context of multiple-goal pursuit may increase 
confidence levels in powerless individuals (Ariely & Norton, 2008; Leotti et al., 
2010). Interestingly, the link between power and prioritization in the context of 
multiple-goal pursuit was mediated by confidence levels as well as the difference in 
confidence between the two goals (Experiment 6). That is, powerless participants 
had higher overall confidence and viewed their abilities to be equal in both goals, 
which decreased the likelihood of prioritization. On the other hand, powerful 
participants had less confidence in their ability to pursue both goals and had higher 
confidence in one goal compared to the other, which enhanced prioritization. This 
mediation is in line with previous studies showing how individuals are more likely 
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to multitask when they have inflated views of their abilities (Sanbonmatsu et al., 
2013; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007), and when they have relatively similar levels of 
self-efficacy across the various tasks (Ashford & Northcraft, 2003). Prioritization 
can ensure that powerholders will successfully complete at least one of the goals, 
which is a common approach when confidence and goal expectation are low. 
However, in Experiment 4, confidence levels did not mediate the relationship 
between power and prioritization, and the relationship between power and 
multitasking behavior. Therefore more research is needed to understand the 
mediating effect of confidence between power, prioritization, and multitasking. 
Together, converging evidence from different measurements of multitasking 
tendency (i.e., self-reports, planning, and actual behaviors) and power manipulations 
(i.e., individual differences, priming, and hierarchical role assignment) from 
Experiments 1-6 provided compelling evidence of a general negative relationship 
between power and multitasking tendency. The negative relationship between power 
and multitasking tendency is in line the hypotheses and with past studies, which 
were based on the idea that powerless individuals process more information and are 
more attentionally defocused, and processing more information can increase 
multitasking. For example, previous theories (Fiske, 1993; Guinote, 2007a; Keltner 
et al., 2003) and empirical findings of power (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; 
Goodwin et al., 2000; Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Guinote, 2007c, 2008; Neuberg & 
Fiske, 1987; Overbeck & Park, 2006; Slabu & Guinote, 2010; Weick & Guinote, 
2010) support the idea that powerless individuals operate under a divided attention 
and treat all information as equally important regardless of their relevancy. This is 
because low-power individuals are either unwilling (due to motivational factors) or 
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unable (due to attentional control abilities) to inhibit irrelevant information in favor 
of goal-relevant information. On the other hand, powerholders are more attentionally 
focused on their current goal, and prioritize information that can help them achieve 
that particular goal and ignore distracting information that may impede goal pursuit.  
The current findings also coincide with past research on multitasking, which 
showed how individuals were more likely to multitask in highly volatile and 
unpredictable situations because they need to be vigilant and pay attention to 
external factors (Kernan & Lord, 1990; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). Moreover, 
decreased inhibitory ability and increased distractibility, factors that are associated 
with powerlessness, predicted multitasking tendency in previous studies as well 
(Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Ophir et al., 2009; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2013; Shah et al., 
2002).  
5.1.2 Multitasking Ability 
The paradigms used in thus far in the thesis were designed to only measure 
multitasking tendency and not to investigate multitasking ability. It is therefore 
possible that power does not affect performance on relatively simple tasks that were 
used in Experiments 4 (ERs: M=0.014, SD=0.017) and 5 (ERs: M = 0.016, SD = 
0.023), but will have an effect on tasks that are more attentionally demanding. In 
order to address the second aim of the thesis, multitasking ability was assessed 
directly in Chapter 5 by using dual-tasking (Experiment 7) and task-switching 
paradigms (Experiments 8 and 9) that were designed to measure multitasking ability.  
It was hypothesized that powerless individuals should have less WM 
capacity available compared to their control and powerful counterparts, which 
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should translate to poorer multitasking ability. Consistent with the hypothesis, 
powerless participants’ dual-task costs were greater compared to control and 
powerful participants, suggesting that they had less WM capacity and less ability to 
manage multiple tasks in parallel (Experiment 7). Likewise, switching between two 
different task-sets also incurred higher switch costs for powerless than control and 
powerful participants (Experiment 8). Finally, using a sample of real-life managers 
and subordinates and self-reported multitasking ability, Experiment 10 provided 
ecologically valid support for the hypothesis that powerlessness impairs 
multitasking ability. However, the extent to which power affects multitasking ability 
may be dependent on the context, such as whether or not it encourages or prevents 
goal neglect (Experiment 9). This is similar to the finding by Smith et al. (2008), 
who showed that powerlessness decreases inhibition ability, but only in no-
congruent as opposed to majority-congruent Stroop trials. Therefore deficits of 
powerlessness may only be manifested in contexts where there is a high likelihood 
for goal neglect.  
It is also important to note that sex did not moderate any of the effects, as the 
relationships between power and multitasking were equally strong for men and 
women. This goes against some studies suggesting that women are more likely to 
multitask than men (Schneider & Waite, 2005), and the assumption that women are 
superior multitaskers (Fisher, 1999; O’Connell, 2002). However, limited studies 
examining gender differences in multitasking tendency have been inconsistent 
(Buser & Peter, 2012; Foehr, 2006), and research suggests that multitasking ability 
is more likely to be associated with executive control than inherent gender 
differences (Ren et al., 2009; Strayer, Medeiros-Ward, & Watson, 2013). Moreover, 
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these consistent effects of power on multitasking across both genders might seem 
surprising, as men have been shown to be more ‘power-oriented’ than women in 
various ways. For example, men show a stronger preference for hierarchical 
relations (Pratto, Stallworth, & Sidanius, 1997), perceive relationships as more 
hierarchically organized (Mast & Hall, 2004), and are more likely to assume 
leadership positions (Johnson, Eagly, Karau, & Miner, 1994). However, the findings 
are consistent with previous work that has found men and women to be similarly 
affected by possessing power (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky et al., 
2003). Thus, in spite of the fact that men and women have traditionally differed in 
their power experiences on a societal level, but they are similarly affected by the 
possession and feeling of power.  
In sum, these findings demonstrated that those in high-power positions 
choose to single-task whereas powerless individuals prefer to multitask, even though 
they have lower multitasking ability. These findings are consistent with the 
hypotheses, as well as with previous research on power and single-goal pursuit and 
theoretical propositions that powerlessness is associated with multiple constraints. 
The next section will discuss the possible mechanisms for these results in more 
detail. Theoretical as well as practical implications of the findings for research on 
social power and on multiple-goal pursuit will then be presented. Lastly, the 
limitations of the empirical studies both with regard to the power manipulations 
implemented and the measures of multitasking tendency and performance will be 
discussed. The discussion will conclude with prospects for possible future directions 
of the current research.  
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5.2 Possible Mechanisms 
A critical question concerns the underlying mechanisms through which 
hierarchical interpersonal relationships affect multitasking tendency and ability. One 
possibility is via attentional focus and information seeking tendencies. First, as 
argued in the Introduction (Chapter 1), powerlessness might increase multitasking 
because it creates a threatening and unpredictable environment and leads people to 
attend more to potential dangers and additional information, goals, and concerns (De 
Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Fiske, 1993; Guinote, 2007a; Keltner et al., 2003). This 
alters the amount of information that individuals are willing and able to inhibit. The 
proposed mechanism was supported by the finding that spontaneous prioritization 
mediated the relationship between power and number of switches made (i.e., 
multitasking behavior; Experiments 4 and 5). Since prioritization indicates a 
cognitive orientation associated with greater attentional focus (Ophir et al., 2009; 
Guinote, 2007a; Shah et al., 2002), then this mediation supports the idea that 
multitasking tendency relies on the effect of power on information processing styles.  
The current thesis also proposes that the effect of power on multitasking 
tendency and ability is initially voluntary and caused by a motivation to seek more 
information. This motivational account is supported by the fact that powerless 
individuals voluntarily attend to multiple information, even when attentional 
demands are low and WM capacity is not compromised (Fiske, 1993; Guinote, 
2007c; Weick & Guinote, 2010). For example, when participants read simple traits 
of a target person at their own pace, those without power carefully read all 
information provided. In contrast, powerful participants focused more on some traits 
whilst disregarding others (Fiske, 1993). This effect is also consistent with the 
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observation that across primate species, subordinates are motivated to pay more 
attentions of their superiors and to encode more information compared to their 
dominant counterparts (see Fiske, 1993; Shepherd et al., 2006). 
Powerless participants are also more willing to attend to possible challenges 
and threats in the environment (Keltner et al., 2003). For instance, prior to making a 
decision, powerless individuals seek more information in order to weigh the 
different opportunities for action, such as the opinions of other people (Galinsky, 
Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). On the other hand, powerholders 
disregard other information and only focus on rewards. It has been consistently 
found across various studies that powerful people attend to information more 
selectively, inhibit peripheral information and vary their attentional focus as a 
function of the demands of the situation (Guinote, 2007a; Guinote et al., 2012; Slabu 
& Guinote, 2010). They may therefore be focused on a single task and do not want, 
or see the need to, attempt other ones. 
As a consequence, powerless individuals might by default be drawn to 
multiple goals and concerns, whereas the tendency for powerholders to single-task is 
consistent with their motivation to focus attention more narrowly across various 
domains. Such behaviors are motivational in nature (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990; Goodwin & Fiske, 1996), and do not seem to derive from reduced WM 
capacity. Furthermore, this conjecture is indirectly supported by the finding in the 
present thesis, because the tasks used to measure multitasking behavior were 
relatively simple and do not require WM capacity (Experiments 2-5). Yet even in 
these conditions, powerless participants still switched more between the tasks than 
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control and powerful participants, which supports the assumption that power creates 
a motivational force towards multitasking intention and behavior.  
Furthermore, if powerless individuals worry more and are vigilant to external 
cues and information in order to detect potential threats and to increase stability and 
control (Fiske, 1993; Guinote, 2007a; Keltner et al., 2003), then they should be 
operating under a divided attention and are motivated to treat all inputs as equally 
important. Processing excessive information exhausts WM capacity, which 
diminishes one’s ability to willfully allocate attention between various demands and 
thus affecting multitasking ability. In contrast, living in a resource-abundant and 
constraint-free environment assures security and control, which can then allow 
powerholders to selectively focus their attention and to inhibit distractors (i.e., to 
prioritize relevant information). Remaining cognitive resources can then be 
employed to control attention in demanding multitasking situations.  
Although high multitasking tendency and low multitasking ability in 
powerless individuals may depend initially on the states and needs of the performer 
and the corresponding attentional and prioritization strategies that they voluntarily 
choose to adopt, but this relationship can be bidirectional. This is because WM 
capacity is necessary for keeping priorities, coordinating information, and 
decreasing interference from competing tasks (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; de Fockert et 
al., 2001; Kane & Engle, 2003; Ophir et al., 2009). Therefore decreasing WM 
capacity by being motivated to divide attention and exhibit a multitasking mindset 
can render powerless individuals even more distractible and susceptible to 
competing external stimuli or internal thoughts, and contribute to further reductions 
in WM capacity (for similar issues in the domain of mind-wandering see Smallwood 
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& Schooler, 2006). As shown in Figure 5.1, cognitive deficits in powerless 
individuals may be responsible for further development as well as maintenance of 
multitasking tendency in the future. Thus powerless individuals may also be less 
able (instead of only less willing) than powerful individuals in focusing on a single 
goal and to block out additional tasks and pursuits. On the other hand, having a 
focused attention may promote a productive cycle of social power. Those high in 
power have higher prioritization and attentional focus than the powerless, which can 
generate a focused attention and a single-tasking mindset. Having an initially 
focused behavior may in turn enhance single-tasking even more by encouraging 
better attentional control over time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poor performance on single and multiple tasks 
Poor attentional focus 
Less WM resources 
Multitasking Tendency 
Multitasking Mind-set 
Figure 5.1: Relationship between power, attention, and multitasking. 
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This bidirectional interpretation is consistent with previous proposals that 
once people multitask, fractured thinking can persist even when they are no longer 
multitasking, which can lead to increasingly higher distractibility and lack of focus 
(Ophir et al., 2009). It may also explain why the tendency to multitask has little 
relation to multitasking performance (Konig et al., 2005; Ophir et al., 2009). For 
example, previous researchers have suggested that chronic exposure to multitasking 
may lead to a broadening of attentional filters and lowers the level of executive 
control (Ophir et al., 2009). It may also explain the somewhat counterintuitive 
results of the current thesis, as powerless individuals, who lack the necessary 
executive control resources to perform multiple tasks effectively, are also more apt 
to multitask than powerful people with abundant resources. However, currently there 
lacks direct empirical evidence for this possible vicious cycle where the multitasking 
mindset of powerless individuals and the single-tasking mindset of powerful 
individuals are reinforced. Hence future studies could investigate whether WM 
capacity or attentional control mediates the relationship between power and 
multitasking tendency.   
In sum, the current thesis proposed that powerless individual’s multitasking 
tendency is primarily motivational and linked to the needs and multiple demands 
faced by these individuals. Vigilance and attention allocation to multiple demands 
can also instill a multitasking mindset, which in turn consumes WM resources and 
decreases attentional focus and multitasking ability. Since the reverse relationship is 
also possible, then powerless individuals’ reduced WM capacity and inability to 
focus attention could further enhance multitasking behavior, despite the potential 
losses of doing so. Unfortunately, it is still unclear what causes increased motivation 
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to treat all tasks as equally important (vs. prioritizing a single task). In order to 
deepen our understanding of the relationship between power and multiple goals, 
further research will need to elucidate the mechanisms underlying the present 
findings. This can be done by investigating additional factors (e.g., worrying 
thoughts and concerns, vigilance, or need for control and predictability) that can 
mediate the relationship between power, WM capacity, and multitasking tendency.   
5.3 Implications of the Present Results 
5.3.1 Theoretical Implications 
The current thesis integrated two literature domains, the research on social 
power and on goal pursuit, which results in potential contributions to both of these 
areas. It will first discuss the important implications for the literature on social 
power, attention, and behavior. Specifically, the findings speak for the divided 
attention strategies of powerless individuals (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003) and 
the selective attention and prioritization of relevant information in powerful 
individuals that were proposed by the SFTP (Guinote, 2007a). Previously, support 
for the theory that power increases prioritization came from literatures on person 
perception, decision making, and single-goal pursuit. For example, in past studies, 
powerless participants voluntarily attended to multiple attributes in a person, as 
opposed to selectively attending to only salient, stereotypic (Fiske, 1993; Guinote & 
Phillips, 2010), or goal-relevant (Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Gruenfeld, 1995; Overbeck 
& Park, 2001, 2006; Vescio et al., 2003) attributes. Moreover, indirect empirical 
support for the SFTP came from the context of single-goal pursuit, where powerful, 
compared to powerless, individuals had higher attentional focus when pursuing a 
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single goal (Guinote, 2007b; Smith et al., 2008), had higher accessibility of goal-
relevant information (Slabu & Guinote, 2010), and displayed more focal goal-
directed behaviors upon encountering distracting action opportunities (Guinote, 
2008). In contrast to prioritizing a focal goal, powerless individuals treated all goals 
and tasks as equally important were more likely to consider distracting alternatives 
for action and to incorporate these new opportunities into their plans (Guinote, 
2007c; Guinote, 2008; Overbeck & Park, 2001; Overbeck & Park, 2006; Vescio et 
al., 2003).  
Thus support for the SFPT has been previously found by showing attentional 
focus and prioritization in powerhodlers in the context of social perception and 
single-goal pursuit. Here it showed, for the first time, that power leads to greater 
attentional focus and prioritization even when participants were given the 
opportunity to divide their attention between multiple tasks in the environment. This 
is an important extension from previous studies because in the domain of single-goal 
pursuit, only one task or goal was assigned or activated in a particular situation and 
all other tasks were considered irrelevant or were distractors that can impede goal 
pursuit. However, in the context of multiple-goal pursuit, there are a number of 
goals to obtain and tasks to work on, all of which are potentially relevant and 
important. These findings can therefore advance previous theories of power and 
provide direct support for the SFTP (Guinote, 2007a). That is, even in situations 
where all tasks are relevant, powerful, compared to powerless, participants were still 
more likely to spontaneously prioritize only one of the tasks and to approach 
multiple potential goals by single-tasking. It suggests that powerholders not only 
neglect information that is irrelevant to the current context, but they also choose to 
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momentarily inhibit multiple goals so that they are constantly prioritizing and 
focusing on a single task.  
On the other hand, the defocused attention that powerless individuals 
exhibited during single-goal pursuit also translates to multitasking behavior, as 
powerless individuals were more likely to multitask than single-task. Therefore the 
current thesis can extend previous research on power and goal pursuit, and confirm 
the idea that powerless participants are more inclined to attend to multiple sources of 
information. Moreover, the current work allows one to look at the implications of 
the SFTP in more ecologically valid situations of pursuing multiple goals. Together 
with findings in the domains of social perception, decision making, and single-goal 
pursuit, the present research unravels a deep rooted tendency of powerless 
individuals to dilute priorities and to activate divided mindsets, intentions, and 
behaviors between multiple sources of information and action opportunities.  
In addition, past studies suggest that individuals with strong approach 
orientation to rewards or gains may be especially enticed to multitasking because of 
the high potential for rewarding outcomes (König, Oberacher, & Kleinmann, 2010; 
Sanbomatsu et al., 2013). In contrast, people who are avoidance oriented, that is, 
those that are risk averse and sensitive to losses or punishments, may be more 
inclined to focus on a single task, rather than on multiple tasks because of the higher 
potential losses associated with trying to do more in a short period of time. Since 
powerholders were less likely to multitask than powerless individuals, then these 
results suggest that high power may not always promote approach-related behaviors 
(Keltner et al., 2003). Instead, the current thesis suggests that approach-related 
behaviors exhibited by powerholders may be a consequence of their focused 
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attention and tendency to prioritize their goals. That is, whether or not powerholders 
exhibit approach-related behaviors depends on situational factors. Under 
multitasking situations, powerholders were less likely to multitask, even though 
multitasking generally entails greater potential rewards than single-tasking. 
Therefore powerholders are not always oriented towards attaining greater rewards, 
but their behaviors are guided more by their tendency to prioritize and focus 
attention on a single source. Similarly, powerless individuals, who live in more 
dangerous environments, usually act in a more inhibited and cautious manner such 
as taking longer to deliberate (Guinote, 2007c; Keltner et al., 2003). However, their 
divided attention and mindset can lead to harmful behaviors that can yield greater 
losses, such as through multitasking.  
The effect of power on multitasking tendency also expands our knowledge 
about the links between power and goal pursuit. That is, how power influences 
single-goal pursuit may be affected by the way individuals pursue multiple goals 
(see Figure 5.1). It was previously found that powerless individuals take longer to 
act (Galinsky et al., 2003), take longer to set goals and to initiate goal pursuit, are 
less flexible, cannot easily maintain goal-directed behavior (DeWall et al., 2011; 
Guinote, 2007c, 2008), and have decreased goal-accessibility (Slabu & Guinote, 
2010). The current research suggests that these impairments in single-goal pursuit 
may, in part, derive from a readiness to multitask. This is because even when 
background goals are not visible to the observer (see Shah & Kruglanski, 2002) and 
participants are not visibly multitasking, the multitasking mindset of powerless 
individuals could still be harmful. Therefore having a multitasking mindset may be 
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the reason why low-power individuals are less capable than high-power individuals 
at keeping the primary goal at the focus of their attention. 
This interpretation is in line with Kruglanski et al.’s (2002) theory of goal 
systems, which suggest that active goals in memory can compete for limited 
attentional resources. Since goals do not exist in isolation, and the pursuit of a single 
goal is usually embedded within a number of competing demands, then being highly 
concerned with multiple goals and tasks can affect performance and commitment to 
a focal task (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002). Even when powerless individuals are only 
assigned one task to complete, but having a multitasking mindset decreases their 
ability to shield additional goals from interfering with performance on the focal 
goal. In addition, decisions made in conflictual situations are characterized by 
inconsistent behavioral intentions and take longer due to the negotiation process 
between the various goals (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). Goal conflict 
also induce people to set lower goals (Locke, Smith, & Erez, 1994) and cause 
pressure, which can be negatively related to productivity (Locke et al., 1994). If one 
goal is viewed as less important than the other (i.e., when one goal is prioritized), 
then the conflict should be less than when both outcomes are highly valued (Ilgen & 
Hollenbeck, 1991). Consequently, the multiple concerns and goals that powerless 
individuals have may also create higher goal conflicts, which explains their tendency 
to deliberate and delay decisions. Therefore constant high activations of multiple 
goals and concerns can explain why powerless participants exhibit lower 
performance on single-goal pursuit compared to powerful individuals, such as 
shorter persistence time and longer deliberations (Guinote, 2007c). The current 
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thesis suggests that, in order to understand performance on single goals, it is 
essential to take into account the broader context of an individual’s multiple goals.  
An additional implication of the present results is to help understand the 
effects of power on cognitive processes by revealing how powerlessness decreases 
the amount of WM capacity required for successful executive control during 
demanding multitasking situations. These findings are in line with previous studies 
showing how powerless, compared to control and powerful, participants are more 
vigilant and process excessive amounts of information (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 
2003). They can also potentially explain why powerless individuals were found to 
have lower executive function abilities in the context of single-goal pursuit 
compared to powerful individuals (DeWall et al., 2011; Guinote, 2007b; Smith et 
al., 2008). That is, the result of Experiment 7 shows that powerlessness may 
decrease WM capacity, which is essential for minimizing distractions and goal 
conflicts (Baddeley, 1996; de Fockert et al., 2001; Eysenck et al., 2005; Mitchell et 
al., 2002; Roberts et al., 1994). For example, when WM is reduced through a WM 
load exercise, people are less able to inhibit prepotent responses (Mitchell et al., 
2002). Therefore decreased WM capacity in powerless individuals could be the 
umbrella factor responsible for poor executive functions related to both single-goal 
pursuit (Guinote, 2007c; Smith et al., 2008) and multiple-goal pursuit (Experiments 
7, 8, and 10). Moreover, the fact that only powerlessness decreased, whereas 
possessing power did not increase, WM capacity and multitasking ability suggests 
that it is more likely for low power to tax WM capacity than for high power to 
improve WM capacity above baseline. This is in line with previous studies showing 
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deficits of executive functions for powerless participants, but not improvements of 
executive functions for powerful participants (e.g., Smith et al., 2008).  
The link between power and multitasking tendency also adds to the literature 
of multiple-goal pursuit, as previous research in this area (e.g., Bendoly, Swink, & 
Simpson, 2013; Payne, Duggan, & Neth, 2007; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007) did not 
focus on social factors as determinants of multitasking tendency. By manipulating 
social power, the current thesis shows how the extent to which people can control 
resources and outcomes can actually cause higher multitasking tendency, and 
complements previous correlational predictors of multitasking behavior (Cain & 
Mitroff, 2011; Ophir et al., 2009; Sanbomatsu et al., 2013). Lastly, the present thesis 
developed novel paradigms to study how individuals approach multiple goals (i.e., 
planning tasks used in Experiments 2 and 3 and switching tasks used in Experiments 
4 and 5), and can be adapted in future research interested in multitasking intention 
and behavior.  
5.3.2 Practical implications  
The present findings have significant applied values as they point out that 
powerlessness not only decreases cognitive performance, but also affects the 
decisions that people make in approaching multiple tasks. This can provide practical 
implications for interventions and procedures that may be implemented in work 
environments to improve performance as well as health and safety. Understanding 
these issues will be extremely beneficial as we live in a world of multiple and 
competing demands where the pace of life and work are increasing and growing 
ever more complex (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998). Moreover, due to implementation 
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of technology and many other changes in the workplace such as job enrichment, 
competition, and faster deadlines, multitasking has now become an important 
component of job performance for many workers (Lindbeck & Snower, 2000). 
These new trends encourage polychornic behaviors, as they demand handling 
different tasks, activities, and roles simultaneously. However, when two goals are 
equally important and conflicting, pressure and performance decrements might 
ensue (Junco & Cotten, 2011; Locke, Smith, & Erez, 1994).  
Since power could predict resource allocation (time on task) between two 
goals, then employees with less social power may be constantly engaging in 
multiple tasks. This not only decreases performance and leads to poor work 
outcomes, but it can put employees under pressure as well and induce stress 
(Appelbaum et al., 2008). In the long-term, the relationship between powerlessness 
and multitasking tendency may lead to significant adverse effects on well-being and 
general quality of life. Feeling powerless may also have significant implications for 
personal safety by putting individuals at risk in situations where multitasking can be 
dangerous, such as driving and speaking on the cell phone (Strayer et al., 2011). For 
example, driving performance is significantly degraded by cell phone conversations, 
and it has been estimated that a minimum of 24% of all accidents and fatalities on 
U.S. highways are caused by distracted drivers. Moreover, studies have found that 
polychronicity relates negatively with job performance (Benabou, 1999; Conte & 
Jacobs, 2003). Knowing that employees with less power tend to multitask, then 
assigning projects in a sequential manner could minimize the side-effects of 
multitasking.  
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Another issue to consider is that individuals who prefer to work on multiple 
tasks simultaneously may enjoy the experience of multitasking more (Poposki & 
Oswald, 2010). For example, participants who prefer to do more tasks at once 
reported that doing so would be challenging, that they were simply comfortable 
doing more tasks at once, or that working on fewer tasks would be boring (Poposki 
& Oswald, 2010). Highly polychronic people might also derive more personal 
fulfillment out of jobs requiring higher levels of multitasking and would be more 
satisfied with the job. Since powerless individuals are more likely to multitask by 
default, then they may enjoy multitasking more than powerful individuals and find 
these jobs more rewarding as a whole. Therefore restricting employees to working 
on tasks in a sequential manner may decrease job satisfaction and increase the 
likelihood of quitting. Instead, giving employees some discretion and choice in 
setting strategies to achieve multiple goals can positively benefit goal acceptance, 
performance, and goal satisfaction (Earley & Kanfer, 1985). It might also be 
beneficial to assign simple (vs. difficult and demanding) tasks that require 
multitasking to employees, as powerless individuals do not underperform on simple 
tasks (Experiments 4 and 5) and may be unsatisfied with jobs that do not allow them 
to multitask. Organizations can then reserve tasks that require focused behaviors, or 
high-demanding multitasking jobs, to high-power individuals. By tailoring task 
allocation to different employees based on their hierarchical ranking allows them to 
experience greater levels of fit with their job, which increases satisfaction, 
fulfillment, motivation, and fewer likelihoods of burnouts (Mathieu, 1991). 
Therefore the current results might inform how managers should delegate tasks in 
organizations. 
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However, it may not always be possible to allocate tasks according to 
individual’s power, as multitasking ability is an increasingly sought after skill in all 
prospective employees (Appelbaum et al., 2008; González & Mark, 2005; Lindbeck 
& Snower, 2000). Personnel often work on multiple projects with time sensitive 
demands, which compel them to work on the projects simultaneously, even when 
this is not desirable. Jobs such as receptionists, administrative assistants, emergency 
room personnel, and air traffic controllers can all illustrate how the ability to 
successfully multitask is of crucial importance (e.g., Laxmisan et al., 2007; 
Loukopoulos et al., 2009). Some authors have even asserted that almost every job 
requires at least some degree of multitasking (Bühner, König, Pick, & Krumm, 
2009). Since in many work situations it is not always possible to reduce the amount 
of multitasking needed, then individuals need to be able to deal with these 
multitasking challenges that are demanded the external environment.  
The present results indicate that hierarchical positions should be taken into 
consideration when predicting multitasking ability, and that a subordinate position 
may backfire when multitasking is necessary. That is, those who are disempowered 
will not only disproportionately multitask, but the negative effects of multitasking 
will be even more detrimental for individuals who are lower in the organizational 
hierarchy. As a result, practical interventions could be provided to promote better 
performance and decrease mistakes and accidents. First, developing time 
management skills and the ability to focus and prioritize various information and 
tasks should be emphasized in personnel training, as time management training have 
been found to improve job performance for polychronics (Nonis, Teng, & Ford, 
2005) and decreased emotional exhaustion in teachers with low autonomy levels 
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(Peeters & Rutte, 2005). Thus, time management skills such as setting goals, 
prioritizing them, planning actions, and monitoring progress, may compensate for 
low levels of control and help powerless individuals to better manage their multiple 
goals. Second, the tendency for powerless individuals to multitask can be 
particularly harmful if individuals do not seem to perceive the challenges associated 
with multitasking. Hence, educating employees about the hidden costs of 
multitasking can help people choose single-tasking strategies that can boost 
efficiency, especially with complex tasks.  
The current results also suggest that multitasking ability can be altered and 
improved. If having power can decrease multitasking tendency and counteract 
underperformance, then enhancing employee’s sense of power or control could 
induce prioritization and increase performance in organizations. As shown in the 
current thesis, people do not need to possess long-term power roles in order to think 
and act like a powerful person. Instead, temporarily heightening a person’s social 
power can be sufficient in improving basic cognitive processes underlying 
multitasking ability. Power is also an embodied concept and grounded in bodily 
states, as posture expansiveness can create neuroendocrine shifts, activate a sense of 
power, and produce behavioral changes (Carney et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2011). 
Therefore exercises that encourage individuals to recall or imagine being in 
positions of power or authority, or engaging in high-power postures, may counteract 
the negative effects of powerlessness.  
Another way to increase sense of power and control is by giving employees 
choice (see Chua & Iyengar, 2006), as choosing can increase feelings of self-
efficacy (i.e., perceived self-control) and facilitates performance (Rokke, Fleming-
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Ficek, Siemens, & Hegstad, 2004). Importantly, the benefits of choice were partially 
mediated by thoughts of personal control. For example, past studies showed that 
choice over treatment alternatives improves treatment effectiveness by enhancing 
personal control (Geers et al., 2013). This assumption is further supported by 
findings from (Inesi et al., 2011) demonstrating that restoring individual control 
when being powerless, for instance by providing individuals with high choice, 
compensates for the effects of low power. Therefore in order to prevent low 
performance, it might be crucial for organizations to render employees a certain 
amount of freedom and autonomy in their work environment, such as having 
opportunities to determine work procedures and outcomes. Organizations can also 
encourage certain types of behaviors by the structures that they create. Less salient 
hierarchical structures may be important in restoring the sense of control of those in 
low power positions and promote performance among employees who will 
otherwise feel powerless.   
Lastly, high power was found to increase secondary goal engagement 
compared to low-power individuals. This could be because powerholders focus on 
the bigger picture and think more abstractly (Smith & Trope, 2006; Weick & 
Guinote, 2010). That is, they are driven by goals and values rather than by small 
details, and may therefore overlook goal feasibility (Weick & Guinote, 2010). 
Focusing on more abstract information, such as distant future plans compared with 
near future plans, increases desirability of activities rather than attention to time 
constraints (Liberman & Trope, 1998). This may put powerful individuals at a risk 
for over-commitment as they are less likely to consider time constraints when 
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deciding whether or not to take on yet another task. Promoting more concrete 
representations of goals may prevent over-commitment of powerful individuals.  
In sum, research in this area can emphasize the important role that power 
plays in determining multitasking ability and in how individuals choose between 
various strategies when faced with multiple goals and provide some interesting 
implications for daily life and for organizations. These include the type of training 
that could be provided, how task can be allocated among employees, and the 
importance of maintaining a sense of power and control. As we are better at 
understanding and predicting how power affects cognition and behavior, we will be 
more effective at creating procedures that mitigates the undesirable effects of 
powerlessness.   
5.4 Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions 
5.4.1 Confounds of Power 
The current thesis attempted to measure potential confounding factors of 
power and multitasking. Although the causal role of motivation and ability to 
prioritize (vs. to treat all information as equally important) and to process 
information more selectively (vs. more broadly) in multitasking behavior was 
emphasized, but other factors could also be attributed to the effects of power on 
multitasking ability. For example, some may suggest that powerless individuals 
switch more than powerful individuals because of demand characteristics. In 
addition, mood (e.g., negative affect and anxiety), task interest, and motivation have 
all been shown to affect multitasking behavior and performance (Carver, 2003; 
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Derakshan et al., 2009; Rokke et al., 2002). The roles of these factors were therefore 
examined throughout the experiments in order to rule out alternative explanations.  
First, asking participants to answer at least one question from each task 
might have created the impression that the experimenter wanted them to switch. 
This could have generated more demand characteristics in powerless compared to 
control and powerful individuals, because low-power participants might want to 
conform to experimenter’s expectations more than high-power participants 
(Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003; Cast, 2003; Galinsky et al., 2008; Guinote et al., 
2002). For example, those who have power are more able to “be themselves” 
whereas those without power try to accommodate social norms (Anderson & 
Berdahl, 2002; Chen et al., 2001; Keltner et al., 2003). Although this is probable, but 
explicitly instructed and emphasized that participants can work on the tasks in 
whichever manner and order that they prefer. In addition, findings from other 
experiments which measured self-reported preferences to multitask as well as 
scheduling daily and weekly plans (Experiments 1-4) all indicate that switching in 
powerless participants is not a result of conforming to experimenter’s expectations. 
Second, mood was a possible confound as having or lacking power may alter 
the amount of positive and negative affect experienced (Keltner et al., 2003). 
However, mood was an unlikely mediator of the effects between power and 
multitasking behavior as positive mood that is usually associated with powerfulness 
actually broadens attentional focus and encourages creative and divergent thinking 
as well as switches between tasks (Carver, 2003). Similarly, negative emotions 
associated with powerlessness, such as anxiety, often narrows attention to process 
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information selectively (Isen, 2000). Moreover, in all of the experiments, power 
manipulations did not affect reported mood (Experiments 2-9).  
In addition, the effects of powerlessness on decreased multitasking ability 
(especially task-switching) could be a byproduct of negative affect and anxiety. For 
example, positive emotions were found to increase whereas negative emotions 
decrease effort in focal goal pursuit (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Ilies & Judge, 2005). 
Moreover, processing inefficiency in high anxious individuals is often related to 
deficiencies of attentional control mechanisms (Bishop, 2009), which is similar to 
the effects of powerlessness. Anxious and depressive moods also increase 
ruminative and distractive thoughts, which can consume WM resources required for 
successful multitasking performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Phillips, Bull, 
Adams, & Fraser, 2002). However, there were no differences in self-reported mood, 
anxiety, arousal, and rumination between powerful and powerless participants 
(Experiments 8 and 9). These results suggest that the effects of power on 
multitasking behavior and performance were not driven by differences in affective 
states elicited by priming power. 
A third factor that may affect multitasking tendency is increased interest and 
stimulation afforded by multiple task engagement. Past studies found that 
participants who indicated that they would like to perform multiple tasks 
simultaneously reported that doing so would be more challenging and interesting 
(Poposki & Oswald, 2010). Also, impulsive individuals and sensation seekers are 
more apt to multitasking as they are more susceptible to boredom (König et al., 
2010; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2013). Therefore individuals may take on several tasks for 
the sheer enjoyment of it, even if it may be distracting and detrimental to overall 
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productivity and performance. However, no difference was found between powerful 
and powerless participants in perceived task interest and the flow of time 
(Experiments 4 and 5), which can be an indication of how boring or engaging 
participants were on the tasks (Sackett, Meyvis, Nelson, Converse, & Sackett, 
2010). In addition, past studies have consistently found powerfulness to be 
associated with disinhibition and risk-taking behaviors (Anderson & Galinsky, 
2006) which should promoted multitasking instead of single-tasking behaviors. 
Therefore even though impulsivity and preferences for challenging situations were 
not measured directly, but these are unlikely mechanism for why powerless 
individuals engage in more multitasking activities than powerful individuals.  
Fourthly, past studies have reported a positive correlation between 
motivation and multitasking tendency, where polychrons attempt to put in more 
effort in order to take care of the many different tasks at hand (Zhang et al., 2005). It 
is therefore possible that powerless participants might have put more effort in, as 
they did not avoid the difficult tasks in Experiment 5. However, there was no 
difference in overall performance between the three groups (Experiments 4 and 5), 
and all participants reported the same amount of effort and attention devoted to the 
tasks. Moreover, Experiment 6 showed that power does not decrease overall 
motivation, as powerful participants were more willing to pursue additional goals. 
This is in line with previous research suggesting that individuals exposed to high, 
instead of low, power are motivated and exert more effort (DeWall et al., 2011). 
Hence, at the very least, differences in multitasking behavior are unlikely to be 
attributed to conscious reports in motivation. 
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Lastly, motivation and effort may also be potential mediators for 
multitasking ability, as motivation could affect resource allocation and resource 
availability (Humphreys & Revelle, 1984). For example, motivational factors can 
contribute to a considerable variance in WM performance (Norman & Shallice, 
2000; Pochon et al., 2002) and the negative effects of high trait anxiety had on 
performance only occurred when motivation was low, but were eliminated when 
motivation was high (Hayes, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2009). As a consequence, 
effort could have been attributed to the results of multitasking ability, where 
powerlessness decreased the amount of effort required for high performance quality 
during demanding multitasking situations. In addition, in Experiment 6, there was a 
main effect of power for ERs even under undemanding single-tasking conditions, 
which suggests that powerless individuals may have put in less effort in general 
compared to control and powerful participants. However, if powerless participants 
put in less effort, then they should have responded faster, in addition to making more 
errors, compared to control and powerful participants, in an attempt to finish the 
tasks quickly. This speed-accuracy trade-off in performance was not observed, and 
powerless participants even responded slower than control and powerful participants 
(Experiment 7). Having both slower RTs and higher ERs supports the idea that 
power has a detrimental effect on resource allocation ability, which cannot be 
explained by a mere lack of motivation. This is in line with previous findings that 
low-power, control, and high-power participants all reported putting similar effort 
into executive functions tasks (Smith et al., 2008).  
However, one cannot completely rule out the role of effort in explaining the 
results, and it is possible that powerlessness may have decreased both the ability as 
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well as the willingness to perform well in demanding multitasking situations. 
Furthermore, increases in motivation and power might actually make more resources 
available by producing a higher level of arousal (Kahneman, 1973). Although no 
effect of power was found on self-report arousal levels (Experiment 9), future 
studies could employ physiological measures, such as increased pupil dilation, in 
order to obtain a valid, objective measure of mental effort  (Hess & Polt, 1964; Hess, 
1965; Kahneman & Wright, 1971; Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray, & Pless, 2004). 
Introducing physiological measurements of effort would be valuable as it is not 
always clear where capacity limits come from. Nevertheless, the current studies 
suggest that power is a fundamental psychological phenomenon that has its own 
unique and basic effects on multiple-goal pursuit that are independent of mood, 
interest, and, to some extent, motivation.  
5.4.2 Directionality of the Effects of Power 
An additional strength of the current thesis is that all studies contained a 
control condition, so that it was possible to investigate whether the effects were 
triggered more by powerlessness, powerfulness, or both. This is important because 
studies including control conditions in the power literature are scarce, and have also 
yielded inconsistent findings. For example, some studies have shown strong 
behavioral effects in individuals primed with high power or assigned to high-power 
roles, in comparison to a control group (e.g., DeWall et al., 2011; Galinsky et al., 
2003; Guinote, 2007c; Keltner et al., 2003; Schmid Mast et al., 2009), while others 
have reported stronger effects in participants with low power (e.g., Smith et al., 
2008; Willis, Guinote, & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010), with only a few studies finding 
both effects (Smith & Trope, 2006).  
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By including control conditions, the current thesis showed, at least in terms 
of attention and prioritization, a general negative effect of manipulated power on 
multitasking tendency and task prioritization (Experiments 3-6) where powerless 
participants were more likely to multitask and prioritize, followed by control 
participants, and with powerful participants least likely to multitask and prioritize. 
Moreover, self-reported sense of power also had a negative correlation with 
multitasking tendency (Experiment 1). Although the downside of using self-reports 
is that it does not demonstrate cause and effect, but together with the results from 
other experimental studies it can provide support for the claim that power causes a 
continuously increasing tendency to single-task, and vice versa with low power.  
It should also be noted that Experiment 2 found an asymmetrical effect of 
power, where powerless participants did not make more switches compared to 
control participants. This inconsistent finding might be due to the difficulty of 
generating an adequate neutral control condition in the first place, that are of similar 
extremity to the low- and high-power conditions (Smith & Trope, 2006) and do not 
trigger some insecurity of powerlessness (DeWall et al., 2011). As a consequence, 
the control condition used in Experiment 3 might not have been viewed as 
completely neutral. Participants were asked to write a day as an independent worker 
in an organization, but this may have induced some feelings of powerlessness in 
terms of receiving salaries and bonuses. Therefore the fact that control participants 
did not fall in between powerless and powerful participants in this particular 
experiment could have been attributed to an ineffective control manipulation. 
Unfortunately, no power manipulation check was given to the control condition to 
verify this claim.  
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Unlike the general effect of power and the propensity to multitask, the 
effects of power on multitasking ability were driven my lacking power as only 
powerlessness showed a clear disadvantage in multitasking ability (Experiments 7, 
8, and 10). Powerless individuals experience challenges and constraints that seem to 
decrease their cognitive resources and impede efficient goal pursuit (see Keltner et 
al., 2003), whereas experiencing high social power may not increase WM resources 
above the baseline capacity. Given that multitasking ability and WM capacity were 
only affected by powerlessness, then the present findings suggest that WM can be 
more easily exhausted (vs. enhanced) by situational factors.  
These findings are consistent with prior work showing that the effects of 
power on executive functions are more pronounced for powerless than powerful 
individuals (Smith et al., 2008), but are inconsistent with other studies showing how 
powerlessness does not affect executive functions such as inhibition during a 
dichotic listening task (DeWall et al., 2011). Again, the method used to manipulate 
high and low power could have contributed to the asymmetrical effect of power on 
multitasking ability. For example, out of all the studies looking at the relationship 
between power and attentional control, only the one by DeWall et al. (2001) used a 
role assignment, instead of priming, for the power manipulation. Using role 
assignments might reflect a tendency for some people to resist powerlessness. That 
is, when participants believe they should have had power but feel that they do not, 
then they may resist this lack of power and attempt to restore their authority 
(Bugental & Happaney, 2000). Since individuals generally desire control, then they 
might misperceive reality in order to maintain the illusion that they have power 
(Langer, 1975). To explore this possibility, future research should include measures 
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of individual’s willingness to be in superordinate or subordinate roles, as well as 
participant’s need for power. 
In addition, previous (Smith et al., 2008) and present experiments 
(Experiments 7 and 8) that only found how powerless (but not powerful) participants 
differed from the control condition have all primed power by asking participants to 
write about their actual experience of having or lacking power. This experimentally 
controlled methodology was used extensively in the power literature to show how 
priming the mere concept of social power can activate behavioral tendencies and 
concepts associated with power and can result in similar effects as the actual 
possession (or lack) of power (Galinsky et al., 2003). However, the asymmetrical 
results found may reflect the differential experience of low- and high-power roles by 
undergraduate participants who may have encountered more low-power situations 
(e.g., following the rules from parents or school authorities), and less experience 
with equally extreme high-power roles. Therefore this particular power prime with 
student populations might have yielded a much stronger and more effective prime of 
low rather than high power. By including control conditions, the current thesis was 
able to better understand the effects of power and any methodological limitations 
than can be accounted for and explored in future research. It also suggests that the 
directionality of power depends on the concept being tested, such as whether it is 
looking at behavioral strategy or ability.  
5.4.3 Power Manipulation 
An additional issue to consider is the generalizability and applicability of the 
power manipulations and the multitasking paradigms to real-life situations. 
  
252 
 
Experiential priming of power are common methods used in social psychology, but 
there is a gap between the actual experience of power and a retrospective essay 
about a power-related incident. Second, it is tempting to think of powerholders as 
unconstrained and free (Keltner et al., 2003), but in organizational contexts, the 
expectations and responsibilities associated with high-power roles can also constrain 
them (Hamilton & Biggart, 1985). For example, leaders must ensure high 
productivity by instigating a cooperative relationship with those below them and the 
approval of those above. Though powerholders may have considerable freedom in 
terms of how they accomplish their tasks, but they may also have multiple concerns 
and accountabilities, and powerful individuals have more people competing for their 
attention than individuals at the bottom of the hierarchy (Fiske, 1993). Therefore 
experimental manipulations of power fail to take into account that power in real life 
is often possessed for a longer period of time, implies social interactions with those 
low in power, and have different levels or responsibility and perceived legitimacy. 
Consequently, the current thesis may be limited by the fact that such a vast and 
complex construct as power is limited only to the context of manipulated power, 
where inexperienced individuals are given high or low power only for a short period 
of time. 
Despite these limitations, the present studies constitute a strong and valid test 
of the hypotheses. First, the current studies were able to isolate and attribute the 
effects of power to the ability to control resources and evaluations, and not to the 
effects of other covariates of power such as dominance, status, or other factors that 
can co-occur in more natural settings. Second, although experiments relied largely 
on data from undergraduate students who have little prior experience with social 
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power, the design created relative differences in power, which are sufficient to test 
the hypotheses.  
Third, the current thesis employed various operationalizations of power to 
show that the effect of power is consistent across different situations. These include 
assignment to different power roles (Experiment 5), activation of the power mindset 
through priming (Experiments 2-4 and 6-9), measuring individual differences in 
sense of power (Experiment 1), which represents one’s real-life power standings 
(Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012), as well as using natural samples of 
powerholders (Experiment 10). Recruiting real-life managers and subordinates can 
address the issue of external validity. Nevertheless, external validity and 
generalizability should be obtained by replicating the present results with different 
populations.  
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that social power is not a static 
concept and cannot be analyzed in isolation as it interacts with contextual factors 
such as culture and individual difference variables to produce more complex 
outcomes (Chen et al., 2001). Therefore an important area for future research in the 
power literature is to consider the different types of power that exist in real-world 
situations. Three particular issues should warrant future consideration. These include 
legitimacy, responsibility, desire for power, and differentiation between personal 
and social power.  
First, in the current studies, most powerholders felt, either subjectively or 
objectively, that they deserve to be in that position and that their power is secure and 
stable. For example, in Experiment 5, the power manipulation was carefully 
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designed to not undermine legitimacy of powerful positions by making participants 
believe that their role assignment was based on actual leadership and creativity 
skills. However, the consequences of power depend, to a great extent, on the 
legitimacy that people make of their power relationships. Studies showed that 
leaders tend to be more efficient when they perceive their power as legitimate (e.g., 
French & Raven, 1959; Pfeffer, 1993; Yukl, 1989). When power relationships are 
perceived as illegitimate, unjust, or undeserved, then these results change 
considerably and the benefits of high (compared to low) power may decrease (e.g., 
Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008; Rodriguez-Bailon & Moya, 2002; 
Rodríguez-Bailón, Moya, & Yzerbyt, 2006; Sligte, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2011). For 
example, illegitimately powerless individuals exhibited the same attentional control 
as legitimately powerful individuals (Willis et al., 2010). This may be due to the fact 
that the perception of illegitimacy implies a threat to the stability of power 
hierarchies (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). By focusing on potential gains, 
illegitimately powerless individuals may therefore have a higher sense of control 
similar to those experienced by powerful individuals (Langens, 2007). On the other 
hand, illegitimate powerholders may focus more on possible losses and experience a 
decreased sense of control (Langens, 2007).  
Second, in the real world, power is often related to responsibility and 
accountability. When powerholders were primed with a sense of responsibility, then 
they started to increase attention to more attributes and became less focused on the 
most accessible or stereotype-consistent information (Goodwin & Fiske, 1993). 
Therefore the stability and legitimacy of power relationships, as well as 
responsibility, can make powerholders more sensitive to the actions and intentions 
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of others and the environment, and disrupt the relationship between high-power and 
attentional focus. As a consequence, individuals who possesses power and is 
unlikely to lose it should be more likely to single-task than someone who possesses 
power, but who could lose it at any moment. These possibilities have not yet been 
explored empirically.  
Third, power is manipulated in the current thesis as direct outcome control 
where powerholders can determine resource allocation or evaluate performance 
(e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007a). However, there are individuals (e.g., 
those with low levels of testosterone) who avoid such high-ranking positions 
(Josephs, Sellers, Newman, & Mehta, 2006). Previous studies showed that when 
individuals who were low in testosterone were put in a high-power position, then 
they exhibited greater emotional and physiological arousal, increased attention to 
social rank, and decreased performance on cognitive tasks (Josephs et al., 2006). 
Hence the effects of power on the powerholder may differ for those who are driven 
to achieve high social rank and those who prefer low-power positions. Individuals 
low in dominance may not necessarily experience the type of constraint- and threat-
free environment that is currently depicted for all powerholders in the literature.  
Lastly, it should also be noted that social power can, and often is, 
confounded by personal power. Although related, these two types of power are 
conceptually different and may elicit different, even opposite, effects on the 
individual (Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2009). Social power is the ability to 
influence and control others and it gives one the ability to do and get what one wants 
without external constraints. However, the ability to ignore the influence of others, 
and thus be less dependent and more free to make one’s own decisions, is known as 
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personal power (van Dijke & Poppe, 2006). These subtle differences are important 
as people usually prefer to increase personal power (i.e., independence from others) 
but have no special desire for social power (i.e., control over others; van Dijke & 
Poppe, 2006) 
More importantly, Lammers et al. (2009) demonstrated that these two types 
of power are inversely associated with independence and interdependence, and can 
thus have opposing effects, depending on the type of behavior examined. For 
example, social power and personal power have opposite effects on stereotyping but 
similar effects on behavioral approaches. That is, people primed with personal 
power increased stereotypic thoughts (rated an ambiguously female target in more 
stereotypical terms for women) compared to those primed with social power 
(Lammers et al., 2009). These distinctions suggest that personal power decreases 
motivation to perceive others accurately and to spend effort on attending to multiple 
information, and increase reliance on automatic cognition such as stereotypes (Fiske, 
1993; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). Although in the present thesis power was defined 
and manipulated as social instead of personal power, but the effects on multitasking 
tendency and ability may rely more on the amount of personal (vs. social) power 
that individuals derive from having control over another individual. That is, personal 
power may be driving the effects on multitasking tendency and ability as it is 
associated more with independence and freedom from constraints. On the other 
hand, social power is more related to interdependence and responsibility, and may 
actually increase the feeling of constraints and accountability that decreases 
attentional focus (Lammers et al., 2009). This hypothesis should be acknowledged 
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and investigated in future studies by comparing the effects of personal power on 
multitasking to those of social power. 
5.4.4 Multitasking Paradigm 
Another potential limitation can be directed towards the paradigms used to 
measure multitasking behavior and ability. It could be disputed that the dual-tasking 
and task-switching paradigms do not predict real world multitasking ability 
(Burgess, 2000; Chaytor, Schmitter-Edgecombe, & Burr, 2006; Lamberts, Evans, & 
Spikman, 2010). However, these paradigms have been employed extensively in 
cognitive research, and have been proposed to share similar underlying processes 
and cognitive requirements that individuals face in everyday multitasking situations. 
For example, dual-task paradigms have been widely used in human performance 
studies to investigate the ability of human operators to cope with high work load 
situations (Gopher & Donchin, 1986). In addition, Experiment 10 attempted to 
account for ecological validity by measuring participant’s ability to deal with real-
life multitasking situations.  
Therefore it is possible that a different pattern might emerge with different 
multitasking paradigms, and it remains for future research to determine if the current 
findings generalize to other measures of multitasking ability. For example, 
extending the current work by using more realistic dual-tasking simulations, such as 
driving whilst holding a conversation, could be beneficial. In addition, real-life 
multitasking is highly dependent on prospective memory, which involves 
remembering to carry out an intended action in response to predetermined cues 
while performing another task (Burgess, Veitch, de Lacy Costello, & Shallice, 
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2000). Failures on the prospective memory task occur when participants do not shift 
attention to the task when cued. Since powerlessness decreases the goal-directed 
attentional system and task-switching abilities, then it could also impair prospective 
memory performance. Instead of looking at only the ability to rapidly change focus 
between two tasks within a few seconds interval, future experiments could test task-
switching impairment in more ecologically valid conditions that require the use of 
prospective memory.  
Moreover, real-life tasks are dynamic and differ in terms of priority, difficulty, 
and the length of time they will occupy. Experiments 3 and 5 did attempt to take into 
account these factors by looking at the effects of task orientation and task difficulty 
on switching behaviors, but the studies so far did not consider switching and 
interruptions between tasks that have continuity. Thus future experiments could 
investigate whether powerless individuals switch between tasks that can yield 
cumulative performance outcomes (e.g., finding as many words from a single 
puzzle) instead of using tasks that are self-contained and require participants to start 
a new question every time they switch.   
In addition, the relationship between power and multitasking behavior was 
tested using paradigms where multitasking does not affect (or can slightly harm) 
performance (Experiments 4 and 5). Focusing on the negative effects of multitasking 
may lead one to believe that the strategies adopted by powerful individuals are more 
adaptive. However, multitasking is not always detrimental, as certain amount of 
cognitive disengagement from a goal may be beneficial. For example, multitasking 
may lead to psychological benefits such as increased excitement and interest 
(Delbridge, 2001). In one study, it was found that faculty members who worked on 
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several projects at one time (typical behaviors of polychrons) had higher quantitative 
and qualitative productivity than faculty members who worked on only one project 
at a time before starting the next project (typical behavior of monochrons; Taylor, 
Locke, Lee, & Gist, 1984). This illustrates how switching to another goal is 
necessary for individuals to achieve a better balance between their various pursuits, 
and help people notice deficiencies and avoid larger problems later on. Furthermore, 
switching between different goals may foster creativity (Madjar & Shalley, 2008), as 
switching away from a task allows time for the unconscious to solve creativity 
problems (Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995; Dijksterhuis, 2004). Multitasking 
opportunities may therefore enhance creativity and contribute to an organization’s 
innovation.  
Thus, in some situations, the effects of high power on multitasking behavior 
may need to reverse in order to prove effective and promote subsequent goal 
attainment. It is unclear whether social power can promote such adaptation, where 
powerful individuals will strategically switch from single-tasking to multitasking 
behavior in order to reach their goals.  Based on past research suggesting that 
powerholders adapt their behavior and the strategies more effectively to situational 
demands than the powerless (e.g., Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Guinote, 2007a; Guinote et 
al., 2012; Karremans & Smith, 2010; Overbeck & Park, 2001), then it may be 
assumed that social power promotes multitasking only when it is functional. 
However, due to the their tendency to focus attention on a single construct, it is also 
possible that powerful participants might be so fixated on only one of the goals and 
fail to concentrated on another task. Future research should address these questions 
empirically and should also investigate the net effect of multitasking on powerless 
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individuals’ wellbeing and performance in situations where multitasking is 
beneficial.  
It should also be noted that the effect of power on multitasking tendency and 
multitasking ability were examined separately in the present thesis. It is therefore 
possible that although powerless participants tend to multitask, but they may only do 
so in situations with relatively simple tasks where switching does not interfere with 
performance (Experiments 4 and 5). However, when multitasking becomes difficult 
and demanding (Experiments 7-9), then this tendency may disappear. Moreover, 
impairment in multitasking ability may only occur when powerless individuals are 
forced to switch, but are less pronounced in discretionary switching situations where 
participants can switch when they want to or when they feel ready. This is indeed 
probable as (Goonetilleke & Luximon 2010) found that polychrons performed better 
than monochrons when participants had the discretion to choose how to approach 
the tasks, even when they switched more between the tasks. It is therefore important 
for future studies to measure behavior and performance in a single paradigm.    
Another issue that may affect multitasking ability in real-world situations is 
the effect of practice on performance. For example, recent studies have found how 
extensive cognitive training may improve multitasking ability, with benefits 
extending to untrained cognitive control abilities (e.g., enhanced sustained attention 
and WM; Anguera et al., 2013). This is because practice shifts the controlled or 
effortful processing into more automatic processing where less attentional resources 
are required and the task becomes less demanding (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). 
However, evidence on whether more multitasking leads to better cognitive abilities 
associated with multitasking is mixed (Alzahabi & Becker, 2013; Ophir et al., 2009). 
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For example, researchers suggest that multitasking practice is only beneficial for 
performance when goals have well-structured components that can be automatized 
and routinized, and not when tasks require novel responses, constant monitoring, 
and are mutually interfering (Ball et al., 2002; Dux et al., 2009; Mackay-Brandt, 
2011; Willis et al., 2006). Nevertheless, it is important to consider the fact that if 
powerless individuals engage more in multitasking, then they may have more 
experience with dual-tasking and task-switching situations. This could, in the long-
run, offset the detrimental effect of powerlessness on multitasking ability in 
situations where performance can be improved over time through practice. Whether 
power affects multitasking ability on highly practiced tasks remains to be shown. 
In sum, the major strengths of the current thesis were measuring various 
confounds of power, establishing the directionality of the effects, and increasing 
reliability and validity of the results by applying a diversity of power manipulations 
and methods to measure multitasking tendency and ability. These methodological 
considerations strengthened the inferences made by ruling out alternative 
explanations and established a causal link between power and multitasking. 
However, the effect of social power on multitasking may underlie certain limitations 
that depend on the situation. Therefore an important question to address in the future 
is when will the effect of power on multitasking be exaggerated and when will they 
be mitigated. Potential factors that could be investigated include features of the 
power relation (e.g., the stability of one’s power position), potential benefits of 
multitasking, and the effects of practice.  
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5.5 Conclusions 
Social power is an omnipresent feature of our social relations and can 
fundamentally alter the way people feel, think, and act. The present theses 
demonstrated, for the first time, that social power can impact how people approach 
multiple goals and how capable they are of multitasking. First it showed a general 
relationship between power and the strategies that people use when pursuing 
multiple goals, with reduced power instilling higher multitasking intention and 
behavior, and high power encouraging single-tasking and prioritization. Moreover, 
these studies illustrate that focusing on a single task does not indicate that powerful 
individuals have lower aspirations and want to pursue fewer goals than powerless 
individuals. Instead, it is merely how individuals balance between various goals (i.e., 
the strategy of approach) that is different between powerful and powerless 
participants. Second, powerlessness was found to decrease multitasking ability by 
reducing the amount of WM capacity needed for executive control, which includes 
coordination, manipulation, and storage of information. Together, the current thesis 
demonstrated an ironic effect of power: the less power individuals have, the more 
they engage in multitasking behavior but the less able they are to multitask. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Power manipulation used in Experiment 2 
 
 
This study focuses on organizational roles. Your task is to read information about 
the role of a person in a given organizational context, and imagine yourself in that 
role. You will then be asked to describe what a typical day in your life would be if 
you would be in that particular role.  
 
Please imagine yourself in this role and describe in detail what a typical day in your 
life would be, what you would do, how you would feel, and what you would think. 
You can describe the whole day from morning to the evening. There are no right or 
wrong answers, we are simply interested in people’s roles in everyday life. Please 
use the space below to describe your day, and imagine yourself in this role as vividly 
as possible. 
 
Control Condition 
 
Please imagine you work in an organization with a team of 20 people. The 
organization promotes various products to the public, and your role is to complete 
tasks, and help implement marketing initiatives that are a priority for the firm. You 
keep records and prepare paperwork for ongoing projects and new clients, and you 
work largely independently on the tasks that were assigned to you. You receive a 
basic pay and a project-based bonus, and therefore can decide on the total salary and 
workload.  
 
Powerful Condition 
 
Managing Director in a Marketing Organization. 
 
The managing director in this marketing organization has 20 employees working 
under him/her. The organization promotes various products to the public, and the 
role of the director is to distribute the work that subordinates must complete, set 
priorities for the team, approve project proposals, and accept or decline new 
clients. The managing director knows the work well and makes all decisions within 
the company. He/she manages a large amount of money, sets priorities and 
determines the salary and the workload of the employees.   
 
Powerless Condition 
 
Employee in a Marketing Organization. 
The employee in this marketing organization works in a team of 20 people. The 
organization promotes various products to the public, and the role of the employee is 
to complete any task that the manager assigns to him/her, and to follow 
instructions regarding priorities in this marketing organization. The employee must 
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also keep records and prepare paperwork for projects and new clients that were 
approved by the manager. The employee knows the work well and strictly follows 
the procedures and priorities set by the manager. His or her salary and workload are 
determined by the manager. 
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Appendix 2: Instructions for Experiment 2 
This experiment is interested in how well people plan future events.  
Please imagine that you don’t need to go to lectures/work for two weeks, but you 
need to hand in two 1000 words essays at the end of the two weeks (Essay 1 and 
Essay 2). Both essays will be due on the same day. We would like you to plan how 
you will work on the two essays. Please consider the following steps:  
1.) When will you start thinking about the essay  
2.) When will you pick the essay topic 
3.) When will you start researching and reading for your essay (and where will 
you go to do that, e.g., library, computer rooms, etc.) and when will you stop 
researching and reading. 
4.) When will you start brainstorming your ideas and when will you finish 
brainstorming  
5.)  When will you start outlining your essays and when will you finish outlining 
the essay 
6.) When will you start writing the introduction and when you will finish the 
introduction  
7.) When will you start writing the next few paragraphs of the essays, and when 
will you finish writing these paragraphs (please state how many paragraphs 
are you planning to write and when you will start/finish writing them).  
8.) When will you start writing the conclusion and when will you finish the 
conclusion  
9.) When will you finish the essay as a whole  
10.) When will you re-read and edit the essays and when will you finish 
re-reading and editing  
11.) When will you start writing the references/bibliography and when 
will you finish the reference/bibliography?  
12.) When will you submit the final essay 
 
Please consider these 12 steps regarding both Essay 1 and Essay 2. That is, if 
you say “reading for the essay”, please indicate whether you are reading for 
“Essay 1” or “Essay 2”, or “Essay 1 and 2”. For all activities, please indicate its 
length/duration.  
You do not have to plan your essay in the particular order given nor do you need to 
complete each of the steps sequentially. Just imagine how you would like to plan 
your time.  
Although you won’t need to go to lectures/work during these 2 weeks, but please 
plan other activities that you may pursue in a normal 2 week period. Some examples 
include: 
1.) Socializing  
2.) Hobbies (e.g., reading, drawing, etc.) 
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3.) Cooking/eating  
4.) Exercising  
5.) Leisure (e.g., Watching TV/movies) 
6.) Other (sleeping, checking e-mails, cleaning) 
 
Please try your best to plan your days as precisely and accurately as possible, while 
taking into consideration that you will need to submit two essays by the end of the 
two weeks.  
 
  
  
331 
 
Appendix 3: Power manipulation used in Experiments 3-4 and 6-9 
 
 
Control Condition 
 
We would like you to write a narrative essay about the last time you went to the 
supermarket. Please recall the last time you went to the supermarket. Please describe 
your experiences in the supermarket - what did you buy, what you did, and how you 
felt. It is important that you imagine your day as vividly as possible. This study is 
completely anonymous and confidential, and there is no right or wrong answers. 
Please use the space below to describe the last time you went to the supermarket. 
 
Powerful Condition 
 
This study focuses on people’s recollections of personal versus factual events. You 
have been allocated to the ‘personal events’ scenario, and hence we would like you 
to write a narrative essay about a particular incident in your life. Please recall a 
particular incident in which you had power over another individual or individuals. 
By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of another person 
or persons to get something they (or you) wanted, or were in a position to evaluate 
those individuals. Please describe this situation in which you had power—what 
happened, how you felt, etc. 
 
It is important that you imagine this situation as vividly as possible. This study is 
completely anonymous and confidential, and there are no right or wrong answers. 
You can write whatever incident comes to your mind that made you feel really 
powerful – no matter how others would feel or think about this incident. Please use 
the space below to describe the incident.  
 
Powerless Condition 
 
This study focuses on people’s recollections of personal versus factual events. You 
have been allocated to the ‘personal events’ scenario, and hence we would like you 
to write a narrative essay about a particular incident in your life. Please recall a 
particular incident in which someone else had power over you. By power, we mean 
a situation in which someone had control over your ability to get something you (or 
they) wanted, or was in a position to evaluate you. Please describe this situation in 
which you did not have power—what happened, how you felt, etc.  
 
It is important that you imagine this situation as vividly as possible. This study is 
completely anonymous and confidential, and there are no right or wrong answers. 
You can write whatever incident comes to your mind that made you feel really 
powerless – no matter how others would feel or think about this incident. Please use 
the space below to describe the incident. 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire used in Experiment 3 
This study concerns decision-making and planning. You will be given a few scenarios to 
read and then a few questions to answer.  
 
Please carefully read the following description and answer the follow-up questions. 
 
Imagine that you work at an organization and you begin your workday by inspecting the 
production line. As you inspected the line, someone asks you to explain the company’s 
retirement policy. Would you prefer to (A) ask him/her to make an appointment and see you 
about that later, (B) ask him/her to walk with you while you inspect the line so that you can 
explain the policy at the same time, or (C) stop your inspection for the moment in order to 
explain the policy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
definitely          definitely    definitely 
 A    B     C 
         
 
You then returned to your inspection and received a call on your mobile phone. The call was 
from one of the company’s sales representatives, who is asking about a product 
manufactured in your unit. Would you prefer to (A) ask the representative to make an 
appointment to discuss the matter later, （B） provide the information as you continue your 
inspection of the production line, or (C) stop your inspection of the of the line in order to 
provide the information to the representative.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
definitely          definitely    definitely 
 A    B           C 
 
You then continued your inspection, when you noticed a machine had been left running, 
which created an extremely dangerous safety hazard. Would you prefer to (A) stop your 
inspection to turn off the machine or (B) wait until you have finished your inspection?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
definitely               definitely 
 A                 B  
 
After you finished your inspection, you examined your to-do list and found that it contained 
three projects: (1) developing a new company website; (2) preparing an oral presentation for 
next week; and (3) writing a request for new machines and equipment. 
 
You will not have time to finish everything in one day, as each project requires 4 hours to 
complete and you only have 8 more hours of work left. Please think about how you would 
like to schedule your time around these 3 projects. In the space below, write out a realistic 
plan for the day (e.g., take into account breaks and lunchtimes) based on your personal 
preferences.  
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10:00 – 10:30 
 
10:30 – 11:00 
 
11:00 – 11:30 
 
11:30 – 12:00 
 
12:00 – 12:30 
 
12:30 – 13:00 
 
13:00 – 13:30 
 
13:30 – 14:00 
 
14:00 – 14:30 
 
14:30 – 15:00 
 
15:00 – 15:30 
 
15:30 – 16:00 
 
16:00 – 16:30 
 
16:30 – 17:00 
 
17:00 – 17:30 
 
17:30 – 18:00 
 
 
Which of the following strategies would you prefer to undertake when faced with 
the 3 projects? 
 
Strategy A: You would choose one of the projects and work on it first, neither working on 
nor thinking about the other 2 projects. You prefer to complete at least one of the projects 
and leave the other 2 projects untouched until you have finished the first one.  
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Strategy B: You would develop ideas for other projects while you work on one of them, 
therefore frequently switching back and forth among the projects. You prefer to make 
significant progress on several of the projects even though you might need more work on all 
of them the next day.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
definitely               definitely 
 A                 B  
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Question #: 1 
Appendix 5: Example instructions for Experiments 4 and 5 
This study focuses on problem solving. You will be presented with questions from 3 
different tasks. Each correct answer to a question will be worth one point. Your goal is to 
attain as many points as possible in a given amount of time. You will be given 3 different 
tasks to perform, which are judged, (on average) of equal difficulties by most people. 
However, the questions within each task can vary in their respective difficulties.  
 
Below are the instructions and examples of each of the tasks:  
 
Arithmetic task: 
 
You will receive simple additions and subtractions, and your task is to calculate the answers 
by hand and write it down.  
 
Example: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geometric shapes task: 
 
For this task, you will see a few geometric figures. Your task is to roughly copy the outlines 
of these geometric figures.  
 
 
Example: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture naming task: 
 
You will receive pictures of everyday objects, and your task is to write down what the 
object is on the back of the card. 
 
 
Example:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question #: 1   
   68 
-  13 
Question #: 1 
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Please take note of the following rules: 
 
 You can work on the 3 tasks in any order that you prefer and return to each of the 
tasks as often as you like.  
 Within the allocated period of time, you must attempt part of all the 3 tasks.  
 You can only move on to the next question once you have answered the previous 
one (if you don’t know the answer to a question within a given task, then you can 
make a guess).  
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Appendix 6: Power manipulation used in Experiment 5 
Participants in the control condition were told the following: 
You will be building something called a Tanagram from a set of Legos. There will 
be 2-3 participants in this room working on the same task, but you will each have 
your own part to work on. So although you will all be building the Tanagram, you 
will be working independently with your own set of Legos. You will be paid a fixed 
amount of £3 for your participation. 
 
Participants in the power conditions were told the following:  
In order to simulate real-world organizational settings, we will assign you to 
different roles. People have one of two interpersonal styles: some people have the 
style of a manager; these people are good at telling others what to do. Other people 
have more the style of a subordinate. These people can easily work on tasks and 
follow instructions. You will be working in small groups of 2-3, with one participant 
being the manager and the rest subordinates. We will assign you to different roles 
according to how you scored on the on-line questionnaire.  
Powerful Condition 
As a manager, you are in charge of directing the subordinates across the hall in 
building something called a Tanagram from a set of Legos. You will decide on how 
to structure the process for building the Tanagram and the standards by which the 
work is to be evaluated. In addition, you will also evaluate the builders at the end of 
the session in a private questionnaire—that is, the builders will never see your 
evaluation. These evaluations will help determine how much bonus money 
subordinates will earn (up to an extra £3). As a manager you will automatically 
receive a bonus of £3. The builders will not have the opportunity to evaluate you. 
Thus, as a manager, you be in charge of directing the building, evaluating your 
subordinates, and determining the rewards your subordinates will receive.  
Powerless Condition 
As a builder, you will have the responsibility of carrying out the task of building a 
Tanagram according to the instructions given to you by your manager. Your 
manager will call you in to give you instructions when ready. Your manager will 
decide how to structure the process for building the Tanagram and the standards by 
which the work is to be evaluated. Which tasks you complete will be decided by the 
manager. In addition, you will be evaluated by the manager at the end of the session. 
This evaluation will be private; that is, you will not see your manager’s evaluation 
of you. These evaluations will help determine how much bonus money (up to £3) 
you will receive. You will not have an opportunity to evaluate your manager. Only 
the manager will be in charge of directing production, evaluating your performance, 
and determining the rewards you will receive.  
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Appendix 7: Scenario used in Experiment 6 
For the second experiment, you will read a scenario and then answer a few 
questions related to the excerpt. Please imagine that you are the character in 
the story and answer the questions based on what you would do if you were in 
this situation: 
 
Imagine that, given your running talent, you are part of the University’s track and 
field team and will compete in the 100-m sprint. You have been training hard for 
this year’s competitive season which is due to start in two weeks, because you are 
eager to win a race. In fact, you have been spending all your free time training which 
adds up to 18 hours per week. On your way home, you keep thinking about your 
goals and aspirations. Your mind shifts between thoughts about your chances of 
winning the 100-m sprint and thoughts about how good it would be to find a way to 
earn extra money. Later that day, you get a call from the Modern Art Museum 
offering you a part-time job as a museum tour guide. These positions do not open 
often and are highly sought after. You would like to accept this job because of your 
goal to earn extra money. Besides, you have been interested in modern art for many 
years now. The tour guide job is, for now, on a trial basis. The decision of whether 
or not to hire you permanently as a part-time tour guide will be based on the quality 
of your work on visitors’ satisfaction. Given your previous experience, you expect to 
be a good tour guide, if you try your best. The job is due to start in 3 days, and you 
may choose to work between 6 to 18 hours each week. At the back of your mind, 
you are thinking that accepting this job would mean training less hours per week. 
The museum needs an answer today, and you promise that you will call back soon. 
You only have a few minutes to think about this, and then make a decision.  
 
 
